The Relations between Diffuse and Performance-Specific Trust with Reform: A Research Report
العلاقة بين الثقة السائدة والخاصة بالأداء مع الاصلاح: تقرير بحثي

Introduction

The Middle East and North Africa region boasts populations whose pride in their nations remains at a high level. The region also enjoys a youth cohort with tremendous energy, entrepreneurship, and endurance, which otherwise is unfortunately and mistakenly labeled as “the youth bulge”. Such a cohort has worked tirelessly to improve their livelihoods and the conditions of their respective countries, whether in the form of collective activism or individual work. In this report, we sought to explore the relations between nationalism or national pride and youth’s tendency to admit to the existence of an issue and in turn, reform or change. 

مقدمة

تشهد منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بنسب عالية من القومية والانتماء للوطن، كما تتمتع المنطقة أيضًا بفئة شبابية ذات طاقة هائلة وفكر ريادي ومثابرة، وإن كان ذلك، لسوء الحظ، يشار إليه بشكل سلبي. ولكن الحقيقة أن الشباب عمل بلا كلل لتحسين سبل معيشهم وظروف بلدانهم، سواء على شكل نشاط جماعي أو عمل فردي. وسعينا في هذا التقرير إلى استكشاف العلاقات بين القومية أو الانتماء للوطن وميول الشباب في الحديث عن القضايا التي تواجه بلدانهم، بما في ذلك الإصلاح أو التغيير.

Methodology

For this research, we examined data gathered by the World Values Survey, the Arab Barometer, the Afro Barometer, and the Arab Center. The data examined reflects a youth cohort of the individual countries, aged 18-30, as part of nationally representative samples. In examining the data, we further curated them on a scale of 1 to 4, whereby 1 was the lowest and 4 was the highest on the scale:

·      1 = do not trust at all/ no confidence at all;

·      2 = do not trust to an extent/ low level of confidence;

·      3 = trust to an extent/ moderate level of confidence;

·      4 = trust to a great extent/ very high level of confidence 

Public confidence or trust was defined as inclusive of two types. The first type delved into people’s attachment to country symbols as the level of belonging to their individual states, which can be labeled as diffuse support. The second type reflects public trust or confidence in the performance of public institutions in meeting their objectives. 

In order to further prove, disprove, or refine the hypotheses made in this report, an in-depth research with more detailed and specific questions and to cross-examine such data to better understand how youth’s willingness to acknowledge the existence of issues and need for change varies with the level of their national pride. Such a research can also be accompanied by an observatory study of engaging youth of different nationalities in discussion with one another and contrasting their attitudes when discussion groups feature different nationalities, which arguably can stimulate nationalism. Nevertheless, this report looks to start a discussion on this matter and engage with young people in the region in a conversation about reform. 

المنهجية

قمنا بجمع بيانات من مصادر مفتوحة مثل "مسح القيم العالمي"، و "الباروميتر العربي"، و " الباروميتر الافريقي"، والمركز العربي. وتمثل البيانات التي تم دراستها آراء الشباب في المنطقة، والذين تتراوح أعمارهم بين 18 و30 عامًا، حيث يمثلونا جزءا من عينات تمثيلية على المستوى الوطني. وعند دراسة البيانات، قمنا بتحليلها على مقياس من 1 إلى 4، حيث كان 1 هو الأدنى و4 كان الأعلى على المقياس، وذلك على النحو الآتي:

·      1 = لا أثق على الاطلاق؛

·      2 = لا أثق إلى حد ما/ مستوى منخفض من الثقة؛

·      3 = أثق إلى حد ما/ مستوى معتدل من الثقة؛

·      4 = أثق إلى حد كبير/ مستوى عال جدا من الثقة

تم تعريف الثقة أو الثقة العامة على أنها شاملة لنوعين. يتعمق النوع الأول في ارتباط الناس برموز الدولة كمستوى الانتماء إلى بلدانهم، ويشار إلى هذا النوع على أنه "الثقة السائدة". أما النوع الثاني، فيعكس ثقة الأشخاص في أداء المؤسسات العامة في تحقيق أهدافها.

لإثبات الفرضيات الواردة في هذا التقرير أو تفنيدها أو تعديلها، يجب إجراء بحث متعمق مع أسئلة أكثر تفصيلاً وتحديدًا وذلك لفحص هذه البيانات للوصول إلى فهم أفضل فيما يتعلق بكيفية مناقشة الشباب للمشكلات في بلدانهم وعلاقة ذلك مع توجهاتهم فيما يتعلق بالإصلاح ليتم تحليل ذلك من منظور مستوى القومية أو الانتماء الوطني لديهم. ويمكن أن يكون مثل هذا البحث مصحوبًا بدراسة رصد بمشاركة الشباب من جنسيات مختلفة في المناقشة مع بعضهم البعض ومقارنة توجهاتهم في مجموعات متجانسة مع مجموعات تشمل جنسيات أخرى، الأمر الذي قد يحفز مستويات القومية والانتماء الوطني لديهم. وإلى ذلك، يتطلع هذا التقرير إلى بدء مناقشة حول هذه المسألة والانخراط مع الشباب في المنطقة في نقاش حول الإصلاح.

Diffuse Trust and Performance-Specific Confidence

Looking at individual countries’ youth populations’ trust levels revealed interesting findings. The individual scores of diffused trust and performance-specific confidence were aggregated under composite scores for each category. The first category included indicators such as national pride level, trust in the armed forces, affinity with the nation, and willingness to fight for country, among others. The second category included an evaluation of the performance of the governments, the legislative councils, the judiciary, the healthcare system, the educational system, among others. 

With that, Algerian youth illustrated a diffuse trust/ national pride level of 3.19 out of 4, compared to only 1.82 level of performance-specific confidence, with a 1.37 difference in favor of the first. Bahrain’s youth national pride level was a little lower with 2.90, about 0.65 higher than its confidence in public institutions with 2.25. As for Egypt, a 3.50 national pride level, compared to 1.92 confidence level in public institutions, which stood 1.58 points below the first. Iranian youth showed similar pride levels to Egypt, but indicated slightly higher public confidence with 2.4, about 1 point lower than its pride levels. Iraqi youth’s pride levels stood at 3.38, almost double its 1.66 confidence in public institutions. Jordanian youth’s diffuse trust was the second highest in the region with 3.75, contrasted by a 2.08 confidence level. 

As for Kuwaiti youth, their diffuse trust stood at 3.28, compared to their 2.18 performance-specific trust. Lebanese youth’s pride level with slightly higher than Kuwait’s with 3.35, but it was lower in terms of specific trust with 1.88, with a 1.47 difference between the two categories. 

Libyan and Mauritanian youth scored very similar diffuse trust levels with 3.24 and 3.29, respectively, compared to a 1.72 and 1.96 performance-specific confidence levels, with Mauritanian youth illustrating some moderate levels of confidence, especially in terms of civil service. Moroccan and Mauritanian youth boasted identical levels of diffuse trust with 3.32, but Oman’s public confidence in the performance of institution higher than Morocco’s with 2.67 compared to 1.69 for the later, mostly due to Omani youth’s satisfaction with its healthcare services. Data for Palestinian youth was harder to find, given their circumstances. Their diffuse trust stood at 2.92, as the second lowest in the region, while their performance-specific confidence appeared exactly in the middle of the scale with 2. Qatari youth indicated the highest levels of confidence in both categories with 3.87 diffused trust and 3.55 for the second category, due to their high satisfaction with civil service, judiciary, and even the government. 

Saudi Arabian youth showed similar patterns to that of Qatar, with a 3.69 diffused trust level, compared to a 3.03 performance specific trust. It is also worth noting that such a number might have been higher if it were not for moderate confidence in labor unions. Sudanese youth’s diffuse trust stood at 3.06, contrasted with a 2.01 performance-specific trust levels, as its government, elections, political parties, and parliament all evaluated under 2 points. Similar to Palestine, data for Syria was somewhat difficult to gather, so we relied on slightly older data. Nevertheless, Syrian youth indicated a diffuse trust level of 2.88, compared to a 1.55 performance-specific confidence, which was the lowest among the countries studied, with a notable 0.93 confidence level in civil services. 

Tunisian youth illustrated a high diffuse trust level with 3.46, about 1.75 points higher than their performance specific confidence, which stood at 1.75. Turkish youth indicated one of the highest diffuse trust levels with 3.23, compared to their 2.55 trust level in their public institutions, with a notable high confidence levels in the judiciary. Youth of the UAE’s diffuse trust stood at 3.64 was the fourth highest, below Qatar, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and their performance-specific confidence was the second highest with 3.35, second only to Qatar’s 3.55. Finally, Yemeni youth illustrated high levels of diffuse trust with 3.46, similar to that of Saudi Arabia, compared to its performance specific confidence level of 2.24. 

الثقة السائدة والثقة الخاصة بالأداء

كشفت دراسة مستويات ثقة الشباب في المنطقة عن نتائج مثيرة للاهتمام. حيث تم تجميع الدرجات الفردية للثقة السائدة والثقة الخاصة بالأداء وحساب معدلهم ضمن الدرجات المركبة لكل فئة. فتضمنت الفئة الأولى مؤشرات مثل مستوى الاعتزاز بالوطن، والثقة في القوات المسلحة، والانتماء للوطن، والهوية الوطنية، ومدى القابلية للدفاع عن الوطن، من بين أمور أخرى. أما الفئة الثانية فقد تضمنت تقييم أداء الحكومات والمجالس التشريعية والقضاء ومؤسسات الرعاية الصحية والنظام التعليمي وغيرها.

بالنظر إلى النتائج، بلغ مستوى الثقة السائدة أو مستوى الانتماء لدى الشباب الجزائري 3.19 من 4، مقارنة بمعدل الثقة الخاصة بالأداء والذي بلغ 1.82، أي 1.37 نقطة أقل من الفئة الأولى. وكان مستوى الفخر الوطني للشباب في البحرين أقل قليلاً حيث بلغ 2.90، وكان أعلى بنحو 0.65 نقطة من ثقتهم في المؤسسات العامة والتي بلغت 2.25. أما بالنسبة لمصر، فقد بلغ مستوى الانماء للوطن 3.50، مقابل 1.92 فيما يتعلق بالثقة بالمؤسسات العامة، والتي استقرت 1.58 نقطة دون الفئة الأولى. وأشار الشباب الإيراني إلى مستويات انتماء مماثلة لمصر، لكنهم أشاروا إلى نسب أعلى فيما يتعلق بالثقة بالمؤسسات العامة والتي بلغت 2.4، أي أقل بمقدار نقطة واحدة من مستويات الانتماء لديهم. واستقرت مستويات الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب العراقي عند 3.38، أي ضعف ثقتهم بالمؤسسات العامة والتي بلغت 1.66. وكانت الثقة السائدة للشباب الأردني ثاني أعلى مستوى في المنطقة حيث بلغت 3.75 مقارنة بمستوى ثقة بلغ 2.08 نقطة في المؤسسات العامة. 

أما بالنسبة للشباب الكويتي، فقد بلغت ثقتهم السائدة 3.28 مقارنة بثقتهم الخاصة بالأداء البالغة 2.18. وأما بالنسبة للشباب اللبناني، فكان معدل الثقة السائدة لديهم أعلى بقليل من الكويت بـ 3.35، لكنه كان أقل من حيث الثقة الخاصة بالأداء والذي بلغ 1.88، وبفارق 1.47 نقطة من أصل 4 نقاط بين الفئتين.

سجل الشباب الليبي والموريتاني مستويات ثقة سائدة متشابهة جدًا بلغت 3.24 و3.29 على التوالي، مقارنة بمستويات الثقة الخاصة بالأداء والتي بلغت على التوالي 1.72 و1.96، حيث قيم الشباب الموريتاني أداء بعض المؤسسات بشكل معتدل، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بالخدمة المدنية. وبلغت مستويات الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب المغربي والموريتاني 3.32 نقطة من أصل 4 نقاط، ولكن ثقة الشباب العماني في أداء المؤسسات كان أعلى من الشباب المغربي بـ 2.67 نقطة مقارنة بـ 1.69 نقطة، ويرجع ذلك في الغالب إلى رضا الشباب العماني عن خدمات الرعاية الصحية. وكان من الصعب العثور على بيانات خاصة بالشباب الفلسطيني، وذلك بالنظر إلى ظروفهم، ولكن أشارت البيانات التي وجدناها إلى معدل ثقة سائدة بلغ 2.92 نقطة، كثاني أدنى مستوى في المنطقة، في حين بلغت ثقتهم الخاصة بأداء المؤسسات العامة في منتصف المقياس بالضبط. وفيما يتعلق بالشباب القطري، كانت مستويات الثقة لديهم أعلى من باقي الدول، وفي كلا الفئتين، وذلك ب 3.87 نقطة فيما يتعلق بالثقة السائدة و3.55 نقطة للثقة الخاصة بأداء المؤسسات العامة، حيث أشاروا إلى رضا كبير عن الخدمة المدنية والقضاء وحتى الحكومة.

وكانت مستويات الثقة لدى الشباب السعودي مشابهة لتلك الموجودة في قطر، حيث بلغ مستوى الثقة السائدة لديهم 3.69 نقطة، مقارنة بمعدل ثقة خاصة بأداء المؤسسات العامة بلغ 3.03 نقطة. وتجدر الإشارة أيضًا إلى أن هذا المعدل كان من الممكن أن يكون أعلى لولا مستوى الثقة المنخفضة نسبيا في النقابات العمالية. وبلغت مستوى الانتماء الوطني أو الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب السوداني 3.06 نقطة، مقارنة بمستويات الثقة الخاصة بالأداء 2.01 نقطة، حيث تم تقييم الحكومة والانتخابات والأحزاب السياسية والبرلمان تحت نقطتين من أصل أربع. وعلى غرار فلسطين، كان من الصعب إلى حد ما جمع البيانات الخاصة بسوريا، لذلك اعتمدنا على بيانات أقدم قليلاً. ومع ذلك، أشار الشباب السوري إلى مستوى ثقة سائدة بلغت 2.88 نقطة، مقارنة مع مستوى ثقة خاص بالأداء يبلغ 1.55 نقطة، والذي كان الأدنى بين البلدان التي شملتها الدراسة، مع مستوى ثقة منخفض جدا بنسبة 0.93 في الخدمات المدنية.

وكان معدل الانتماء الوطني أو الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب التونسي مرتفعًا وذلك بمعدل 3.46 نقطة، أي حوالي 1.75 نقطة أعلى من الثقة الخاصة بالأداء، والتي بلغت 1.75 من أصل أربع نقاط. وكانت معدلات الانتماء أو الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب التركي 3.23 نقطة، مقارنة بمستوى ثقة بلغ 2.55 نقطة في أداء مؤسساتهم العامة، وإن كانت معدلات الثقة في القضاء عالية نسبيا. وبلغ معدل الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب الإماراتي 3.64 نقطة في المرتبة الرابعة، بعد قطر والأردن والسعودية، وجاء معدل ثقتهم في الأداء في المرتبة الثانية حيث بلغت 3.35 نقطة، بعد قطر 3.55. وأخيرًا، بلغ معدل الثقة السائدة لدى الشباب اليمني 3.46 نقطة، على غرار السعودية، بينما بلغ معدل الثقة الخاصة بأداء المؤسسات 2.24 نقطة من أصل 4 نقاط. 

Looking at the overall average of the two categories, we find that the average diffuse trust levels stood at 3.34 out of 4, which means it was between “trust to an extent” and “trust to a great extent”. On the other hand, the average performance-specific confidence levels stood at 2.20 out of 4, which was between “trust to an extent” and “do not trust to an extent”. While the average performance-specific confidence was somewhat higher than initially anticipated, it was still 1.14 below that of diffuse trust. Further, such high levels of national pride or diffuse trust should not stand in the way of demanding better and higher quality performance from public institutions. 

Sub-regionally, North African youth’s average diffuse trust stood at 3.29, compared to an average of 1.83 performance-specific trust. West Asian youth’s average diffuse trust was also 3.29 while their average performance specific confidence stood at 2.02, slightly higher than that of North Africa. Youth of the Gulf averaged the highest diffuse trust level with 3.45 as well as the highest performance-specific confidence level with 2.75. 

بالنظر إلى المتوسط العام للفئتين، وجدنا أن متوسط مستويات الثقة السائدة بلغ 3.34 نقطة من 4، مما يعني أنه وقع ما بين "أثق إلى حد ما" و"أثق إلى حد كبير". وعلى الجانب الآخر، بلغ متوسط مستويات الثقة الخاصة بأداء المؤسسات العامة 2.20 نقطة من 4، أي كانت ما بين "أثق إلى حد ما" و "لا أثق إلى حد ما". وفي حين كان متوسط الثقة الخاصة بالأداء أعلى إلى حد ما مما كان متوقعًا في البداية، إلا أنه لا يزال أقل من مستوى الثقة السائدة بمقدار 1.14 نقطة. وعلاوة على ذلك، يجب ألا تقف هذه المستويات العالية من الثقة السائدة أو الانتماء الوطني في طريق المطالبة بأداء أفضل وأعلى جودة من المؤسسات العامة.

وعلى المستوى دون الإقليمي، بلغ متوسط الثقة السائدة لشباب شمال إفريقيا 3.29 نقطة، مقارنة بمعدل ثقة خاصة بأداء المؤسسات العامة بلغ 1.83 نقطة. كما بلغ متوسط الثقة السائدة لشباب غرب آسيا 3.29 نقطة، بينما بلغ متوسط الثقة الخاصة بأداء مؤسساتهم الوطنية 2.02، وهو أعلى قليلاً من المعدل في شمال إفريقيا. وكان متوسط مستوى الثقة السائدة لشباب الخليج العربي أعلى مستوى للثقة السائدة في المنطقة بـ3.45 نقطة بالإضافة إلى أعلى مستوى ثقة خاصة بأداء المؤسسات العامة والذي بلغ 2.75 نقطة.

North Africa Sub-Region

Looking more specifically at the individual component scores for each country, we provide the highest and lowest trust/confidence levels for each country, divided by subregions. For North Africa, Egyptian youth noted the highest individual diffuse trust level, in the form of a 3.80 national affinity level, followed by Libya’s 3.72 national affinity level, and Tunisia’s national affinity with 3.61. Morocco and Algeria followed with 3.54 and 3.46, respectively, both for “national pride”. Mauritanian youth’s highest component was a 3.29 confidence level in the military. Finally, Sudanese youth’s highest component was a 3.17 national affinity level. 

On the other hand, Algerian youth noted the lowest component, which was in the form of a 0.90 confidence level in elections. This was mirrored in low turnout and boycott calls. Egyptian and Mauritanian youth underscored the second lowest component, as Egyptian youth noted a 0.92 confidence level in labor unions and Mauritanian youth illustrated another 0.92 confidence level in healthcare services. Moroccan youth also had little confidence in elections with 1.19 confidence level, as Tunisian youth’s lowest trust component was a 1.20 confidence level in political parties, and Libyan and Sudanese youth illustrated similar disenchantment with elections with a 1.25 and 1.53 confidence levels. 

National affinity and national pride were among the highest scoring indicators in this sub-region, yet the lowest scoring indicators were ultimately mostly institutions of democracy such as elections, labor unions, and political parties. 

منطقة شمال إفريقيا

بالنظر بشكل أكثر تحديدًا إلى المؤشرات الفردية لكل بلد، خصصنا القسم التالي لأعلى وأدنى مستويات الثقة لكل بلد، مقسومة على المناطق الفرعية. وبالنسبة لشمال إفريقيا، كان الانتماء للوطن هو أعلى مؤشر لشباب المصري فيما يتعلق بفئة الثقة السائدة، حيث بلغ 3.80 نقط، يليه مستوى الانتماء الوطني لدى الشباب الليبي ب 3.72 نقطة، والانتماء الوطني لدى الشباب التونسي بـ 3.61 نقطة. يليها المغرب والجزائر بـ 3.54 و3.46 نقطة على التوالي، ل"الاعتزاز بالوطن". وكان أعلى مؤشر لدى الشباب الموريتاني هو 3.29 نقطة وكان لصالح مستوى الثقة في الجيش. وأخيرًا، كان أعلى مؤشر للشباب السوداني هو 3.17 نقطة وكان على شكل الانتماء للوطن.

وعلى الجانب الآخر، كان مستوى ثقة الشباب الجزائري بالانتخابات هو أقل مؤشر ب 0.90 نقطة، وقد انعكس ذلك فعلا في ضعف الإقبال على الانتخابات الأخيرة بالإضافة إلى دعوات لمقاطعة الانتخابات. وكان ثاني أقل مؤشر من نصيب كل من لشباب المصري والموريتاني، حيث بلغ مستوى ثقة الشباب المصري في النقابات العمالية 0.92، وهو نفس مستوى ثقة الشباب الموريتاني في خدمات الرعاية الصحية. كما لم يكن لدى الشباب المغربي ثقة كبيرة في الانتخابات والتي بلغ مستوى الثقة بها 1.19 نقطة، وكان أدنى مستوى ثقة للشباب التونسي هو 1.20 وكان من نصيب الثقة في الأحزاب السياسية، وأظهر الشباب الليبي والسوداني خيبة أمل في الانتخابات بمستويات ثقة بلغت 1.25 و1.53 نقطة على التوالي.

وعليه، فقد كان الانتماء للوطن والاعتزاز بها من بين أعلى المؤشرات في هذه المنطقة، بينما كانت المؤشرات المنخفضة بالغالب لمصلحة مؤسسات ديمقراطية مثل الانتخابات والنقابات العمالية والأحزاب السياسية.

West Asia Sub-Region

As for West Asia, Jordanian youth’s highest component came in the form of a 3.85 national affinity level, followed by a 3.69 and 3.6 for Lebanese and Iranian youth, in the same category. Palestinian youth’s highest individual indicator was a 3.58 national pride level, followed by a 3.56 national affinity level for Iraqi youth. Turkish youth’s highest individual component was a 3.36 national pride level, as Syria’s highest individual indicator came in the form of a 2.88 confidence level in the military, albeit data on Syria is slightly older than the other countries. 

Syrian youth indicated the lowest confidence level in this sub-region, with a 0.93 confidence level in civil service, followed by 1.20 and 1.24 confidence level in political parties for each of Jordan and Iraq, respectively. Palestinian youth’s lowest individual indicator was a 1.31 confidence level in elections while Lebanese youth’s lowest indicator came in the form of a 1.35 confidence in healthcare services, also cited as the lowest by Iranian youth, with a 1.84 confidence level. Turkish youth’s lowest single indicator was a 2.27 confidence level in labor unions. 

Similar to North Africa sub-region, the highest scoring indicators were mostly national affinity and national pride, whereas the lowest scoring indicators were split between institutions of democracy and those of public services. 

منطقة غرب آسيا

أما بالنسبة لغرب آسيا، فقد كان أعلى مؤشر للشباب الأردني ب 3.85 للانتماء للوطن، يليه 3.69 و3.6 للشباب اللبنانيين والإيرانيين، في نفس المؤشر. وكان أعلى مؤشر فردي للشباب الفلسطيني هو الاعتزاز بالوطن ب3.58 نقطة، يليه معدل الانتماء للوطن لدى الشباب العراقي والذي بلغ 3.56 نقطة. وكان أعلى مؤشر فردي للشباب التركي هو 3.36 للاعتزاز بالوطن. وكان أعلى مؤشر فردي في سوريا على شكل مستوى ثقة في الجيش بلغ 2.88، وإن كانت البيانات المتعلقة بسوريا أقدم قليلاً من البلدان الأخر كما آنفنا سابقا.

وكان أدنى معدل ثقة لدى الشباب السوري، بمستوى ثقة بلف 0.93 في الخدمة المدنية، يليه مستوى ثقة 1.20 و1.24 نقطة في الأحزاب السياسية لكل من الأردن والعراق على التوالي. وكان أدنى مؤشر فردي للشباب الفلسطيني هو 1.31 نقطة كمستوى ثقة في الانتخابات، بينما بلغ أدنى مؤشر ثقة للشباب اللبناني 1.35 نقطة في خدمات الرعاية الصحية، والتي كانت أيضا أدنى مؤشر لدى الشباب الإيراني بمستوى ثقة بلغ 1.84 وكان أدنى مؤشر ثقة للشباب التركي هو 2.27 نقطة وكانت للنقابات العمالية.

على غرار لشمال إفريقيا، كانت أعلى مؤشرات الثقة في الغالب من نصيب الانتماء للوطن والاعتزاز به، في حين كانت المؤشرات الأدنى لمؤسسات ديمقراطية ومؤسسات الخدمات العامة.

The Gulf Sub-Region

Individual indicators for the Gulf sub-region were on average higher than those of the other two sub-regions. Qatari youth’s highest individual indicator was 3.97 national pride level, the highest single indicator across all countries. Yemeni youth also boasted a high level of national pride with 3.81, followed by 3.76 and 3.64 confidence level in the military for Saudi Arabian and Emirati youth. Kuwait youth’s highest indicator was a 3.59 national pride level, followed by 3.32 confidence level for the military for Omani youth, and finally a 3.24 national pride level for Bahraini youth. 

On the other hand, Yemeni youth’s lowest single indicator was a 0.94 confidence level in labor unions, which was also the lowest single indicator for both of Kuwait and Bahrain with a 1 and 1.94 confidence levels, respectively. Omani youth’s lowest single indicator came in the form a 2.04 confidence level in the educational system. Saudi youth’s lowest indicator was a 2.40 confidence level in labor unions. As for Emirati youth, the lowest indicator was still a relatively high level of confidence (3.00) in the judicial system, as Qatari youth’s lowest indicator was also a high level of confidence (3.18) in the educational system. 

In short, the Gulf sub-region’s highest levels were divided between national pride and confidence in the military while their lowest scoring indicators were labor unions, followed by educational systems. 

منطقة الخليج العربي

كانت المؤشرات الفردية لمنطقة الخليج العربية أعلى في المتوسط في كل من المنطقتين الأخرى. حيث كان الاعتزاز بالوطن هو أعلى مؤشر فردي للشباب القطري ب3.97 نقطة، وهو أعلى مؤشر في جميع البلدان. وكان الاعزاز بالوطن أعلى مؤشر في اليمن أيضا وبلغ 3.81 نقطة، يليه مستوى الثقة بالجيش في كل من السعودية والإمارات ب 3.76 و 3.64 نقطة، على التوالي. وكان أعلى مؤشر لشباب الكويت هو الاعتزاز بالوطن والذي بلغ 3.59 نقطة يليه مستوى الثقة بالجيش لدى الشباب العماني ب 3.32 نقطة، وأخيراً مستوى الاعتزاز بالوطن لدى الشباب البحريني ب3.24 نقطة.

وعلى الجانب الآخر، كان أدنى مؤشر فردي للشباب اليمني هو مستوى الثقة في النقابات العمالية ب0.94 نقطة، والذي كان أيضًا أدنى مؤشر منفرد لكل من الكويت والبحرين بمستويات ثقة 1بلغت و 1.94 نقطة، على التوالي. وكان أدنى مؤشر فردي للشباب العماني من نصيب النظام التعليمي ب2.04 نقطة. وكان أدنى مؤشر ثقة للشباب السعودي هو مستوى الثقة في النقابات العمالية ب2.40 نقطة. أما بالنسبة للشباب الإماراتي، فقد كان أدنى مؤشر هو مستوى الثقة المرتفع نسبيًا (3.00) في النظام القضائي، وكان أدنى مؤشر للشباب القطري (3.18) للنظام التعليمي، وإن كان مرتفعًا مقارنة بالدول الأخرى.

باختصار، يمكن تقسيم أعلى المستويات في منطقة الخليج بين الاعتزاز بالوطن والثقة بالجيش، في حين كانت أدنى المؤشرات من نصيب النقابات العمالية، تليها الأنظمة التعليمية.

Most Pressing Challenges

The sub-regional brief analysis shows that national pride and national affinity were the highest scoring single indicators and notably higher than youth’s confidence in public institutions. In fact, the institutions which received the lowest performance evaluation were civil service, labor unions, elections, political parties, and healthcare services. Such poor evaluation is consistent to the major challenges facing people in the MENA region. With the COVID-19 global pandemic persisting, the three main and recurring challenges can be grouped under (1) economic challenges, including unemployment, price hikes, poverty, and deteriorating livelihoods; (2) government performance in terms of weak public services including health, education, and transportation, coupled with financial and administrative corruption; and (3) security related challenges including safety and political stability. The fact that these challenges continue to linger and remain under-addressed explains the low evaluation public institutions in meeting their objectives. 

أبرز التحديات التي تواجه الشباب في المنطقة

وتبين أن الاعتزاز بالوطن والانتماء للوطن كانا أعلى مؤشرات فردية، وكانا أعلى بشكل ملحوظ من ثقة الشباب في المؤسسات العامة. في الواقع، كانت المؤسسات التي حصلت على أقل تقييم للأداء هي مؤسسات الخدمة المدنية والنقابات العمالية والانتخابات والأحزاب السياسية وخدمات الرعاية الصحية. ويتوافق هذا التقييم الضعيف مع التحديات الرئيسية التي تواجه الشباب في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. فمع استمرار انتشار جائحة فايروس كورونا، يمكن تصنيف التحديات الرئيسية الثلاثة على النحو التالي: (1) التحديات الاقتصادية، بما في ذلك البطالة وارتفاع الأسعار والفقر وتدهور سبل العيش؛ (2) أداء الحكومة من حيث ضعف الخدمات العامة بما في ذلك الصحة والتعليم والنقل، بالإضافة إلى الفساد المالي والإداري؛ و (3) التحديات المتعلقة بالأمن بما في ذلك السلامة والاستقرار السياسي. والحقيقة أن هذه التحديات لا تزال موجودة وغير معالجة وتفسر انخفاض تقييم المؤسسات العامة في تحقيق أهدافها.

Conclusion

The main take-aways of this brief report shows that young people in the MENA region boast high levels of pride in and belonging to their respective nations. But their confidence in public institutions in addressing their needs and meeting their objectives remains low, specifically, about 1.14 points out of 4, lower than their average diffuse trust levels. While the gap is clear, a tendency to overlook, downplay, deprioritize, or even ignore the challenges we face remains a trend in the region. 

In an attempt to explain this discrepancy, there are three main arguments in mainstream political literature. The first argument states that people’s national affinity or national pride would heighten when their countries are compared to others, propelling them to defend their countries’ shortcomings. The second argument entails that people’s national identity, and by proxy national pride, heightens when their countries face security-related challenges. This bears resemblance to the “security-human rights” debate, for which human rights is believed to take a backseat to safety and security. The third hypothesis indicates that governments have, in one shape or form, implanted the idea that criticizing government performance automatically means criticizing the country, and in turn reflects negatively on one’s patriotism or love for nation, and even means “defection”.

الخاتمة

الخلاصات الرئيسية لهذا التقرير الموجز تكمن في أن الشباب في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا يتباهون بمستويات عالية من الاعتزاز والانتماء لدولهم. ولكن ثقتهم في المؤسسات العامة في تلبية احتياجاتهم وتحقيق أهدافها لا تزال منخفضة، وعلى وجه التحديد، حيث جاء معدل الثقة في المؤسسات العامة حوالي 1.14 نقطة أقل من متوسط مستويات الثقة السائدة. وفي حين أن الفجوة واضحة، إلا أن هناك بعض الميل إلى التغاضي عن التحديات التي نواجهها أو التقليل من شأنها أو تقليل أولوياتها أو حتى تجاهلها. 

ولمحاولة تفسير هذا التناقض، هناك ثلاث نظريات رئيسية في الأدب السياسي السائد. تنص النظرية الأولى على أن القومية أو الاعتزاز بالوطن يتضاعف عندما تقارن الدول بين بعضها، مما يدفع مواطنيها للدفاع عن التقصير في بلدانهم. وتنص النظرية الثانية أن الهوية الوطنية للشعب - وبالاعتزاز بالوطن – تزداد عندما تواجه بلدانهم تحديات تتعلق بالأمن. وهذا يشبه النقاش حول "الأمن وحقوق الإنسان"، حيث يُعتقد أن حقوق الإنسان تتراجع إلى مكانة أقل أهمية عندما يكون الأمن هو الأولوية. وتشير النظرية الثالثة إلى أن الحكومات، بشكل ما أو آخر، قد غرست فينا فكرة أن انتقاد الأداء الحكومي يعني تلقائيًا انتقاد الدولة، وهذا بدوره ينعكس سلبًا على حب المواطن وانتمائه إلى بلده، وقد يصل حتى إلى حد "الانشقاق".

Young People in Electoral Law: The Tunisian Example

الشباب في القانون الإنتخابي: المثال التونسي

Mohamed Nakib
August 11, 2020

محمد نقيب
١١/ آب/ ٢٠٢٠

Introduction

The right to vote and the right to run for political office are among the most important political rights a citizen should enjoy to participate in political life and also to enhance the access of the public to authority, through democratic means. Tunisia is, perhaps, among the countries that have witnessed a major political transition during the last decade, where a new constitution was written for a second republic, the Constitution of January 27, 2014. Article 3 of this Constitution states “The people are sovereign and the source of authority, which is exercised through the peoples’ representatives and by referendum."

Looking at this article, we can see that the people exercise their authority, as the original sovereign, through elections and referendums, as the Tunisian Constitution stated in its Article 34 that the rights to vote and to run for office are guaranteed according to what is set by law. The Constitution has referred here to organizing the election and candidacy and laying down its regulations for the law, provided that it does not compromise the essence of these rights. Further, these regulations are put in place except for a necessity required by a civil and democratic state, with the aim of protecting the rights of others or for the requirements of public security, national security, public health, or public morals, with respect the proportionality between these regulations and their obligations, as the judicial authorities guarantee protection of rights and freedoms from any violation.

The Tunisian constitution also focused on youth, as Article 8 stipulated the following: “Youth are an active force in building the nation. The state seeks to provide the necessary conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realizing their potential, supports them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalize their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development.” Based on all of the above, the laws related to elections have paid attention to the youth component with regard to youth participation in political life through election or candidacy, and this has been applied on the ground in many electoral events during the past years, including the presidential and legislative elections in 2014, the municipal elections in 2017, and the presidential and legislative elections in 2019. We will discuss in the first part the Tunisian youth and the right to vote, then in the second part the Tunisian youth and the right to run for political office will be discussed.

مقدمة

حق الإنتخاب و حق الترشح للمناصب السياسية هي من أهم الحقوق السياسية التي يجب أن يتمتع بها المواطن للمشاركة في الحياة السياسية وأيضا النفاذ للسلطة العمومية بطرق الديمقراطية. ولعل تونس من بين البلدان التي شهدت إنتقال سياسي كبير خلال العشرية الأخيرة حيث تمت كتابة دستور جديد لجمهورية ثانية وهو دستور 27 جانفي يناير 2014 حيث جاء في الفصل 3 من هذا الدستور ما يلي: "الشعب هو صاحب السيادة و مصدر السلطات يمارسها بواسطة ممثليه المنتخبين أو عبر الإستفتاء." 

بالنظر إلى هذا الفصل، نتبين أن الشعب يمارس سلطته بإعتباره صاحب السيادة الأصلي من خلال الإنتخاب والإستفتاء كما أورد الدستور التونسي في فصله 34 أن حقوق الإنتخاب و الإقتراع والترشح مضمونة طبق ما يضبطه القانون . وقد أحال هنا الدستور تنظيم الإنتخاب و الترشح ووضع ضوابطه للقانون شرط أن لا ينال من جوهر هذه الحقوق وأن يتم وضع هذه الضوابط  إلا لضرورة تقتضيها دولة مدنية ديمقراطية وذلك بهدف حماية حقوق الغير أو لمقتضيات الأمن العام أو الدفاع الوطني أو الصحة العامة أو الأداب العامة وذلك مع إحترام التناسب بين هذه الضوابط و موجباتها كما تتكفل الهيئات القضائية بحماية الحقوق و الحريات من أي إنتهاك. 

وقد إهتم الدستورالتونسي  أيضا بالشباب فنص الفصل 8 على ما يلي: "الشباب قوة فاعلة في بناء الوطن. تحرص الدولة على توفير الظروف الكفيلة بتنمية قدرات الشباب و تفعيل طاقاته و تعمل على تحمله المسؤولية و على توسيع إسهامه في التنمية الإجتماعية و الإقتصادية و الثقافية و السياسية." وبناء على كل ما سبق فقد إهتمت القوانين المتعلقة بالإنتخابات بالعنصر الشبابي فيما يتعلق بمشاركة الشباب في الحياة السياسية عبر الإنتخاب أو الترشح وقد تم تطبيق ذلك على أرض الواقع في مناسبات إنتخابية عديدة خلال السنوات الماضية منها الإنتخابات الرئاسية والتشريعية سنة 2014 والإنتخابات البلدية سنة 2017 والإنتخابات الرئاسية والتشريعية سنة 2019. وسنتطرق في الجزء الأول إلى الشباب التونسي وحق الإنتخاب  ليتم التطرق بعد ذلك في الجزء الثاني إلى الشباب التونسي وحق الترشح للمناصب السياسية.

First:
Tunisian Youth and the Right to Vote

:أولا
الشباب التونسي و حق الإنتخاب

The right to vote is the right of every young Tunisian who completed 18 years of age on the day before an election or a referendum, as stated in Article 5 of Basic Law No. 16 of 2014 dated May 26, 2014 relating to elections and referendums: “A voter is every Tunisian who is registered in the registry of voters; they are eighteen years old on the day before the polls, enjoy civil and political rights, and are not included in any of the deprivation forms stipulated in this law.”

The registration in the electoral registry that is held by the Independent High Authority for Elections voluntarily means that the young man who has reached the age of 18 has the right to go to the nearest office that specializes in the electoral administration to register themselves in the electoral register, according to their actual residence. The state, through the independent electoral administration, encourages young people and other citizens to register and participate in elections. The voluntary registration of young person and the citizen in general, and the possibility of updating their registration according to their actual residence, is related to the ability and desire of young people to participate in political life. Tunisia has chosen voluntary registration so that the registration is not overseen by the executive authority that gives voter cards, for which it might make mistakes while distributing voter cards, thus culminating in some citizens not receiving their cards, which opens the door to distorting the electoral process and losing its credibility.

Of course, it must be mentioned that acquiring the status of a voter is not only limited to reaching the age of 18, but also that they are not fall under any of the violations that prevent them from exercising the right to vote. Here, one can see the Tunisian electoral law that highlighted these different forms of violations.

حق الإنتخاب هو حق لكل شاب تونسي بلغ من العمر 18 سنة كاملة في اليوم السابق للإقتراع حيث جاء في الفصل 5 من القانون الأساسي عدد 16 لسنة 2014 المؤرخ في 26 ماي 2014 والمتعلق بالإنتخابات و الإستفتاءات: "يعد ناخبا كل تونسيّة وتونسي مرسم في سجل الناخبين، بلغ ثماني عشرة سنة كاملة في اليوم السابق للاقتراع، ومتمتّع بحقوقه المدنيّة والسياسيّة وغير مشمول بأيّ صورة من صور الحرمان المنصوص عليها بهذا القانون."

ويكون التسجيل في السجل الإنتخابي التي تمسكه الهيئة العليا المستقلة للإنتخابات بصفة إرادية والمعنى أن الشاب الذي بلغ 18 سنة له الحق بالتوجه إلى أقرب مكتب تخصصه الإدارة الإنتخابية لتسجيل نفسه في السجل الإنتخابي وفق مقر إقامته الفعلي. وتقوم الدولة من خلال الإدارة الإنتخابية المستقلة الهيئة العليا المستقلة للإنتخابات بتشجيع الشباب وباقي المواطنين بضرورة التسجيل و المشاركة في الفعل الإنتخابي والتسجيل الإرادي للشاب وللمواطن بصفة عامة، وإمكانية تحيين تسجيله حسب مقر إقامته الفعلي يرتبط بعقلية الشباب ومدى قدرتهم ورغبتهم في المشاركة في الحياة السياسية. وقد إخترت تونس التسجيل الإرادي لكي لا يكون التسجيل متعلق بالسلطة التنفيذية التي تعطي بطاقات ناخب وهنا قد تتدخل السلطة في فرز المواطنين والشباب فتعطي بطاقة الناخب للمواطنين وتتنسى مواطنين أخرين مما يفتح الباب أمام تشويه العملية الإنتخابية وتفقد مصداقيتها.

وطبعا لا بد من أن نذكر أن أكتساب صفة الناخب لا يقتصر فقط على بلوغ سن 18 سنة بل أن لا يكون مشمولا بصورة من صور الحرمان التي تمنعه من ممارسة حق الإنتخاب وهنا يمكن الإطلاع على القانون الإنتخابي التونسي الذي أبرز هذه الصور المختلفة.

Second:
Tunisian Youth and the Right to Run for Political Offices

:ثانيا
الشباب التونسي وحق الترشح للمناصب السياسية

The Tunisian legislator, through legal system related to the new elections, has worked on caring for young people to open the way for them to participate in political life, not only through elections, but also by giving them access to power whether to the presidency of the republic, membership of the Assembly of the People’s Representatives, or membership of local councils is municipal or regional.

1. Running for the Presidency of the Republic:

The Tunisian constitution of 2014 gave the right to those who have reached at least 35 years of age to file for running for the position of President of the Republic of Tunisia, of course, with a set of conditions concerning nationality and endorsement, among others.

2. Candidacy for membership in the Tunisian Parliament:

Candidacy for membership in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People is a right for every Tunisian national, who has been a Tunisian national for at least ten years, completed 23 years of age on the day of submitting their candidacy, provided that they are not included under any form of violations, stipulated by the law. The Tunisian legislator also tried to stress more on the need to include young people in the candidate lists for the legislative elections, as Article 25 of the Tunisian Electoral Law states that every candidate list, for legislative elections in a district that has four or more seats, must include among the first four a male or female candidate who is not older than 35 years old in order to obtain the full grant of public funding for the electoral campaign. If this condition is not fulfilled, the candidate list shall be deprived of half of the total value of the public grant. This stipulation has propelled the majority of candidate lists in the legislative elections, whether party lists, coalitions, or independent, to work as much as possible to include young people in their lists, resulting in a respectable percentage of young people, males and females, in the current and the previous assembly. This has become an impetus for political parties to get youth involved in running for elections.

3. Candidacy for membership of municipal and regional councils:

Article 43 of the Tunisian Electoral Law states that every Tunisian who has voter status and at least 18 years old on the day of submitting their candidacy can run for membership in municipal and regional councils.

As stated in Article 49 tenth of the Tunisian electoral law that every list running for municipal and regional elections must be among the first three in a candidate list or a candidate whose age is not more than 35 years on the day of submitting the application for candidacy. Further, the same article states that each list submitting their candidacy must include among every six candidates consecutively in the rest of the list a male of a female candidate who is not older than 35 years on the day the candidacy application was submitted. The legislator has placed significant value on the representation of young people in municipal councils during the 2017 elections, making the parties attract more youth to integrate them into political life.

The new electoral legal system in Tunisia after the Tunisian revolution of 14 January 2011 tried to accommodate young people much as possible. It worked to put in place many mechanisms in order to encourage young people to participate in political life, whether that was through elections and choosing who represented them or by running for various political public offices within the state.

لقد عمل المشرع التونسي، في المنظومة القانونية المتعلقة بالإنتخابات الجديدة، على الإهتمام بالشباب ومحاولة لفتح المجال لهم للمشاركة في الحياة السياسية ليس فقط بالإنتخاب بل كذلك بإعطائه فرصة النفاذ للسلطة إن كانت رئاسة الجمهورية أو عضوية مجلس نواب الشعب أو عضوية المجالس المحلية بلدية أو جهوية.

1 .الترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية: 

أعطى الدستور التونسي لسنة 2014 الحق لمن بلغ 35 سنة على الأقل الحق في تقديم ملف الترشح لمنصب رئيس الجمهورية التونسية طبعا مع مجموعة من شروط تهم الجنسية والتزكية وغيرها...

2.الترشح لعضوية مجلس نواب الشعب التونسي: 

الترشح لعضوية مجلس نواب الشعب حق لكل تونسي الجنسية منذ عشر سنوات على الأقل بلغ من العمر 23 سنة كاملة يوم تقديم ترشحه شرط أن لا يكون مشمولا بأي صورة من صور الحرمان التي يضبطها القانون وهذا ماجاء في الفصل 53 من الدستور و كذلك الفصل 19 من القانون الإنتخابي التونسي كما أن المشرع التونسي حاول أن يأكد أكثر على ضرورة تشريك الشباب في القائمات المترشحة للإنتخابات التشريعية حيث جاء في الفصل 25 من القانون الإنتخابي التونسي أنه يتعين على كل قائمة مترشحة للإنتخابات التشريعية في دائرة يساوي فيها عدد المقاعد أربعة أو أكثر أن تضم من بين الأربعة الأوائل فيها مترشح أو مترشحة لا يزيد سنه عن 35 سنة وذلك من أجل الحصول على كامل منحة التمويل العمومي للحملة الإنتخابية وإذا لم يحترم هذا الشرط تحرم القائمة المترشحة من نصف القيمة الجملية للمنحة العمومية، حيث جعل هذا الفصل غالبية القائمات المترشحة في الإنتخابات التشريعية من قائمات حزبية أو إيتلافية أو مستقلة  تعمل قدر الإمكان لتشريك الشباب في قوائمها مما أدى إلى نسبة محترمة من الشباب في مجلس نواب الشعب الحالي والمجلس السابق أيضا من الجنسين وكان دافعا للأحزاب أن تقوم بتشريك شبابها في الترشح.

3.الترشح لعضوية المجالس البلدية و الجهوية: 

جاء في الفصل 43 مكرر من القانون الإنتخابي التونسي أن كل تونسي حامل صفة ناخب بالغ من العمر على الأقل 18 سنة يوم تقديم الترشح يمكن له الترشح لعضوية المجالس البلدية و الجهوية.

كما جاء في الفصل 49 عاشرا من القانون الإنتخابي التونسي  أنه يتعين على كل قائمة تترشح لخوض الإنتخابات البلدية والجهوية أن يكون من بين الثلاث الأوائل في قائمة مترشحة أو مترشح لا يزيد سنه عن 35 سنة يوم تقديم مطلب الترشح وزيادة لهذا أيضا نص نفس الفصل أنه يتعين على كل قائمة تقدم ترشحها أن تضم من بين كل ستة مترشحين تباعا في بقية القائمة مترشحة أو مترشحا لا يزيد سنة عن 35 سنة يوم تقديم مطلب الترشح.وقد أعطى المشرع لهذا الشرط قيمة كبيرة حيث تسقط القائمة التي لا تحترم هذه الشروط. مما ساهم في أن يتمثل الشباب بنسبة هامة في المجالس البلدية خلال إنتخابات 2017 وجعل الأحزاب تستقطب أكثر الشباب لإدماجهم في الحياة السياسية.

لقد حاولت المنظومة القانونية الإنتخابية الجديدة في تونس بعد الثورة التونسية 14 جانفي 2011 أن تستوعب قدر الإمكان فئة الشباب، فعملت على وضع العديد من الأليات من أجل تشجيع الشباب على المشاركة في الحياة السياسية إن كان ذلك من خلال الإنتخاب وإختيار من يمثلهم أو من خلال الترشح لمختلف المناصب العمومية السياسية داخل الدولة.

The State of Legislative Elections in the Middle East and North Africa: A Research Report

حالة الانتخابات التشريعية/ النيابية في الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا: تقرير بحثي

Analytical Framework

For this report, MENAACTION presents the findings of our most recent research project on the state of legislative elections in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. We compared the difference between voting age and candidacy age in each country in the region; we studied the variation between the national average for voter turnout in the most recent elections in each country and the voter turnout rates for youth; we outlined the percentage of women in each country’s legislative councils; and we illustrated the dates for the upcoming legislative elections in each country in the region. Before delving into the findings of the research, it is important to outline a number of important definitions. 

·      Legislative Assemblies: A branch of government that generally has the authority to make laws and keep other branches accountable. The formation and roles of a legislative assembly varies by country; whereby in many countries, members are appointed, and their roles are just a formality. It is also worth mentioning that legislative assemblies’ names vary from country to another, including the House of Representatives, People’s National Assembly, the Parliament, the House of Deputies, and the Shura Council, among others. 

·      Voting Age: The minimum age established by law that a person must attain before they become eligible to vote. The most common voting age is 18, but some countries require different ages.

·      Candidacy Age: The minimum age at which a person can legally qualify to stand or run for elections or hold certain elected offices.

·      Voter turnout: The percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election. This is calculated by dividing the number of those who cast ballots over the total number of voting-eligible population (not the total adult population).

·      Youth Voter Turnout: The percentage of youth eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election. This is calculated by dividing the number of young people under 30, who cast ballots, divided over the total number of voting-eligible population.

For this research, we relied on raw data produced by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the World Values Survey Wave 7, the Arab Barometer Wave V, and the Afro-Barometer Wave 7. 

الإطار التحليلي

يمثل التقرير التالي نتائج مشروع بحثي قمنا بتنفيذه في مين أكشن حول حالة الانتخابات التشريعية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا. فقمن بالمقارنة بين سن التصويت وسن الترشح للانتخابات التشريعية في كل بلد في المنطقة، وقمنا بدراسة التفاوت بين المعدل الوطني لإقبال الناخبين ومعدلات إقبال الناخبين للشباب في آخر انتخابات في كل بلد، وقمنا بتحديد النسبة المئوية للنساء في المجالس التشريعية لكل بلد، وقمنا بتوضيح مواعيد الانتخابات التشريعية القادمة في كل دولة في المنطقة. ولكن قبل الخوض في نتائج البحث، فيما يلي بعض المصطلحات الهامة في هذا التقرير: 

·      المجالس التشريعية: سلطة من السلطات الثلاث من نظام الحكم ويتمحور دور هذه المجالس حول سن القوانين ومساءلة السلطات الأخرى. ويختلف نظام تشكيل ونوع أدوار هذه المجالس من بلد إلى آخر، حيث قد يتم تعيين الأعضاء في بعض البلدان وعندها تكون أدوارهم شكلية. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن أسماء المجالس التشريعية تختلف من دولة لأخرى، ومن هذه المسميات: مجلس النواب، ومجلس الشعب، والبرلمان، ومجلس الشورى، وغيرها.

·      سن التصويت: الحد الأدنى للسن الذي يحدده القانون الذي يجب أن يبلغه الشخص قبل أن يصبح مؤهلاً للانتخاب. في معظم الدول، سن التصويت الأكثر شيوعًا هو 18، ولكن قوانين بعض البلدان تنص على أعمار مختلفة.

·      سن الترشيح: هو الحد الأدنى للسن القانوني الذي يتيح للشخص الترشح للانتخابات أو شغل بعض المناصب المنتخبة.

·      نسبة اقبال الناخبين: هي النسبة المئوية للناخبين الذين أدلوا بأصواتهم في الانتخابات. ويتم حساب ذلك من خلال تقسيم عدد الذين أدلوا بأصواتهم على إجمالي عدد السكان المؤهلين للانتخاب (وليس إجمالي عدد السكان البالغين). 

·      نسبة إقبال الناخبين الشباب: هي النسبة المئوية للشباب الناخبين الذين أدلوا بأصواتهم في الانتخابات. يتم حساب ذلك من خلال تقسيم عدد الشباب الذين أدلوا بأصواتهم على العدد الإجمالي للسكان المؤهلين للانتخاب.

واعتمدنا في هذا البحث على بيانات أولية تم الحصول عليها من خلال الاتحاد البرلماني الدولي، ومسح القيم العالمية – الموجة السابعة، والباروميتر العربي – الموجة الخامسة، بالإضافة إلى الموجة السابعة من الباروميتر الإفريقي. 

Voting Age vs. Candidacy Age

Looking at the difference between voting age and candidacy age, we find that 14 of 21 countries in the region adhere to universal suffrage, placing the minimum age legally required to vote at 18 calendar years, culminating into an average of 18.67 years. Additionally, 7 different countries adopted different internal laws stipulating other ages. For example, Iran chose the minimum legal age required at 15 (as the lowest minimum age required in the region); Sudan selected 17; Bahrain selected 20; Kuwait, Lebanon, and Oman require 21 years of age; and the UAE require 25 years of age as the highest minimum age required in the region. 

As for the minimum legal age required for citizens to stand for or run for legislative elections, also known as candidacy age, we found that Morocco and Tunisia stipulate the lowest age in the region with 23 years of age while Sudan has the highest candidacy age of 40. Further, 9 different countries selected 25 as the most common minimum age required to run for legislative elections. These countries are Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen. Additionally, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar require 30, as Palestine selected 28, albeit the last legislative elections they had was back in 2006. Overall, the average candidacy age in the region was found to be 27.57. 

مقارنة بين سن الانتخاب وسن الترشح

بالحديث عن التفاوت ما بين سن التصويت وسن الترشيح القانونيان، وجدنا أن 14 من أصل 21 دولة في المنطقة تعتمد القوانين أو الأعراف الدولية فيما يتعلق بالاقتراع العام الذي يعني أن الحد الأدنى للسن المطلوب قانونًا للتصويت هو 18 سنة. ووجدنا أن هناك 7 دول مختلفة تتبع قوانين داخلية مختلفة تنص على أعمار أخرى. فعلى سبيل المثال، اختارت إيران الحد الأدنى للسن القانوني المطلوب ليكون 15 سنة (وهو أقل سن أدنى مطلوب في المنطقة)؛ وفي السودان كان السن الأدنى القانوني هو 17 عاما، مقارنة ب20 في البحرين، و21 في كل من الكويت ولبنان وعمان، و25 في الإمارات العربية المتحدة، كأعلى حد أدنى للسن المطلوب في المنطقة. وبالتالي، المتوسط لسن الانتخاب في المنطقة هو 18.67 سنة. 

أما بالنسبة للحد الأدنى للسن القانوني المطلوب للمواطنين للترشح للانتخابات التشريعية - المعروف أيضًا باسم سن الترشح - فقد وجدنا أن المغرب وتونس ينصان على أدنى سن في المنطقة بـ 23 عامًا بينما السودان لديه أعلى سن ترشيح 40. واختارت 9 بلدان مختلفة 25 سنة لتكون السن الأدنى الأكثر شيوعاً في المنطقة فيما يتعلق بالترشح للانتخابات التشريعية. وهذه البلدان هي الجزائر ومصر ولبنان وليبيا وموريتانيا وسوريا وتركيا والإمارات واليمن. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تنص قوانين كل من البحرين والعراق وإيران والأردن والكويت وعمان وقطر على أن يكون السن الأدنى للمترشح للانتخابات التشريعية 30 عاما، بينما اختارت فلسطين 28 عامًا، وإن كانت آخر انتخابات تشريعية كانت قد جرت في عام 2006. وعمومًا، كان المتوسط للعمر القانوني الأدنى للترشح للانتخابات التشريعية في المنطقة 27.57 عاما. 

Voting Age vs. Candidacy Age

Voter Turnout in the Latest Legislative Elections

We, then, looked at the voter turnout rates for the most recent legislative elections in each country. As indicated earlier, voter turnout is the percentage of eligible voters who voted in an election. The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of those who voted (without any violations) over the total voting-eligible population (not to be mistaken with the total adult population). There are a number of factors we did not delve into in this research, such as voting laws, registration laws, and whether voting is compulsory or not. 

With that, we found that Turkey holds the highest voter turnout with 86.2%, recorded at the legislative elections of 2018. It is indicated that Turkey has, theoretically, compulsory voting, but it is not enforced. Palestine’s 2006 legislative elections (the most recent in Palestine) recorded a 77.7% voter turnout. Third, Yemen recorded 75% voter turnout, albeit back in 2003, which is still the most recent legislative elections in Yemen, as subsequent rounds have not seen the light since then. Qatar’s 2016 and Mauritania’s 2018 legislative elections recorded 72.5% each in voter turnout, followed by 70% for Kuwait. Bahrain recorded 67% voter turnout in their legislative elections of 2018, followed by Syria with 57.6% in 2016. It is worth mentioning that there was not sufficient, accurate, or reliable data for Syria’s elections for the People’s National Assembly held in July of 2020. Nonetheless, Lebanon’s 2018 legislative elections recorded a turnout of 49.7%, followed by Oman’s 2019 elections with 49%, Sudan’s 2015 legislative elections with 46.4%, Iraq with 44.9%, Morocco’s 2016 legislative elections with 43%, Iran’s 2020 legislative elections with a voter turnout of 42.3%, and Tunisia and Libya with 41.7% in 2019 and 2014 respectively. On that note, Libya has not yet held legislative elections since 2014. Furthermore, Jordan’s 2016 legislative elections recorded a voter turnout of 36.1%, as registration is automatic. Algeria’s 2017 legislative elections recorded 35.4%, amid boycott calls. UAE’s 2019 Federal National Council elections resulted in 34.8% in voter turnout, albeit voting for 50% of the 40-member council, as the remaining 20 members are appointed. Finally, Egypt’s 2015 House of Representatives elections yielded the lowest voter turnout in the region with 28.3%. It is also worth mentioning that members of the Shura Council in Saudi are directly appointed. 

There a number of factors impacting voter turnout. These factors include electoral competitiveness, confidence in elections, electoral laws, registration process, and the socioeconomic status of the voter. Meaning, if elections are held on a weekday, voters who are not well-off may not afford asking their employers for a day off. Additionally, voting stations may not be easily accessible to everyone. Furthermore, we found low levels of confidence in both the electoral process and in legislative councils across the MENA region, whereby 50% indicated that they did not trust their national parliaments at all, coupled with 24.9% who indicated they did not trust their national parliaments that much, compared with 37.5% and 26.8%, respectively, for elections, according to the World Values Survey. 

نسب إقبال الناخبين في آخر انتخابات تشريعية

كما أشرنا سابقًا، فإن نسبة إقبال الناخبين هي النسبة المئوية للناخبين المؤهلين الذين صوتوا في الانتخابات. ويتم حساب النسبة المئوية بقسمة عدد الذين صوتوا (بدون أي انتهاكات) على إجمالي السكان المؤهلين للانتخاب (وليس إجمالي عدد السكان البالغين). وهناك عدد من العوامل التي لم نتعمق فيها في هذا التقرير، مثل قوانين التصويت، وقوانين التسجيل، وإذا ما كان التصويت إجباريًا أم لا.

وإلى ذلك الأمر، وجدنا أعلى نسبة إقبال للناخبين في المنطقة كانت في تركيا بنسبة 86.2٪، والتي سجلت في الانتخابات التشريعية لعام 2018. والجدير بالذكر أن الانتخاب في تركيا، من الناحية النظرية على أقل تقدير، هو أمر إجباري، وإن كان تطبيق ذلك القانون مرنا لحد ما. ثانيا، سجلت الانتخابات التشريعية الفلسطينية لعام 2006 (الأخيرة في فلسطين) نسبة إقبال 77.7٪. ثالثاً، سجلت اليمن 75٪ من الإقبال على التصويت، وإن كان ذلك في عام 2003، والتي لا تزال أحدث انتخابات تشريعية في اليمن، حيث لم تنعقد أية انتخابات تشريعية في البلاد منذ ذلك الحين. وسجلت الانتخابات التشريعية القطرية لعام 2016 وموريتانيا لعام 2018 نسبة 72.5٪، تليهما الكويت بنسبة 70٪. وسجلت البحرين 67٪ من إقبال الناخبين في انتخاباتها التشريعية لعام 2018، تلتها سوريا بنسبة 57.6٪ في عام 2016. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه لم نجد بيانات كافية أو دقيقة أو موثوقة عن الانتخابات السورية لمجلس الشعب الوطني التي أجريت في تموز من عام 2020.

وسجلت الانتخابات التشريعية اللبنانية لعام 2018 نسبة إقبال بلغت 49.7٪ ، تلتها انتخابات عمان لعام 2019 بنسبة 49٪، ثم الانتخابات التشريعية السودانية لعام 2015 بنسبة 46.4٪، والعراق بنسبة 44.9٪، والانتخابات التشريعية المغربية لعام 2016 بنسبة 43٪، وبلغت نسبة إقبال الناخبين في إيران 42.3٪ في الانتخابات التشريعية لعام 2020، وسجلت الانتخابات التشريعية في كل من تونس وليبيا نسبة إقبال بلغا 41.7٪ في 2019 و2014 على التوالي. في هذا الصدد، لم تجر ليبيا حتى الآن انتخابات تشريعية منذ عام 2014. أما في الأردن، فقد سجلت الانتخابات التشريعية لعام 2016 نسبة إقبال للناخبين بلغت 36.1٪، وإن كان تسجيل الناخبين تلقائيا. وسجلت الانتخابات التشريعية الجزائرية لعام 2017 نسبة إقبال بلغت 35.4٪ وسط دعوات المقاطعة. وأسفرت انتخابات المجلس الوطني الاتحادي لدولة الإمارات لعام 2019 عن نسبة إقبال للناخبين بلغت 34.8٪، وإن كان التصويت لصالح 50٪ فقط من أعضاء المجلس البالغ عددهم 40، حيث يتم تعيين الأعضاء العشرين المتبقين. وأخيرًا، أسفرت انتخابات مجلس النواب المصري لعام 2015 عن أدنى نسبة إقبال للناخبين في المنطقة بنسبة بلغت 28.3٪. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن أعضاء مجلس الشورى في السعودية يتم تعيينهم مباشرة.

وهناك عدد من العوامل التي تؤثر على إقبال الناخبين. وتشمل هذه العوامل على التنافسية الانتخابية، والثقة في الانتخابات، والقوانين الانتخابية، وعملية التسجيل، والوضع الاجتماعي والاقتصادي للناخب. بمعنى، إذا أجريت الانتخابات في يوم من أيام الأسبوع، فقد لا يستطيع الناخبون غير ميسوري الحال أن يحصلوا على إجازة من أعمالهم للأدلاء بأصواتهم. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، قد لا يكون من السهل على الجميع الوصول إلى محطات الاقتراع. وفيما يتعلق بالثقة، وجدنا مستويات منخفضة من الثقة تجاه كل من العملية الانتخابية والمجالس التشريعية في جميع أنحاء منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، حيث أشار 50٪ إلى أنهم لا يثقون في برلماناتهم الوطنية على الإطلاق، إلى جانب 24.9٪ الذين أشاروا إلى أنهم لا يثقون في برلماناتهم الوطنية بشكل كبير، مقارنة بـ 37.5٪ ممن أشار إلى أنهم لا يثقون بالانتخابات على الإطلاق و26.8٪ ممن أشار إلى أنهم لا يثقون بالانتخابات بشكل كبير، وفقًا لمسح القيم العالمية.

Youth Voter Turnout for the Most Recent Legislative Elections

Looking more specifically at youth voter turnout for the most recent legislative elections across the region, we found that data was not easily available. Essentially, most source were abstract and did not include any figures, instead, they only indicated whether it was higher or lower than the national average. With that, we relied on scientific public opinion polling while acknowledging a ±2.5% margin of error. The figures indicated below refer to the percentages of young voting-eligible population who indicated they voted in their country’s most recent legislative elections. It is also worth mentioning that there was not any data available for Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, or Syria.

Similar to the national average, Turkey also recorded the highest youth voter turnout with 90.3%, albeit voting is compulsory in Turkey as we previously mentioned. Palestine also ranked second with 67.3% youth voter turnout, followed by Qatar with 62.6%, Iran with 56.9%, and Iraq with 56.3%. Yemen recorded 51.8%, followed by Bahrain with 51.6%, Lebanon with 47.6%, and Sudan with 46%. Jordan recorded 37.9% in youth voter turnout, followed by Tunisia with 36.3%, Libya with 36.1%, and Kuwait with 36%. Further, Algeria recorded 33.8% in youth voter turnout, as many youth-led demonstrations called for boycotts. Morocco recorded 32.9%, Egypt recorded 27.1%, and lastly, UAE recorded 20.9%. Ultimately, we find that the average youth voter turnout across the region is 46.5%, lower than the national average of 53.6%, showing that youth are less likely to cast ballots, mostly for the barriers illustrated earlier, mainly the lack of trust in the electoral processes and their results. 

نسب إقبال الناخبين الشباب في آخر انتخابات تشريعية

وبالحديث عن نسبة مشاركة الناخبين الشباب في الانتخابات التشريعية الأخيرة في المنطقة، لم تكن البيانات متاحة بسهولة. وبشكل أساسي، كانت معظم المصادر مجردة ولم تتضمن أي أرقام، بل أشارت فقط إلى ما إذا كانت أعلى أو أقل من معدل إقبال الناخبين بشكل عام على مستوى الوطن. ولذلك، اعتمدنا على نسب الاستطلاعات العلمية التي تقوم بدراسة القيم، وأخذنا بعين الاعتبار نسبة الخطأ وهي: 2.5%±.. وتشير الأرقام الموضحة أدناه إلى النسب المئوية لأقبال الناخبين الشباب، الذين أشاروا إلى أنهم صوتوا في آخر انتخابات تشريعية في بلادهم. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه لم تكن هناك أي بيانات متاحة لموريتانيا وعمان والسعودية وسوريا.

وعلى غرار المتوسط الوطني، سجلت تركيا أيضًا أعلى نسبة إقبال للناخبين الشباب بنسبة 90.3٪، وإن كان التصويت إجباريًا في تركيا كما ذكرنا سابقًا. كما احتلت فلسطين المرتبة الثانية بنسبة إقبال للناخبين الشباب بلغت 67.3٪، تليها قطر بنسبة 62.6٪، وإيران بنسبة 56.9٪، والعراق بنسبة 56.3٪. وسجلت اليمن نسبة إقبال للناخبين الشباب بلغت 51.8٪، تليها البحرين بنسبة بلغت 51.6٪، ولبنان بنسبة بلغت 47.6٪، والسودان بنسبة بلغت 46٪. وسجل الأردن نسبة إقبال للناخبين الشباب بلغت 37.9٪، تليها تونس بنسبة 36.3٪، وليبيا بنسبة 36.1٪، ثم الكويت بنسبة 36٪. وسجلت الجزائر نسبة إقبال الناخبين الشباب بلغت 33.8٪، وسط العديد من المظاهرات التي طالبت بالمقاطعة. وسجل المغرب نسبة إقبال للناخبين الشباب بلغت 32.9٪، ومصر بنسبة 27.1٪، وأخيراً سجلت الإمارات نسبة بلغت 20.9٪. بلغ متوسط إقبال الناخبين الشباب في جميع أنحاء المنطقة 46.5٪، وهو أقل من المتوسط الوطني البالغ 53.6٪، مما يدل على أن الشباب هم أقل احتمالًا للإدلاء بأصواتهم، ولربما كان ذلك بسبب العوامل التي ناقشناها آنفا وتحديدا فيما يتعلق بانعدام الثقة في العمليات الانتخابية ونتائجها.

Percentage of Women in Legislative Councils

Next, we outlined the percentages of women in the legislative councils in the MENA region. Looking at North Africa, we find that Algeria currently has the highest percentage of women in their legislative council with 25.8%, followed by 25.4% in Mauritania, and Sudan with 25%. In Tunisia, 22.6% of members of the legislative council are women, compared to 20.5% for Morocco, 15.7% in Egypt, and 15% in Libya. Looking at West Asia, Iraq holds the largest percentage of women in parliament with 25.2%, followed by Turkey with 17.3%, and Jordan with 15.4%, thanks to a quota system. Palestine’s 2006 legislature featured 13.2% women, followed by Syria with 12.4%. Iran and Lebanon have the lowest percentage of women in parliament with 5.9% and 4.7%, respectively. Overall, 16.12% is the average women representation across the MENA region. 

نسب النساء في المجالس التشريعية

أما فيما يتعلق بالنسب المئوية للنساء في المجالس التشريعية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، فكانت النتائج على النحو التالي. بالنظر إلى منطقة شمال أفريقيا، نجد أن لدى الجزائر حاليا أعلى نسبة من النساء في مجلسها التشريعي بنسبة 25.8٪، تليها موريتانيا بنسبة 25.4٪، والسودان بنسبة 25٪. وفي تونس بلغت نسبة تمثيل النساء في المجلس التشريعي 22.6٪، مقابل 20.5٪ للمغرب، و15.7٪ في مصر، و15٪ في ليبيا. وبالنظر إلى غرب آسيا، كانت أكبر نسبة من النساء في المجالس التشريعي في العراق بنسبة 25.2٪، تليها تركيا بنسبة 17.3٪، والأردن بنسبة 15.4٪، وذلك بفضل نظام الكوتا. وبلغ معدل تمثيل النساء في مجلس النواب الفلسطيني لعام 2006 نسبة 13.2٪، تلتها سوريا بنسبة 12.4٪. وجاءت أدنى نسبة للنساء في البرلمانات في المنطقة في إيران ولبنان بنسبة 5.9٪ و4.7٪ على التوالي. وبشكل عام، بلغ متوسط تمثيل المرأة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا 16.12٪.

Upcoming Legislative Elections

Looking ahead, part of MENAACTION’s vision is empowering young people in the region to not only be civically active but to also see more youth representation in elected offices. With that, we mapped out the confirmed dates of legislative elections across the region, as seen in the figure below. In October later this year, 2020, Kuwait will hold its legislative elections for the National Assembly. Then, in November, all of Jordan, Egypt, and Libya are scheduled to hold their legislative elections for their respective House of Representatives. In 2021, Qatar will hold its legislative elections in June for its Shura Council, as Morocco will hold its elections in November for the House of Representatives. In 2022, Algeria (National People’s Assembly), Iraq (Council of Representatives), and Lebanon (National Assembly) are set to hold their legislative elections in May, Turkey will hold its legislative elections in June for its Grand National Assembly, and Bahrain is scheduled to hold its elections in November for its Council of Representatives. In 2023, Mauritania will hold its elections in September for its National Assembly, followed by Oman (Shura Council) and UAE (Federal National Council) in October later that year. Finally, in 2024, Iran will hold its Parliamentary elections in February, Syria will hold its elections for the People’s National Assembly in July, and Tunisia will hold its elections for the Assembly of People’s Representatives in October 2024. 

مواعيد الانتخابات التشريعية القادمة

يتمثل جزء من رؤية مينا أكشن في تمكين الشباب في المنطقة، وليس فقط للنشاط المدني ولكن أيضًا لرؤية المزيد من تمثيل الشباب في المناصب المنتخبة. وبذلك، يمكنكم متابعة المواعيد المؤكدة للانتخابات التشريعية في المنطقة، كما هو موضح في الشكل أدناه. وعليه، ستجري الكويت انتخاباتها التشريعية لمجلس الأمة الكويتي في تشرين الأول هذا العام، 2020. ثم، في تشرين الثاني، من المقرر أن تجري كل من الأردن ومصر وليبيا انتخاباتها التشريعية لمجالس النواب. وفي عام 2021، ستجري قطر انتخاباتها التشريعية لمجلس الشورى في حزيران، وستجري المغرب انتخاباتها في تشرين الثاني لمجلس النواب. وفي عام 2022، من المقرر أن تجري الجزائر انتخاباتها للمجلس الشعبي الوطني في أيار، وكذلك الأمر بالنسبة لمجلس النواب العراقي ومجلس النواب اللبناني. وستجري تركيا انتخاباتها التشريعية للبرلمان في حزيران. ومن المقرر أن تجري البحرين انتخاباتها لمجلس النواب في تشرين الثاني. وفي عام 2023، ستجري موريتانيا انتخاباتها التشريعية للبرلمان في شهر أيلول، تليها عمان (لمجلس الشورى) والإمارات (للمجلس الوطني الاتحادي) في تشرين الأول في وقت لاحق من ذلك العام. وأخيرًا، في عام 2024، ستجري إيران انتخاباتها البرلمانية في شباط، وستجري سوريا انتخاباتها للمجلس الوطني الشعبي في تموز، وستجري تونس انتخاباتها لمجلس نواب الشعب في تشرين الأول.

Forced Displacement in the Middle East and North Africa Region

التهجير القسري في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا

Introduction

In our previous report, we discussed migration trends in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with an emphasis on inward and outward migration. In this report, we delve into a far more pressing issue facing the region today; forced displacement. In fact, the MENA region produces 32.5 million displaced persons, divided between 16.5 million IDPs and 15.2 million refugees under the mandate of UNHCR and UNRWA, in addition to other categories of displaced persons. Forced displacement includes a number of categories such as refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and stateless persons, among others. This issue is not new in the region, with protracted displacement (meaning displacement for three consecutive years) being a common issue. Today, the region is home to some of the most pressing and protracted displacement issues in the world, affecting Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, and others. 

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is “Someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. They a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so.” Furthermore, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center at the UNHCR, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are “Persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

مقدمة

ناقشنا في تقريرنا السابق أنماط الهجرة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. وفي هذا التقرير، نتطرق إلى قضية أكثر إلحاحًا تواجه المنطقة؛ وهي قضية التهجير القسري. ويشمل التهجير القسري على عدد من الفئات مثل اللاجئين والنازحين وعديمي الجنسية وغيرهم. هذه القضية ليست جديدة في المنطقة، حيث أن النزوح أو التهجير المطول (بمعنى النزوح لمدة ثلاث سنوات متتالية) يمثل مشكلة شائعة. واليوم، هناك في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا 32.5 مليون مهجر قسري (نازحين ولاجئين وغيرهم)، مقسمين بين 16.5 مليون نازح و15.2 مليون لاجئ تحت ولاية مفوضية الأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين والأونروا، بالإضافة إلى فئات أخرى من النازحين. وتعد المنطقة موطنًا لبعض أكثر قضايا النزوح والتهجير إلحاحًا في العالم، بما في ذلك القضايا التي تؤثر على الفلسطينيين والسوريين والعراقيين واليمنيين وغيرهم.

ووفقاً للمفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين، فإن اللاجئ هو "شخص أرغم على الفرار من بلاده بسبب الاضطهاد أو الحرب أو العنف. لديهم خوف مبرر من الاضطهاد لأسباب تتعلق بالعرق، الدين، الجنس، الآراء السياسية، أو الانتماء لمجموعة اجتماعية معينة. في الغالب، لا يمكنهم العودة إلى ديارهم أو يخشون القيام بذلك." ووفقًا لمركز مراقبة النزوح الداخلي في المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين، فإن النازحين هم "الأشخاص الذين أجبروا أو اضطروا إلى الفرار أو مغادرة منازلهم نتيجة أو لتجنب آثار النزاع المسلح أو حالات العنف أو انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان أو الكوارث سواء كانت طبيعية أو من صنع الإنسان، ولا يعبرون حدود دولة معترف بها دوليا." 

Countries in the MENA region do host a large number of refugees and displaced persons. More specifically, they host about 25.6 million displaced persons in total. Despite this large number, MENA countries remain somewhat unable to fulfill the even-more pressing supply of displaced person in the region, which is currently at 32.6 million refugees, displaced persons, asylum seekers, and stateless persons, who are displaced due to wars, conflicts, and disasters. Meaning, MENA states continue to struggle in terms of providing services along with the economic pressure accompanying hosting displaced persons. Furthermore, despite their tremendous capacities, the Gulf countries with the exception of Yemen, only host 0.7% of all displaced person in the region, with a large number of this percentage is in fact, stateless persons. A stateless person is defined, according to UNHCR, as a “person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law.”

وتستضيف دول منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا عددًا كبيرًا من المهجرين قسريا، حيث يستضيفون حوالي 25.6 مليون بالمجمل. وعلى الرغم من هذا العدد الكبير، فإنهم غير قادرين إلى حد ما على تلبية الإمدادات الأكثر إلحاحًا للمهجرين في المنطقة، والذين يبلغ عددهم حاليًا 32.6 مليون لاجئ ونازح وطالب لجوء وعديم الجنسية، الذين نزحوا بسبب الحروب والصراعات والكوارث وغيرها من الأسباب. ويعني ذلك أن دول المنطقة تواجه صعوبات فيما يتعلق بتلبية الاحتياجات الاقتصادية والخدمية المتعلقة باستضافة المهجرين قسريا. وعلاوة على ذلك، على الرغم من قدراتها الهائلة، فإن دول الخليج باستثناء اليمن، تستضيف فقط 0.7٪ من جميع النازحين في المنطقة، كما أن قسما كبيرا من هذه النسبة، في الواقع، هو من عديمي الجنسية. ويتم تعريف الشخص عديم الجنسية، وفقًا للمفوضية السامية لشؤون اللاجئين، بأنه "الشخص الذي لا تعتبره أي دولة مواطناً لها بموجب قانونها".

Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and IDPs by Country of Origin

West Asia Region

Home to the region’s most protracted conflicts, the West Asia subregion currently has produced approximately 25 million persons in displacement. Syria, alone, has produced 13.2 million persons currently in displacement, divided between 6.6 million refugees, 118,435 asylum seekers, and 6.5 million IDPs, 29% of those IDPs have been displaced in 2019 alone. Palestine came second with 7.45 million persons currently in forced migration from Palestine. Of those 7.45 million, 7.2 million are refugees currently under direct UNRWA mandate, 11,523 asylum seekers, and 243,000 IDPs. It is also worth noting that more Palestinian houses were demolished in East Jerusalem in 2019 than in any of the past 15 years. Iraq ranked third highest, as it produced 2.3 million persons currently in forced migration, divided between 344,460 refugees, 302,721 asylum seekers, and 1.6 million IDPs, 6.5% of whom were displaced in 2019. 

Turkey currently has produced approximately 1.3 million persons in forced migration, whereby 83,271 are refugees, 46,934 asylum seekers, and 1.1 million IDPs. Then, Iran produced 736,168 persons currently in forced migration, divided between 129,676 refugees, 86,087 asylum seekers, and 520,000 IDPs, the majority of whom are disaster induced. Furthermore, Lebanon produced 26,055 persons currently in forced migration, whereby 5,801 are refugees, 8,024 are asylum seekers, and 7,200 are IDPs, 60% of whom were displaced in 2019 alone. Jordan came last with the least number of persons in forced migration, 9,095 persons currently in displacement coming from Jordan, whereby 2,384 are refugees, 4,711 are asylum seekers, and 46 are disaster induced IDPs. 

West Asia has witnessed a number of pressing conflicts, including the 9-year-long ongoing war in Syria, the occupation in Palestine, the various armed conflicts in Iraq, and the migration of Afghanis fleeing armed conflict into Iran. 

اللاجؤون وطالبو اللجوء والنازحون حسب بلد الأصل

منطقة غرب آسيا

تضم منطقة غرب آسيا، والتي ما زالت تشهد أكثر النزاعات طويلة الأمد في المنطقة، نحو 25 مليون شخصا مهجرا قسريا، حيث أدت الحرب الأهلية في سوريا وحدها إلى تهجير 13.2 مليون شخص، مقسمين بين 6.6 مليون لاجئ، 118435 طالب لجوء، و6.5 مليون نازح، 29٪ من هؤلاء النازحين قد نزحوا في عام 2019 فقط. وجاءت فلسطين في المرتبة الثانية بحوالي 7.45 مليون شخص مهجر قسريا حاليا (تحت ولاية الأنروا). ومن بين هؤلاء، هناك 7.2 مليون لاجئ، و11523 طالب لجوء، و243000 نازح. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه تم هدم منازل فلسطينية في القدس الشرقية في عام 2019 أكثر من أي من السنوات الـ 15 الماضية. واحتل العراق المرتبة الثالثة، حيث أدت النزاعات إلى تهجير 2.3 مليون شخص حاليا، مقسمين بين 344460 لاجئ، و302721 طالب لجوء، و1.6 مليون نازح، 6.5٪ منهم نزحوا في عام 2019.

وفي تركيا حاليًا ما يقرب من 1.3 مليون شخصا مهجرا قسريا، حيث يوجد 83271 لاجئًا تركيا و46934 طالب لجوء و1.1 مليون نازح. وفي إيران، هناك 736168 شخصًا مهجرا، مقسمين بين 129676 لاجئًا، و86087 طالب لجوء، و520000 نازح، معظمهم نازحين بسبب الكوارث الطبيعية. أما بالنسبة لبنان، فهناك 26055 شخصًا في حالة نزوح حاليًا، 5801 منهم من اللاجئين، و8024 من طالبي اللجوء، و7200 من النازحين، 60٪ منهم نزحوا في عام 2019 فقط. وجاء الأردن في المرتبة الأخيرة كأقل عدد من المهجرين، حيث هناك حاليا 9095 شخصا مهجرا من الأردن، حيث يوجد 2384 لاجئًا و4711 طالب لجوء و46 من النازحين بسبب الكوارث الطبيعية.

وتشهد منطقة غرب آسيا العديد من الصراعات، بما في ذلك الحرب المستمرة منذ 9 سنوات في سوريا، والاحتلال في فلسطين، والصراعات المسلحة المختلفة في العراق، والصراعات المسلحة في أفغانستان الي أدت إلى العديد إلى إيران.

North Africa Region

North Africa subregion currently has produced approximately 3.9 million persons currently in forced migration, with Sudan, alone is the origin country for 82% of those currently in forced migration. As such, there are currently 3.2 million Sudanese in forced migration, divided between 734,947 refugees, 71,959 asylum seekers, and 2.4 million IDPs, 15% of those have been displaced in 2019 alone. Libya has produced 473,050 persons currently in forced migration, whereby16,033 are refugees, 5,975 are asylum seekers, and 451,000 IDPs, 48% of whom have been displaced in 2019 alone. Egypt ranked third highest, producing 109,299 persons currently in forced migration, divided between 27,506 refugees, 16,370 asylum seekers, and 65,004 IDPs. Mauritania currently has produced approximately 52,603 persons in forced migration, whereby 37,423 are refugees, 8,580 are asylum seekers, and 6,600 are IDPs. 

Then, Algeria produced 15,284 persons currently in forced migration, divided between 4,514 refugees, 7,463 asylum seekers, 3,200 IDPs, the majority of whom are disaster induced. Furthermore, Morocco produced 13,410 persons currently in forced migration, whereby 4,637 are refugees, 8,313 are asylum seekers, and 200 are IDPs. Lastly, Tunisia has produced 4,778 persons currently in forced migration, whereby 2,068 are refugees, 2,664 are asylum seekers, and 32 are IDPs. 

Ultimately, North Africa has witnessed a number of conflicts contributing to forced migration, including the armed conflict in Libya, the partition of Sudan, the Arab Spring movements in the region, and the issues in the countries in the Sahara.

منطقة شمال إفريقيا

أنتجت منطقة شمال إفريقيا حالياً حوالي 3.9 مليون شخصا مهجرا، فتعد السودان البلد الأصل لـ 82٪ من المهجرين حاليًا. وعليه، يوجد حاليًا 3.2 مليون سوداني في النزوح، مقسمون بين 734947 لاجئ، و71959 طالب لجوء، و2.4 مليون نازح، 15٪ منهم نزحوا في عام 2019 فقط. وأنتجت الصراعات في ليبيا 473050 شخصًا في حالة نزوح، من بينهم 16033 لاجئًا و5975 طالبًا للجوء و451000 نازحا، نزح 48٪ منهم في عام 2019 فقط. واحتلت مصر المرتبة الثالثة، حيث هناك حاليا 109299 مصريا في حالة نزوح، موزعين بين 27506 لاجئ و16370 طالب لجوء و65004 نازح. وفي موريتانيا حاليًا، هناك حوالي 52603 شخصًا في حالة نزوح، حيث هناك 37423 لاجئًا، و8580 طالب لجوء، و6600 نازحًا.

ومن الجزائر، هناك 15284 شخصًا في حالة نزوح حاليًا، موزعين بين 4514 لاجئ و7463 طالب لجوء و3200 نازح، معظمهم بسبب الكوارث الطبيعية. ومن المغرب، هناك 13410 شخصًا في حالة نزوح حاليًا، حيث يوجد 4637 لاجئًا و8313 طالب لجوء و200 نازح. وأخيرًا، هناك من تونس 4778 شخصًا في حالة نزوح حاليًا، حيث هناك 2068 لاجئًا و2664 طالب لجوء و32 نازحا. 

وتشهد منطقة شمال أفريقيا عددًا من النزاعات التي ساهمت في الهجرة القسرية، بما في ذلك النزاع المسلح في ليبيا، وتقسيم السودان، بالإضافة إلى تبعات الربيع العربي في المنطقة، والنزاعات المتعددة في دول الصحراء الكبرى. 

The Gulf Region

With the exception of Yemen, the Gulf region enjoys a rather safe and secure setting, culminating in a low number of displaced persons. In fact, only 11.4% of the total number of displaced persons in the MENA were displaced from the Gulf region, with Yemen, alone producing 99.75% of those currently in forced migration from the Gulf region. Moreover, there are currently 3.7 million Yemenis in forced migration, divided between 36,518 refugees, 34,312 asylum seekers, and 3.6 million IDPs, 11% of whom were displaced in 2019 alone. Saudi Arabia came in second with 3,461 total persons in forced migration from the Kingdom, whereby 1,762 are refugees, 1,413 are asylum seekers, and 260 disaster induced IDPs. Kuwait came in third, producing 2,715 total persons currently in forced migration, divided between 1,300 refugees and 1,405 asylum seekers. Oman currently has produced approximately 2,174 persons in forced migration, whereby only 42 are refugees, 58 are asylum seekers, and 1,100 are IDPs. 

Bahrain produced a total of 701 persons currently in forced migration, divided between 557 refugees and 144 asylum seekers. Furthermore, The UAE produced 559 persons currently in forced migration, whereby 155 are refugees, 184 are asylum seekers, and 220 are IDPs. Lastly, Qatar has produced 73 persons currently in forced migration, whereby 36 are refugees and 37 are asylum seekers. 

منطقة الخليج العربي

باستثناء اليمن، تتمتع منطقة الخليج العربي بمستوى أمان وأمان بشكل جيد، ويمكننا رؤية ذلك من خلال عدد المهجرين القسريين من هذه المنطقة، حيث أن 11.4٪ فقط من إجمالي عدد المهجرين القسريين في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا هم من منطقة الخليج العربي، بينما أخرج اليمن وحده 99.75٪ من المهجرين القسريين من منطقة الخليج، فيوجد حالياً 3.7 مليون يمني في حالة نزوح، موزعين بين 36518 لاجئ، و34312 طالب لجوء، و3.6 مليون نازح، 11٪ منهم نزحوا عام 2019 فقط. وجاءت السعودية في المرتبة الثانية حيث بلغ عدد المهجرين القسريين من المملكة 3461 شخصًا، موزعين على النحو التالي: 1762 لاجئ و1413 طالب لجوء و260 نازح بسبب الكوارث. واحتلت الكويت المرتبة الثالثة، حيث هناك 2715 شخصًا حاليا في حالة تهجير قسري من الكويت، موزعين بين 1300 لاجئ و1405 طالب لجوء. ومن عُمان، هناك حاليًا حوالي 2174 شخصًا في حالة نزوح، حيث هناك حاليا 42 لاجئًا، و58 طالب لجوء، و1100 نازح.

ومن البحرين، هناك ما مجموعه 701 شخصًا في حالة نزوح، موزعين ما بين 557 لاجئ و144 طالب لجوء. ومن الإمارات، هناك 559 شخصًا في حالة نزوح حاليًا، حيث يوجد 155 لاجئًا و184 طالب لجوء و220 نازح. وأخيرًا، من قطر، هناك حاليا 73 شخصًا في حالة نزوح، 36 منهم من اللاجئين و37 طالبًا للجوء.

Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and IDPs by Country of Asylum

West Asia Region

In terms of hosting displaced persons, West Asia hosts 74.7% of all displaced persons in the MENA region. Syria, which produced the highest number of displaced persons is also the host country to the largest number of persons. In fact, Syria currently hosts 6.6 million displaced persons within its borders, with a large percentage of which attributed to IDPs in addition to 18,817 refugees, 18,654 asylum seekers, and 160,000 stateless persons. Turkey hosts close to 4 million displaced persons currently, with 3.7 million of whom are refugees couple with 311,719 asylum seekers, in addition to IDPs. Iraq ranked third highest, hosting 3.1 million displaced persons, whereby 283,022 are refugees and 14,035 are asylum seekers in addition to about 1.8 million IDPs. In fourth, Jordan hosts approximately 3 million displaced persons, whereby 2.95 million are refugees and 52,562 are displaced persons. Lebanon, moreover, hosts 1.44 million displaced persons, 1.42 million of whom are refugees coupled with 16,423 asylum seekers. Additionally, Iran hosts 979,476 displaced persons, the vast majority of whom are refugees, mostly from Afghanistan. 

اللاجؤون، وطالبو اللجوء، والنازحون
حسب بلد اللجوء

منطقة غرب آسيا

فيما يتعلق باستضافة المهجرين القسريين، تستضيف منطقة غرب آسيا 74.7٪ من جميع المهجرين القسريين في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. سوريا، والتي أدت الحرب الأهلية فيها إلى تهجير ونزوح أكبر عدد من المهجرين القسريين، هي أيضًا البلد المضيف لأكبر عدد من المهجرين القسريين في منطقة غرب آسيا. وفي الحقيقة، تستضيف سوريا حاليًا 6.6 مليون مهجرا قسريا داخل حدودها، فبالإضافة إلى الملايين من النازحين، هناك حاليا 18817 لاجئًا و18654 طالب لجوء و160000 عديم الجنسية داخل الحدود السورية. وتستضيف تركيا حاليًا ما يقارب 4 ملايين نازح، منهم 3.7 مليون من اللاجئين و311719 طالب لجوء، بالإضافة إلى العديد من النازحين. واحتل العراق المرتبة الثالثة، حيث يستضيف العراق حاليا 3.1 مليون نازح، منهم 283022 لاجئ و14035 طالب لجوء بالإضافة إلى حوالي 1.8 مليون نازح. رابعاً، يستضيف الأردن قرابة 3 ملايين مهجرين قسريين، منهم 2.95 مليون لاجئ و52562 نازح. ويستضيف لبنان حاليا 1.44 مليون مهجرا قسريا، من 1.42 مليون لاجئ بالإضافة إلى 16423 طالب لجوء. وتستضيف إيران 979476 مهجرا قسريا حاليا، غالبيتهم العظمى من اللاجئين، ومعظمهم من أفغانستان.

North Africa Region

North Africa hosts 14.3% of all displaced persons in the MENA region. Similar to West Asia, Sudan in North Africa hosts the largest number of displaced persons just as it has produced the largest number of displaced persons too. Currently, Sudan hosts about 2.96 million displaced persons, 1.07 million are refugees and 17,622 are asylum seekers. Egypt ranked second highest with 314,937 displaced persons currently hosted in Egypt, 246,749 of whom are refugees coupled with 68,184 asylum seekers. Libya currently hosts about 270,379 displaced persons, 8,794 of whom are refugees and 47,414 are asylum seekers. Moreover, Algeria hosts currently 103,276 displaced persons, the majority of whom are refugees (94,350) coupled with 8,926 asylum seekers. Moreover, Mauritania hosts 84,322 displaced persons, 83,919 are refugees and 1,131 are asylum seekers. Then, Morocco hosts 7,775 displaced persons divided between 5,940 refugees and 1,835 asylum seekers. Finally, Tunisia came in last with 1,330 displaced persons hosted within its borders, 1,066 of whom are refugees and 256 are asylum seekers 

منطقة شمال إفريقيا

تستضيف منطقة شمال أفريقيا 14.3٪ من جميع المهجرين القسريين في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. وعلى غرار غرب آسيا، يستضيف السودان في شمال إفريقيا أكبر عدد من المهجرين مثلما أدت النزاعات إلى تهجير أكبر عدد منهم أيضا، وعليه، يستضيف السودان حالياً حوالي 2.96 مليون مهجرا قسريا منهم 1.07 مليون لاجئ و17622 طالب لجوء. واحتلت مصر المرتبة الثانية بحوالي 314937 مهجرا قسريا في مصر حاليا، موزعين على النحو التالي: 246749 لاجئ إلى جانب 68184 طالب لجوء. وتستضيف ليبيا حالياً حوالي 270379 مهجرا قسريا، منهم 8794 لاجئ و47414 طالب لجوء. وتستضيف الجزائر حاليًا 103276 مهجرا قسريا، معظمهم من اللاجئين (94350) إلى جانب 8926 طالب لجوء. وتستضيف موريتانيا 84322 مهجرا قسريا، منهم 83919 لاجئًا و1131 طالبًا للجوء. ثم يستضيف المغرب 7775 مهجرا قسريا موزعين بين 5940 لاجئ و1835 طالب لجوء. وجاءت تونس أخيرًا، حيث تستضيف حالي 1330 مهجرا قسريا داخل حدودها، 1066 منهم من اللاجئين و256 من طالبي اللجوء.

The Gulf Region

The Gulf region hosts 10.6% of the total number of displaced persons in the MENA region. Discounting Yemen, the six other states only host 0.7% of the total displaced persons in the region despite their financial capabilities to host more. Yemen hosts 2.5 million displaced persons divided between 264,369 refugees and 8,814 asylum seekers in addition to a large number of IDPs. Kuwait hosts 93,670 displaced persons, 673 are refugees, 981 are asylum seekers, and 92,000 are stateless persons. Saudi Arabia hosts 72,436 displaced persons, 266 of whom are refugees and 2,170 are asylum seekers in addition to 70,000 stateless persons. Further, UAE hosts 7,782 total displaced persons divided between 1,184 refugees and 6,506 asylum seekers. Qatar hosts 1,482 displaced persons whereby only 190 are refugees and 92 are asylum seekers in addition to 1,200 stateless persons. Oman hosts 564 displaced persons divided between 308 refugees and 256 asylum seekers. Finally, Bahrain hosts 319 displaced persons, 263 of whom are refugees and 56 are asylum seekers. It is worth mentioning that GCC countries, including Qatar, have relaxed the rules for existing expats who do not have the means of renewing travel documents / passports to prevent them from further displacement. 

منطقة الخليج العربي

تستضيف منطقة الخليج العربي 10.6٪ من إجمالي عدد المهجرين القسريين في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. وفي حال عدم احتساب اليمن، تستضيف الدول الست الأخرى 0.7٪ فقط من إجمالي المهجرين القسريين في المنطقة على الرغم من قدراتهم المالية لاستضافة المزيد. وعليه، يستضيف اليمن 2.5 مليون مهجرا قسريا موزعين بين 264369 لاجئ و8814 طالب لجوء بالإضافة إلى عدد كبير من النازحين. وتستضيف الكويت 93670 مهجرا قسريا: 673 من اللاجئين و981 من طالبي اللجوء و92000 من عديمي الجنسية. تستضيف المملكة العربية السعودية 72436 مهجرا قسريا، منهم 266 لاجئ و2170 من طالبي اللجوء بالإضافة إلى 70000 من عديمي الجنسية. وتستضيف الإمارات العربية المتحدة 7782 مهجرا قسريا موزعين بين 1184 لاجئًا و6506 طالب لجوء. وتستضيف قطر 1482 مهجرا قسريا، 190 منهم فقط من اللاجئين و92 من طالبي اللجوء بالإضافة إلى 1200 من عديمي الجنسية. وتستضيف عمان 564 مهجرا قسريا، موزعين بين 308 لاجئ و256 طالب لجوء. وأخيرًا، تستضيف البحرين 319 مهجرا قسريا، 263 منهم من اللاجئين و56 من طالبي اللجوء. والجدير بالذكر أن العديد من دول منطقة الخليج العربي، بما فيها قطر، سهلت التعليمات على الوافدين الحاليين الذين لا يملكون وسائل لتجديد وثائق سفرهم مثل جوازات السفر وذلك لتجنب المزيد من التهجير القسري.

Conclusion: Broad Trends

In analyzing raw UNHCR, UNRWA, and IDMC data, we find that forced displacement in the MENA region is more or less localized per sub-region. Meaning, most displaced persons either remain within the borders of their countries or flee to the most neighboring states. West Asia is the sub-region where the vast majority of forced displacement occurs and hosted. In fact, we find that the region produces 76.7% of all displacement in the region and also hosts and welcomes 74.7% of all displacement in the region. North Africa produces 11.9% and hosts 14.6% of all displaced persons in the MENA region while the gulf region produces 11.4% and hosts 10.7% of all displaced persons in the region. Furthermore, Yemen is the country where the majority of displacement occurs in the gulf region. Without Yemen, the remaining 6 states in the sub-region produce only 0.03% of displaced persons and welcome only 0.7%. Such an analysis shows a disproportionate action between the individual states when factoring their overall economic wellbeing, as states such as Jordan and Lebanon host far more displaced persons than their Gulf counterparts. At the same time, it is worth noting that many GCC states do provide sizeable financial aid to those hosting displaced person to further enable them to provide better services. 

الخاتمة: خطوط عريضة

عند تحليل البيانات الأولية للمفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين والأونروا ومركز مراقبة النزوح، نجد أن التهجير القسري في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا متمركزا بشكل محلي وحسب المنطقة الفرعية. بمعنى أن معظم النازحين إما يبقون داخل حدود بلدانهم أو يلجؤون إلى الدول المجاورة. وعليه، نجد أن الغالبية العظمة للتهجير القسري، بما يشمل الطرد والاستضافة، هو متمركز في منطقة غرب آسيا. وفي الواقع، نجد أن دول غرب آسيا مسؤولة عن انتاج 76.7٪ من إجمالي التهجير القسري في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، كما أنها تستضيف وترحب ب 74.7٪ من العدد الكلي للمهجرين القسريين في المنطقة. وتنتج شمال أفريقيا 11.9٪ وتستضيف 14.6٪ من جميع المهجرين القسريين في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، بينما تنتج منطقة الخليج العربي 11.4٪ وتستضيف 10.7٪ من جميع المهجرين القسريين في المنطقة. اليمن هي الدولة التي يحدث فيها غالبية التهجير القسري في منطقة الخليج. فبدون اليمن، تنتج الدول الست المتبقية في الخليج العربي 0.03٪ فقط من المهجرين القسريين وتستضيف 0.7٪ فقط من إجمالي عدد المهجرين القسريين. فيُظهر هذا التحليل حالة من عدم التناسب بين الدول وتحديدا عند احتساب الحالة الاقتصادية لدول المنطقة، حيث تستضيف دول مثل الأردن ولبنان عددا من المهجرين القسريين بشكل أكبر بكثير من دول الخليج العربي التي تتمتع بنمو اقتصادي ممتاز. وتجدر الإشارة إلى أن العديد من دول منطقة الخليج العربي تقدم بالفعل مساعدات مالية كبيرة للدول التي ستضيف المهجرين قسريا لتمكينهم من تقديم خدمات أفضل.

Migration Trends in the Middle East and North Africa Region

General

أنماط الهجرة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا

عام

Migration encompasses a variety of different types of. It includes economic migrants, internal displacement, asylum seeking, refugees, and smuggled and trafficked persons. Migrants can also be grouped in terms of direction/destination, whereby migrating within one’s countries is internal migration and migrating out of one’s country is external migration, or emigration. 

In this brief report, MENAACTION studied migration trends in the Middle East and North Africa(MENA), whereby we analyzed the “Migration Stock Database” produced by United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Population Division, which monitors global population trends periodically. For that, we studied inward migration (immigration) and outward migration (emigration) for 21 states in the MENA region. 

According to the Dictionary of Human Geography, emigration is a form of migration that occurs when a person leaves a place. Emigration is also a basic human right under Article 12 of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Immigration, on the other hand, is entering a new place and is considered one of the most significant causes of social change in the world (Clark, 1986; Sassen, 1996).

Looking at the overall trend in the MENA region, we find that there are more immigrants than there are emigrants. In fact, there is a total of 34.5m emigrants incoming into the 21 countries in the region, and there is a total of 48.7m immigrants, leaving their individual countries in the region. 


تشمل الهجرة العديد من الأنواع أو الأشكال المختلفة، فهنالك الهجرة الاقتصادية، والنزوح الداخلي، وطلب اللجوء، بالإضافة إلى الاتجار وتهريب البشر. ويمكن دراسة الهجرة من حيث الاتجاه أو الوجهة، فالهجرة إلى بلد معين هي الهجرة الداخلية أو الهجرة الوافدة والهجرة خارج البلد تعد هجرة خارجية أو الهجرة المغادرة.

في هذا التقرير الموجز، قمنا في مينا أكشن بدراسة أنماط الهجرة في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، حيث قمنا بتحليل قاعدة بيانات الهجرة والتي تنشرها إدارة الشؤون الاقتصادية والاجتماعية التابعة للأمم المتحدة - قسم السكان لمراقبة توجهات الهجرة العالمية وبشكل دوري. وعليه، قمنا بدراسة الهجرة الداخلية والهجرة الخارجية لـ 21 دولة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا.

وفقًا لقاموس الجغرافيا البشرية، الهجرة الخارجية هي شكل من أشكال الهجرة يحدث عندما يغادر الشخص مكانًا ما، وتعد أيضًا حق أساسي من حقوق الإنسان بموجب المادة 12 من ميثاق الأمم المتحدة الدولي الخاص بالحقوق المدنية والسياسية لعام 1966. وعلى الجانب الآخر، الهجرة الداخلية تحدث عند ذهاب شخص ما إلى مكان جديد، وتعتبر واحدة من أهم أسباب التغيير الاجتماعي في العالم، بحسب كلارك (1986) وسوسين (1996).

وبالحديث عن التوجهات العامة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، نجد أن عدد المهاجرين القادمين (الهجرة الداخلية) أكبر من عدد المهاجرين المغادرين (الهجرة الخارجية)، فهنالك ما مجموعه 34.5 مليون مهاجر قادمون إلى 21 دولة في المنطقة مقابل ما مجموعه 48.7 مليون مهاجر مغادر، يغادرون بلدانهم في المنطقة.

North Africa Region

منطقة شمال إفريقيا

Looking more specifically at the states in North Africa, we find that Sudan has seen the most incoming immigrants with over 1.2m immigrants, 63% of whom immigrated from South Sudan. Secondly, Libya has about 818,216 immigrants, with 37% of whom came from Palestine. Egypt has about 504,053 total immigrants, 27% of whom immigrated from Palestine. Moreover, Algeria came in fourth with approximately 249,075 total immigrants, 13% of whom also came from Palestine, a heavily featured state in this report. Mauritania welcomed about 172,967 immigrants with the vast majority immigrated from Mali (63%). As for Morocco, 103,958 immigrated into the North African state, with 36% came from France. Tunisia was the country that welcomed the least immigrants, with 57,455 in total, 18% of whom came from Algeria.

For youth specifically, we find that 43% of immigrants into Egypt are youth, followed by 38% incoming into Mauritania, 37% for Libya, 33% for Morocco, 32% into Algeria, 30% into Tunisia, and 26% incoming into Sudan.

Moreover, for emigration, we find that the numbers are much higher than they are for immigration, as residents of the region are leaving more. Egypt produced the most emigrants with 3.5m, 27% of whom emigrated to Saudi Arabia, a place where many Egyptians go to for work opportunities. Secondly, Morocco exported about 3.3m in emigrants, with France being a popular destination. Sudan exported over 2m emigrants, with 28% of whom emigrated to South Sudan. The transfer of population between Sudan and South Sudan is evident in these figures amid the partition. Algeria exported 1.9m in emigrants with a staggering 81% emigrated to France. Similarly, 52% of Tunisia’s 831,634 emigrants left to France, a popular destination among North Africans. As for Libya, 180,611 emigrated outwards with about 20% to Italy, as 36% of Mauritania’s 126,509 left to Senegal.

بالنظر بشكل أكثر تحديدًا إلى منطقة شمال إفريقيا، نجد أن السودان شهد أكبر عدد من المهاجرين الوافدين بأكثر من 1.2 مليون مهاجر، 63٪ منهم هاجروا من جنوب السودان. ثانياً، يوجد في ليبيا حوالي 818216 مهاجر، 37٪ منهم قدموا من فلسطين. ويوجد في مصر حوالي 50،053 مهاجر، 27٪ منهم هاجروا من فلسطين. علاوة على ذلك، جاءت الجزائر في المركز الرابع مع ما يقرب من 249075 مهاجر وافد، 13٪ منهم هاجروا أيضًا من فلسطين، وهي دولة شهدت قدرا كبيرا من الهجرة. واستقبلت موريتانيا حوالي 172967 مهاجر غالبيتهم العظمى هاجروا من مالي (63٪). أما بالنسبة للمغرب، فقد هاجر إليها 103958، 36٪ منهم قدموا من فرنسا. وكانت تونس الدولة التي استقبلت أقل عدد من المهاجرين الوافدين، حيث بلغ عددهم الإجمالي 57455 مهاجر وافد، 18٪ منهم هاجروا من الجزائر.

وبالنسبة للشباب على وجه التحديد، نجد أن 43٪ من المهاجرين الوافدين إلى مصر كانوا من الشباب الذين أعمارهم تحت الثلاثين، يليهم 38٪ من الوافدين إلى موريتانيا، و 37٪ بالنسبة للمهاجرين الوافدين إلى ليبيا، و 33٪ من الوافدين إلى المغرب كانوا من الشباب، و 32٪ من الوافدين إلى الجزائر كانوا من الشباب، و 30٪ بالنسبة لتونس، و 26٪ من الوافدين إلى السودان.

أما بالنسبة للهجرة الخارجية أو المهاجرين المغادرين دول منطقة شمال إفريقيا، نجد أن الأرقام أعلى بكثير مما هي عليه بالنسبة للمهاجرين الوافدين لدول المنطقة، بحيث أن سكان المنطقة يغادرون دولهم بشكل كبير، فصدرت مصر أكبر عدد من المهاجرين بـ 3.5 مليون، هاجر 27٪ منهم إلى المملكة العربية السعودية، وهو مكان يذهب إليه العديد من المصريين للحصول على فرص عمل. ثانياً، قام المغرب بتصدير حوالي 3.3 مليون مهاجر، وكانت فرنسا أكثر دولة يتوجهون إليها. وقام السودان بتصدير أكثر من مليوني مهاجر، 28٪ منهم هاجروا إلى جنوب السودان. ويتضح من خلال هذا التقرير أن هناك نمط ملحوظ لانتقال السكان بين السودان وجنوب السودان وذلك بسبب الانفصال. وبالنسبة للجزائر، فقد صدرت 1.9 مليون مهاجر، وتوجه غالبيتهم (81٪) إلى فرنسا. وبالمثل، غادر 52٪ من 831634 مهاجرًا تونسيًا إلى فرنسا، وهي وجهة مفضلة بشكل كبير بين سكان شمال إفريقيا. أما بالنسبة لليبيا، فقد هاجر 180611 إلى الخارج، 20٪ منهم توجهوا إلى إيطاليا، بينما غادر 36٪ من 126509 مهاجري موريتانيا إلى السنغال.

The Gulf Region

For the Gulf region, immigration is a far more prevalent trend than emigration. Given the attractive economic opportunities present in this region, a large number of economic migrants turn to these states for opportunities, many of whom come from neighboring states as well as from Southeast Asian states, primarily India. With that, Saudi welcomed the highest number of immigrants, not just among the gulf region, but among the entire MENA region with 13.1m immigrants, 19% of whom immigrated from India. The UAE came in second with 8.5m immigrants, 40% from India as well. Kuwait came in third with about 3m immigrants, 37% also came from India. Qatar welcomed 2.29m immigrants, 31% of whom immigrated from India, as Oman’s 2.28m immigrants featured 58% from India. Bahrain welcomed 741,161 immigrants, 40% of whom immigrated from India too. Yemen came in last with 385,628 immigrants, 73% of whom immigrated from Somalia, migrating from one conflict impacted nation to another.

48% of Oman’s immigrants are youth, followed by 46% incoming into the UAE, 45% for Qatar, 40% for Bahrain, 31% into Yemen, 30% for Kuwait, and Saudi came in last with 29% of its immigrants are youth.

As for emigration, with the exception of 1.2m Yemeni emigrants (60% of whom emigrated to Saudi), this region features moderate numbers of outward migration. Saudi Arabia exported 303,904 emigrants, with 31% leaving to the United States, a popular destination for education and work opportunities. For Kuwait, 205,411 migrated out of the nation, 32% of whom went to the UAE, which in turn exported 162,747 emigrants, 16% of whom went to Kuwait. Bahrain produced 60,163 emigrants, 51% of whom went to Bangladesh. Qatar exported about 26,312 emigrants, 38% of whom went to Palestine, a similar destination to which 41% of Oman’s 22,461 emigrants left.

منطقة الخليج العربي

بالنسبة لمنطقة الخليج العربي، تعد الهجرة الوافدة أكثر انتشارًا من الهجرة الخارجية أو المغادرة، وذلك نظرًا للفرص الاقتصادية الجذابة الموجودة في هذه المنطقة، حيث يلجأ عدد كبير من المهاجرين الباحثين عن فرص عمل إلى هذه الدول، وتحديدا من الدول المجاورة وكذلك من دول جنوب شرق آسيا، خاصة الهند. وبذلك، رحبت السعودية بأكبر عدد من المهاجرين الوافدين، ليس فقط بين دول الخليج، ولكن بين منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا بأكملها، حيث بلغ عدد المهاجرين الوافدين إلى السعودية 13.1 مليون مهاجر، 19٪ منهم قدموا من الهند. وجاءت الإمارات في المرتبة الثانية حيث قدم 8.5 مليون مهاجر إلى الإمارات، 40٪ هاجر إليها قادما من الهند أيضًا. وجاءت الكويت في المركز الثالث بحوالي 3 ملايين مهاجر، 37٪ منهم قدم من الهند. واستقبلت قطر 2.29 مليون مهاجر وافد، 31٪ منهم هاجروا من الهند أيضا، بينما في عمان هنالك 2.28 مليون مهاجر وافد، 58٪ منهم هاجر من الهند أيضا. واستقبلت البحرين 741161 مهاجرًا وافدا، 40٪ منهم هاجروا أيضًا من الهند. وجاء اليمن في المرتبة الأخيرة من حيث عدد المهاجرين الوافدين، الذين بلغوا 385628 مهاجرًا وافدا، 73٪ منهم هاجروا من الصومال، حيث هاجروا من مكان يشوبه النزاعات إلى دولة أخرى تعاني من الحروب.

وبالحديث عن فئة الشباب الوافدين إلى هذه الدول، 48٪ من المهاجرين الوافدين إلى عمان هم من الشباب، يليهم 46٪ من الوافدين إلى الإمارات، و45٪ من الوافدين إلى قطر، و40٪ من الوافدين إلى البحرين، و31٪ من الوافدين إلى اليمن، و30٪ من الوافدين إلى الكويت، و29٪ من الوافدين إلى السعودية.

أما بالنسبة للهجرة الخارجية أو المغادرة، فكانت الأرقام معتدلة بشكل أكبر من أعداد الوافدين، باستثناء 1.2 مليون مهاجر يمني (60٪ منهم هاجروا إلى السعودية). وصدرت المملكة العربية السعودية 30،904 مهاجرا للخارج، 31٪ منهم هاجر إلى الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، وهي وجهة جذابة للتعليم وفرص العمل. أما بالنسبة للكويت، فهاجر منها 205411 خارج الدولة، ذهب 32٪ منهم إلى الإمارات، والتي بدورها صدرت 162747 مهاجرًا للخارج، ذهب 16٪ منهم إلى الكويت. وهاجر من البحرين 60163 مهاجرًا للخارج، ذهب 51٪ منهم إلى بنغلاديش. وصدرت قطر حوالي 2،312 مهاجرًا للخارج، ذهب 38٪ منهم إلى فلسطين، ونفس الأمر ينطبق على 41٪ من المهاجرين المغادرين من عمان البالغ عددهم 22461 مهاجرًا.

West Asia Region

For West Asia, a region where conflicts are more prevalent, we find large numbers of migration. Looking at incoming migration, immigration, Turkey welcomed the highest number of immigrants with 5.8m, 64% immigrated into Turkey from Syria. Jordan came in second with 3.3m immigrants, 63% of whom migrated from neighboring state Palestine. Iran came in third with 2.6m immigrants, with a staggering 86% of whom coming from war torn Afghanistan. Lebanon welcomed 1.8m immigrants, 62% of whom migrated from Syria, which in turn welcomed 867,848 immigrants, 69% of whom came from Palestine. Iraq welcomed 368,062 immigrants, 70% of whom also came from Syria. Palestine ranked last with 253,735, 25% of whom came from Israel.

Youth immigration is also a featured trend in this region. For that, Palestine immigrants featured 48% youth, followed by 42% into Iraq, 41% into Iran, 40% into Turkey, 38% into Syria, 37% into Lebanon, and 29% into Jordan.

As for emigration, Syria’s ongoing civil war resulted in 8.2m emigrants, 45% of whom emigrated into Turkey. Palestine came in second with 3.8m emigrants, 55% of whom migrated to Jordan. Turkey came in third with 3.4m emigrants, 44% of whom moved to neighboring Germany. Additionally, there are also about 2m immigrants from Iraq, 11% of whom migrated to the United States. Similarly, of Iran’s 1.3m immigrants, 31% migrated to the United States. As for Lebanon, 844,503 immigrated outwards, with 18% of whom moved to Saudi Arabia, a popular destination for Jordanians, as 30% of the nation’s 784,428 immigrants moved to their southern neighbors.

منطقة غرب آسيا

بالنسبة لغرب آسيا، وهي منطقة تنتشر فيها الصراعات بشكل كبير، نجد أن أعداد المهاجرين سواء وافدين أو مغادرين كانت كبيرة. وبالحديث عن الهجرة الوافدة، رحبت تركيا بأكبر عدد من المهاجرين في هذه المنطقة، حيث بلغ عدد الوافدين إلى تركيا 5.8 مليون مهاجر، 64٪ منهما هاجروا إلى تركيا قادمين من سوريا. واحتل الأردن المرتبة الثانية بعدد 3.3 مليون مهاجر، هاجر 63٪ منهم من فلسطين. واحتلت إيران المرتبة الثالثة بعدد 2.6 مليون مهاجر وافد، 86٪ منهم هاجروا من أفغانستان التي تعاني من تبعات الحرب. واستقبل لبنان 1.8 مليون مهاجر وافد، 62٪ منهم هاجروا من سوريا، والتي استقبلت بدورها 867848 مهاجرًا وافدا، 69٪ منهم هاجروا من فلسطين. واستقبل العراق 368062 مهاجرًا وافدا، 70٪ منهم هاجروا من سوريا. واحتلت فلسطين المرتبة الأخيرة بـ 253735، 25٪ منهم هاجروا من إسرائيل.

وهنالك مستوى عال لهجرة الشباب في هذه المنطقة، فمن بين المهاجرين الوافدين إلى فلسطين، بلغ نسبة الشباب منهم 48٪، بينما بلغ نسبة الشباب الوافدين إلى العرق 42٪، يليهم نسبة الشباب الوافدين إلى إيران 41٪، و40٪ من الوافدين لتركيا كانوا من الشباب، و38٪ من الوافدين إلى سوريا، و 37٪ من الوافدين إلى لبنان، وأخيرا 29٪ من الوافدين إلى الأردن.

أما بالنسبة للهجرة الخارجية، فقد أدت الحرب الأهلية المستمرة في سوريا إلى هجرة 8.2 مليون مهاجر للخارج، 45٪ منهم هاجروا إلى تركيا. وجاءت فلسطين في المرتبة الثانية بعدد 3.8 مليون مهاجر للخارج، 55٪ منهم هاجروا إلى الأردن. واحتلت تركيا المرتبة الثالثة حيث هاجر منها 3.4 مليون مهاجر للخارج، 44٪ منهم ذهبوا إلى ألمانيا المجاورة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، هناك حوالي 2 مليون مهاجر من العراق، 11٪ منهم هاجروا إلى الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، ومن بين 1.3 مليون مهاجر إيراني، هاجر 31٪ منهما إلى الولايات المتحدة الأميركية أيضا. أما بالنسبة للبنان، فقد هاجر 844503 منها إلى الخارج، 18٪ منهم هاجر إلى المملكة العربية السعودية، وهي وجهة مفضلة للأردنيين أيضا، حيث هاجر 30٪ من العدد الكلي للمهاجرين الأردن (784428) إلى السعودية.

The Impact of Supranational Identities on Interests in Jordan's Foreign Policy Making

Introduction

When discussing Jordan’s role in the Middle East, observers and scholars often attribute a disproportionate large role to the kingdom despite its small size, lack of resources, and more powerful neighbors. Unlike neighboring Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Jordan does not suffer from the presence of a variety of ethno-religious identities; instead, a predominantly Sunni nation with about 6% Christian community illustrate homogeneity on the surface. However, looking deeper into the demographic fabric of Jordan, we see a number of sub-state identities that play a large role in influencing foreign policy decision making. More specifically, Jordan is a home to a multigeneration Jordanians of Palestinian origins in addition to Jordanians or “East Bankers” or “Transjordanians”. Such a demographic makeup often transcends a common national Jordanian identity, resulting into major prevalence of supranational identities such as pan-Arab and Pan-Islamist identities. These demographics and identities along with its location and geographic proximity to many protracted conflicts in the region require cautious and very calculated foreign policy making, often taking the shape of omni-balancing. 

In this paper, I look at the dynamics between identities and interests in Jordan’s foreign policy making. I examine how Jordan’s supranational identities, namely Pan-Arabist and Pan-Islamist identities, shape and influence its interests. I argue that these identities intertwine and overlap, further complicating foreign policy decision making in a sense that such identities take precedence on the expense of state national interests and ultimately result in shaping these interests to align with these supranational identities. In furthering this argument, I explore Jordan’s role in the ongoing Arab-Israeli. More specifically, I analyze how the precedence of identities over interests impacts domestic dynamics, foreign policy orientation, and foreign policy outcomes. 

Theoretical Approach

In this case, supranational identities are those that transcend national identities. They are cross-border identities that often supersede nation states and their associated identities. Literature shows that this concept is vastly understudied, especially in the Middle East despite the fact that supranational identities are somewhat inescapable in the region given the underdevelopment of individual national identities. Instead, most literature studies this concept within the context of Europe. For instance, Zimmerbauer indicates that supranational identities contribute to the idea of bounded regions and regional identities, with Medrano, Ciornei, and Apaydin asserting that it implies solidarity, and Kennedy adding that supranational identities can be a stepping stone for democratization. Richard Lyons refers to supranational identities as an alternative form of identity, conversed with regional identities, national identities, place identities, historical and cultural identities, geographic identities, and socioeconomic and political identities, and together, they make “self-identity”. He asserts that a high degree of identification with a supranational identity may lead to a perceived conflict at the intra-national level.

Of the prevalent supranational identities in the Middle East and in Jordan, Pan-Arabist and Pan-Islamist identities are at the forefront. James Mellon indicates that these two identities provide a “supranational ideal transcending individual states as a focus of identity capable of shaping ends and means of foreign policy.” Adeed Dawisha in Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair looks at the foundation of Pan-Arab identity or Pan-Arab Nationalism as shaped by the rhetoric that Arab states can be stronger through economic, political, military, and cultural solidarity and cooperation. Arab Nationalists such as Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Baathists such as Hafez Al-Assad viewed Arab states as artificial entities, created by the West, to keep Arabs politically, economically, and militarily ineffective. This anti-imperialist narrative gave much attraction to this notion, propelling many Arabs to cling to this identity, as it remains a major draw until this very day. Ali Muhsen Hamed adds that much of this overarching consensus lies within the shared language and history that binds Arabs together, making the idea of transforming these bonds into political bonds appealing. Faheem Sheikh illustrates that while it has not been successful in achieving its goals (which have been contested in themselves), Pan-Arabism will remain prevalent as long as Israel remains in the region.

The second form of supranational identity is Pan-Islamic identity; that is the identification with the wider group of the Ummah. Cemil Ayden asserts that Pan-Islamist identity came into being as a response to the lack of leadership for the imagined Muslim World, which refers to narratives of geopolitics, civilization, and religious tradition. Ayden indicates that it is when Islam is under scrutiny or attack that Pan-Islamist identity is heightened. Moreover, Raymond Hinnerbusch reasons that historically, Arabs have identified with such groups far more intensely than they have with their territorial states. As such, many states and nonstate actors have worked towards utilizing this form of identity to rally support.

Supranational Identities in the Jordanian Context

How does Jordan view itself vis-à-vis these identities? Looking at the Jordanian constitution, Article 1 asserts that Jordan is a Hashemite Kingdom, it is an Arab state, and the Jordanian people is a part of the Arab Nation. Article 2 adds that Islam is the religion of the state. These two articles show identification and association with the overall Arab and Islamic identities. As for how Jordanians view themselves. The World Values Survey data shows that religion is very important for Jordanians, as stated by 95.4% of the general public, with 77.2% said unprompted that religious faith should be taught to children at home, 93.1% feel close to the Arab World, and 95.6% feel close to the Islamic World.

As such, it is evident that Jordan and Jordanians place great value and identify largely with Arabs and Muslims, but how does this affect foreign policy decision making? Mitzen asserts that states need to experience one-self as a whole to ensure their ontological security, Darwich adds that security is ensured vis-à-vis a stable conception of self-identity. Further unwrapping this conception, if a state has many competing identities, how does it maintain its security, let alone its interests. Acknowledging this challenge, Jordan prioritized people’s contestations of its identity and worked on shaping its interests as byproduct, as Lynch asserts “Jordan’s foreign policy can be best explained by incorporating public contestation of identity in which the interests of the state came to be defined rather than simply pursued.” Such a Constructivist method utilizes what is known as Steven David’s omni-balancing or Hinnerbusch’s domestic security dilemma. In essence, Jordan’s preferences are constructed through the intertwining and overlapping dynamics of these supranational identities, propelling Jordan to give its national interest in foreign policy making a passenger seat to the supranational identities, which in turn shape its foreign policy orientation to align more clearly with these identities, as they become the prime foreign policy determinants. 

The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is Jordan’s most important foreign policy issue. Its importance stems from geographic proximity posing a security threat. It also stems from Jordan’s Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic identities, along with the presence of a sizeable Palestinian community in the kingdom. Within this conflict, Jordan exhibits a major struggle between identities and interests, particularly through its dealings with Israel. Marc Lynch indicates that there are “sharp contradictions between demands of identity and of interests,” whereby Jordan’s identities would place Israel as its eternal enemy while its interests would view Israel as a necessary strategic partner. Jordan has carried out its dealings with Israel privately, “cautious of open collaboration that would place Jordan outside the Arab consensus and in violation of its own identity.

With the two options in mind (enemy or partner), Jordan approached the conflict cautiously. For many years, Jordan has been a strong advocate for the Two State Solution, particularly since its first official participation in direct Palestinian-Israeli peace talks that resulted in The Wye River Memorandum in 1998. King Abdullah, since ascending to the throne in 1999, placed major priority over the Two State Solution, often asserting that it is the only option and the only solution to the conflict and to peace in the region. He indicated numerous times that Jordan’s stance will not change. This is attributed to many reasons, as indicated earlier, but another reason is the Hashemite custodianship over Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, a near century long responsibility of the Jordan monarch, a source of legitimacy domestically, and a bargaining piece within the conflict. This custodianship has been contested; in fact, in 2017, the Saudi monarchy made public assertions that they look to challenge it. This can be explained through Darwich’s ontological insecurity of similarity argument, that Saudi’s leadership of the Islamic world is hindered in the presence of the Hashemites’ custodianship over Jerusalem’s religious sites. 

Saudi’s remarks followed the United States’ decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, a move that preceded its declared “Deal of the Century”. Trump’s election into presidency saw a disruption to the peace process and associated resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as he essentially argued that a Two State Solution should not be the only option on the table. The Deal of the Century is proclaimed as the ultimate solution to the conflict, but it essentially ends the Palestinian quest and their right to return, with more Palestinians will be expelled from their homes into Jordan as their “substitute home.” One can argue that King Abdullah retrospectively warned of such an alteration. In fact, in his book Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril, he argues that “if we do not seize the opportunity presented by the now almost unanimous international consensus on the solution, I am certain we will see another war in our region-most likely worse than those that have gone before and with more disastrous consequences.”

The departure from the previously quasi-unanimous Two State Solution poses major complications for Jordan’s foreign policy making, particularly with the aforementioned supranational identities intact. Essentially, following the reveal of the proposed deal, Jordan has been pressurized by various world and regional leaders to alter its position on the deal, with various accounts conforming attempts to penetrate Jordan’s political and security institutions to weaken its position on the Palestinian cause. King Abdullah’s response to the Deal of the Century has been manifested through three No’s: “no to giving in on Jerusalem”; “no to alternative homeland for the Palestinians in Jordan”; and “no to settling the Palestinians in Jordan” which received an average of 94% strong support among Jordanians, as shown by a national poll conducted in August 2019.

Jordan’s seemingly unshaken position is driven by the fact that Jordan holds a vast majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origins and Palestinian refugees. As such it is imperative for Jordan to advocate for their rights. The alternative homeland rhetoric also poses a threat to Jordan’s own sovereignty as well as to the Palestinians’ right of return. In exchange for this firm stance, Jordan has been under massive pressure; for example, the Saudi-owned Ritz Carlton luxury hotel project in Amman has been halted and listed for sale for “government stubbornness”. There have also been many reports of an attempted coup or infiltrations into the Jordanian system. Many international nongovernment organizations have reduced their work in Jordan, particularly in the humanitarian sector. Additionally, with the rising unemployment rates in Jordan and the stagnant economic situation, it has been reported that Jordan would be financially pressured into agreement, as the United States can stop its annual $1.275b financial aid package to Amman while the Gulf States have been pumping endowments into the Central Bank of Jordan to further lure in the kingdom. Moreover, Jordan has been promised a share of the Saudi pledged $50b mega projects in Jordan, Egypt, Gaza, the West Bank, and Egypt.

Domestically, countless demonstrations have further solidified Jordan’s stance on the matter. However, one additional matter was conflated with the Deal of the Century: a natural gas deal between Jordan’s NEPCO (National Electric Power Company) and the US-based Noble Energy to supply Jordan with natural gas, albeit imported from Israel. This deal, while would provide Jordan with favorable prices, it would both position Israel as a mega provider of natural gas in the region and place Jordan under further pressure domestically. In fact, following the unveiling of the Deal of Century, Jordanians took to the streets to protest the gas deal as well, under the slogan “enemy gas is an occupation”.

As such, Jordan’s foreign policy making in the midst of all of this is as complicated as ever. On the one hand, political and economic pressures mount with rising unemployment and deteriorating economic situation. The kingdom is risking not only its biggest financial provider in the United States, but also its most important political ally. It would also risk the $1.5b penalty clause for the gas deal along with the risk of going back to the international market, a move that saw tremendous daily losses, particularly following a series of bombings of the Egyptian gas pipelines during the Egyptian revolution. And most importantly, Jordan is risking its political role on the peace process map, as its political and military power relative to the rest of the actors entail that it cannot sustain the pressures for long. On the other hand, Jordan would gain tremendous financial and economic benefits from the United States and especially the Gulf States, but it would be risking domestic support, from both Jordanians and those of Palestinian origins. As such, the situation can be best described as a process of clipping Jordan’s wings. 

With that, if we were to look at the situation from the Realist point of view, it is mostly in Jordan’s best interest to agree to the deal to sustain its national, economic, and political securities. However, Jordan’s supranational identities are likely to trump such interests, with Jordanians’ closeness and identification and affiliation with the Arab and Islamic worlds add a serious dimension to be addressed. As a result, Jordan is left with the imperative to omni-balance the situation, with the spectrum leaning more towards the domestic security dilemma which is shaped by supranational identities. 

As such, it is more realistic to illustrate the situation through a Constructivist point of view. As indicated earlier, a Realist point of view would propel Jordan to sign off on the deal; however, with increasingly vocal demonstrators, Jordan had to proceed with caution. In essence, a strictly economic deal (i.e. NEPCO’s deal with Noble Energy) was faced with major public discontent, meaning the kingdom cannot even justify its signing on the Deal of the Century, regardless of how unlikely that is. In other words, Jordan’s deal with Noble gave a realistic indicator to further shape its foreign policy orientation in the conflict, in a learning process that further shapes its interests. This means that Jordan’s interests came to be rather defined through this conflict, and they are likely to sustain themselves, particularly that any change in Jordanians’ identities is unlikely. Ultimately, the king’s “Three No’s” represent Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic identities and even interests, a process that shows an adoption and application of the public’s supranational identities onto its own national interests.  

Conclusion

Understanding that it cannot possibly emerge out of this crisis without losses, Jordan looks to balance its national security with its domestic security dilemmas while looking to ensure the most favorable outcome out of this unfavorable identity-interest dichotomy. Jordan’s foreign policy making toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict especially amid the Deal of the Century has been more shaped by its identities rather than interests. It prioritizes its supranational identities over its national interests, elevating the importance of domestic security dilemma higher than the traditional security dilemma, and further leaning the spectrum of omnibalancing domestically. As such, Jordan has and will likely continue to place greater priority on its supranational identities over its interests. Finally, given Jordan’s decision making resilience and history of forging middle paths, it has shifted its interests to align more clearly with its supranational identities, following a constructivist learning process of its own identities.

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At MENAACTION, we do not only highlight the challenges our young peers face in the Middle East and North Africa region, but we also believe that the region is a home to thousands of successful young people who have accomplished a great deal. With that, this is a space designated to highlight success stories of MENA youth. 

Iran's Dustbowl Migration

The once vibrant wetland culture of Hamun has now become a relic with scenes of abandoned boats and dried up lake beds

It seems only a few decades ago, when Iran was home to some of the Earth’s most fertile and agricultural land. Large permanent rivers flowed through and contributed sediment-rich soil to the abundant oasis that previously characterized Khuzestan, a southwestern province of Iran. Similarly, Iran’s historical southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan Province, housed a once-vibrant agricultural community and vast wetlands known as the Hamun Wetlands, an oasis in an otherwise Mars-like landscape.

Khuzestan Province neighbor Iraq’s southern marshlands is an area historically known as the Mesopotamian Marshes. The region is often referred to as the ‘Cradle of Civilization’ for being home to ancient civilizations, such as Sumer and Babylon who made sophisticated use of the dense marshland. Surrounded by a vast arid landscape, has made it a unique yet abundant biome filled with fish, migratory birds, and even big cats such as lions, tigers, leopards, and cheetahs that once heavily prowled but have had their ranges significantly reduced due to human activity. 

Prior to the onset of desertification and 20-year drought that began after the 1950s due to Afghanistan building a dam on the Helmand River, these once thriving cradles of civilizations have become desolate wastelands resulting in the exposure of both lakebeds and the consequences of human negligence on the environment. The once vibrant wetland culture of Hamun has now become a relic with scenes of abandoned boats in dried up lake beds and skeletal remains of fish baking in the scorching sun being common sightings.

When we think about climate change, our minds often evoke replayed images that you see on commercials for climate change advocacy such as melting ice caps, rising sea levels, and island nations being swallowed up which does not cover the whole story of our changing planet.

“Desertification is a slow-moving disaster,” says Dr. Kristina Shull, a current post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University. Shull specializes in the intersections of history, migration and policy and noted this process is in part a result of water mismanagement, such as the over-use of dams, as well as government corruption. “Local and regional politics are also shaped by global inequalities exacerbated by US sanctions and histories of colonialism,” she says.

Desertification, drought, dust storms, and rising temperatures in the Middle East are largely an overlooked topic, mainly due to its numerous conflicts, sectarian schisms, and ongoing proxies that achieve mainstream media attention.

Neighboring the harsh mountainous desert terrain of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran’s southeast-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan Province is one of the least developed regions of Iran taking shape in a lack of infrastructure and economic development resulting in the region having the lowest per capita income in Iran. This purposeful neglect has resulted in over 70 percent of the Baloch living below the poverty line by State Department estimates due to state-sponsored marginalization-resulting from the Baloch being a Sunni minority in a Shiite theocracy. This, coupled with having to face extreme drought has prompted resistance and anger towards the Iranian government among the local majority ethnic population — its Baloch-Sunni residents. Dry winds, similar to the wildfire igniting Santa Ana winds of California, dominate the region and are known as the “Wind of 120 Days”, and have a fearsome reputation among U.S. service members in Afghanistan who faced these winds first-hand with numerous injuries being attributed to being physically lifted up and being pegged by loose objects. However, the number of days in this storybook title is increasing as the lack of moisture fuels the intensity and recurrence of these harsh desert winds. 

A prime example of this crisis can be seen in southern Iran where thermometers consistently hit a scorching 110F (43.3C), and maximum temperatures of 131F (55C) being recorded at an alarmingly increased rate. For U.S. readers to relate, Iran is undergoing a modern-day Dust Bowl. 

Notably, climate migration within the Middle East is a growing contributor to internal displacement and deserves more attention from the mainstream media and multilateral action. Minority-inhabited territories such as Khuzestan and Balochistan, with already marginalized local tribes, are generally rich in resources and agricultural potential. Yet exploitative policies coupled with water mismanagement due to corruption are severely affecting traditional livelihoods. This mismanagement and political negligence have exacerbated the environmental crisis in addition to humanitarian impacts encompassing food insecurity, mass migration, health hazards, soil deterioration and desertification. “Those on the front lines and who are most directly affected are often of indigenous or minority communities who have been historically and economically marginalized and experiencing environmental racism as a result,” states Dr. Shull. 

The Baloch tribes, local to Balochistan, depended on managing fisheries along the Hamun river for survival – an oasis in a barren landscape. Following drastic and swift change of the landscape due to drought, the local Baloch have had to pack up their former livelihoods and migrate elsewhere where they will likely face discrimination. Nearly one-fifth of the Sistan-Baluchistan province’s inhabitants have either had to move to neighboring provinces inland or are at-risk of being displaced immediately due to deteriorating conditions. Likewise in Khuzestan Province to the west of Sistan-Baluchistan, many agricultural livelihoods depended on producing and exporting lucrative crops such as dates, wheat, barley, and sugar cane. Today, these livelihoods are at stake with the lack of moisture in drying plains allowing dust to rise before winds carry it away creating unstable and weakened soil, which is not ideal for agriculture. The weakened soil has made it susceptible to being blown away forming into massive dust storms which encapsulates major cities such as Abadan and Ahvaz.

The environmental impact from desertification has become detrimental both to the health and livelihoods of the local populace resulting in residents emigrating en-masse to northern Iranian cities in order to escape desertification.

The wetlands of Hamun suffered major dry spells by the start of 1950s but the conditions worsened significantly in the late 1990s where Southern Iran suffered a water crisis. By 2011, Khuzestan had the third largest level of emigration — behind Tehran and East Azerbaijan Provinces. The negative environmental impact in Khuzestan is so bad that it has caused many government employees, enjoying the most stable jobs in Iran through its current economic crisis, to even submit requests to move to other cities due to the mismanagement of water and the accompanying drought making conditions unbearable. By 2018, drinkable water had become so scarce, it had to be rationed among individual Abadan residents. 

In both regions of Iran, development projects in the form of dams take some of the blame in these drastic environmental changes. Dam projects resulting in environmental catastrophe seem to be the norm in recent years, as evidenced by tragedies such as the Brumadinho dam disaster in Brazil earlier this year. Per the norm, against the advice of environmental experts and cautionary preliminary studies, the Gotvand Dam was built upon the Karun River near the Gachsaran Salt Mine in Khuzestan Province in 2012, to supply sugar cane plants with hydro-electric energy and since then has increased water salinity to levels that inhibit its use in agriculture and even drinking. This has had a primarily negative impact on the marginalized Ahwazi Arabs of Iran who’s farming livelihoods have been hampered by increased salinity levels from the Gotvand Dam. 

Development projects and political corruption go hand-in-hand in producing disastrous results for the environment. The local populaces contend that the detrimental decision-making is because none of the cabinet members of Presidential administrations came from either of these regions, despite their economic and political importance due to water, farming and oil resources as well as a sizeable heavy industry base and electricity generation. Instead, ministries are dominated by relatively powerful local figures made up of both politicians and clerics, from Isfahan, Kerman, and Yazd, provinces who profit from the exploitation of these regions by operating in a mafia-like manner rife with embezzlement of state-funds and payoffs, similar to that of the political machines of the late-19th century in the United States who effectively ruled cities such as Chicago – a common theme now in authoritarian countries marked by a lack of effective internal oversight. Disenfranchised farmers stripped of their livelihoods have even disrupted official prayer ceremonies that are essentially religious distractions to showcase false piety and turn attention away from the real issues, such as the case in Isfahan in 2018 where farmers from rural areas banded together and turned their backs towards the aforementioned corrupt clerics while chanting anti-state slogans in a show of solidarity.

“Climate change contributes to social conflict and unrest we are seeing world-wide. However, governmental responses that are repressive create a feedback loop that in turn exacerbates the disparate impacts of climate change, social inequities, and so on,” states Dr. Shull

The lack of inclusivity in the policy-making process increases the marginalization of ethnic minorities such as the Ahwazi Arabs and Balochis in terms of policy impacts. While both ethnic groups have been represented by organized armed resistance from their fringes towards the Iranian government in response to state marginalization, both the Ahwazi Arab and Baloch people face a changing environment and climate as the ultimate obstacle in achieving stable livelihoods while voicing their frustrations with the state. While individuals attempt to stay in their ancestral homelands of Khuzestan and Balochistan, others feel the strain of staying in an unstable environment and migrate towards more developed urban centers in the north of Iran to achieve new livelihoods.

First Published on Eon Magazine

https://www.eonmag.org/irans-dustbowl-migration/?fbclid=IwAR2AS5UiBAP8QE9RuRzQif4_UTV0lY42wmVedACkOEVVQMgC1tKMG8va774

An Analysis of the Triadic Relationship of Saudi, Iran, and Jordan and The Impact on Pan-Islamism in the Post-Cold War Era

Introduction

The Cold War era in the Middle East saw the emergence of various colliding ideologies, with kingdoms ideologically deterring Nasser’s Pan-Arabism quest at the core of the mid-twentieth century. The post-Cold War era was just as scrambled in the Middle East as it was throughout the world. With global powers marking the end of their mega financial and security support to their-once-proxies, the Middle East was set for the emerging Sunni-Shia rhetoric to be heightened at its central stage. As such, Saudi Arabia and Iran began to exert their spheres of influence in the region, and by the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, one can argue that Muslim states in the region are aligned with one sphere or the other. 

Despite different social and political ideologies penetrating Middle Eastern states at the national and local levels, Islamic ideologies retained their importance not only in shaping state dynamics, but also in shaping Pan-Islamism, as states pushed their own versions of the Muslim World. Since the decline of the Ottoman Empire and ultimately its fall, Muslim states sought to revitalize the role of the leader of the Muslim World. Three states have been at the forefront of this quest in the Post-Cold War era: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran see themselves as the rightful and legitimate leader of the Muslim World, while Jordan’s Hashemite leadership has advanced its own imaginative Muslim World through the lenses of Hashemite legitimacy. On the local level, the Arab Barometer Wave II illustrates that 54% of Saudi Arabian respondents and 44% of Jordanian respondents disagree that religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life. Similarly, according to the World Values Survey, 94.3% of Iranian respondents and a staggering 99.5% of Jordanian respondents characterize religion as either “rather important” or “very important,” ultimately showcasing the role played by religion in state-state relations, state-society dynamics, and societal relations. 

While the conventional discussion of the Muslim World in the modern era automatically is inherently narrow, placing Saudi Arabia as the global leader of Sunnis and Iran as the global leader of Shiites, the role played by the Hashemites in Jordan is ought to be incorporated in the discussion of Pan-Islamism. As such, this paper explores the impact of the triad of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan on Pan-Islamism. It addresses the roles played and the avenues utilized by these states in filling the vacuum of Pan-Islamism and advancing their geopolitical interests. As such, this triad’s attempt to exert religious legitimacy and exercise the lead role in the Muslim World has changed in the past 28 years, and it has resulted in enabling non-state actors to pursue their own versions of Pan-Islamic thought, albeit through violent extremist means.

Analytical Framework

In order to explore the impact of this triad on Pan-Islamism, it is important to define what a triad and Pan-Islamism are. Alex Mintz defines triads in his article “Triads in International Relations: The Effect of Superpower Aid, Trade, and Arms Transfers on Conflict in the Middle East.” He indicates that triads consist of three members of the international community, such as countries A, B, and C. He adds that any two countries of a triad “may be linked through formal or informal alliance structures, while two may have a hostile relationship or one nation has influence on the other two nations.” Furthermore, Lee, Muncaster, and Zinnes explore triadic interactions through their module of: “the friend of my friend is my friend, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and the enemy of my friend is my enemy.” The authors add that this rule manifests itself in the creation and preservation of the polarity of regions, as the nature of relations whether amiable or hostile intensify with time. These dynamics can be seen, at face value, in the triad of Saudi, Iran, and Jordan. With the first two in a clear intensifying hostility, Jordan’s position had to be determined with this increasing conflictual relationship.

As for the Muslim World and Pan-Islamism, Cemile Aydin, in his book “The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History,” explores these notions throughout the late 18th century until the end of the Cold War. The idea of the Muslim world and Pan-Islamism embrace and incorporate the notion of Muslim unity. In fact, Cemile Aydin illustrates that the idea of the Muslim World refers to narratives of geopolitics, civilization, and religious tradition. He adds that it does not mean Ummah, which refers to the Muslim community, expressing unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings. Both Cemile Aydin and Dwight Lee attribute the emergence of the idea of the Muslim World as well as Pan-Islamism to Europeans’ categorization of race. Aydin indicates that Pan-Islamists and Islamophobes utilized the imaginative idea of Muslim unity in ways to advance their own agenda, as they argued for and responded to racialization. Lee adds that Pan-movements emerged as a trend, responding to Europeans’ racialization of groups. He argues that Pan-Islamism “was probably adopted as an imitation of Pan-Slavism.”

Many of the themes and parameters he utilized in his analysis are still prevalent today, including Muslim unity and solidarity, narratives of Islamophobia, Pan-Islamic discourse, public opinion, and state and non-state actors attempting to fill the vacuum left by the caliphate. As such and given the rise of ferocious extremist organizations, it is important to analyze the extent to which the contemporary shape of the Muslim World, particularly the aforementioned triangle, contributed to allowing the motives and space for such organizations to advance their own agenda. The prevalent geopolitical rivalry of Sunna-Shia and its inability to produce appropriate responses to islamophobic narrative have fragmented the Muslim World and hindered Pan-Islamic thought and ultimately allowed for terrorist organizations to gain a voice in the discourse despite Jordan’s efforts.

Relations Among the Three States

Before discussing the roles played by the triad, it is important to provide a background about the relations between the three countries. The following section offers an overview of the relations of Saudi Arabia with Iran, Saudi Arabia with Jordan, and Iran with Jordan. 

Saudi Arabian-Iran Relations

The dynamics and relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be viewed through the lenses of the Realist international affairs theory, with emphasis on rivalry, distrust, and embracing conflictual relations to gain internal support. Scholars including Cemile Aydin in The Idea of the Muslim World, Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp in Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, Gwenn Okruhlik in “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and Internal Consolidation,” and Frederic Wehrey et. al in Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for US Policy, all provided analyses of Saudi-Iran relations through realism. 

Saudi-Iranian relations cannot be addressed without understanding the impact of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the dynamics it posed on the region in general and in Saudi Arabia in specific. In fact, the aforementioned scholars marked the revolution as the start of their rivalry, and this rivalry has been manifested in religious legitimacy and regional security and hegemony.  Aydin asserts that Saudi Arabia feared the impact of the revolution on its internal societal fabrics, given the sizeable Shiite community. Iran’s leadership began voicing an anti-West and anti-allies-of-the-West narrative, with Saudi Arabia at the core, as they saw the Kingdom as America’s eyes, ears, and hands in the region. As such, ties with the United States has been an integral part of Iran’s narrative in the region. More specifically, Iran sees Saudi as a “client of the US” who implements the orders provided from Washington, an outside force to which it denounces a “demonic role”. These orders include economic issues such as oil prices and political matters with Palestine at the core. 

The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked the beginning of the religious primacy rivalry. Aydin reports Ayatollah Khomeini’s narrative towards Saudi Arabia, arguing that the leaders of the Kingdom has failed to be a leader of the Muslim World, and it was time for Iran to demonstrate its religious legitimacy, as they questioned the compatibility of monarchy with true Islam. With time, the relationship between the two states became centered around competition for legitimacy as leaders of Islam. For Saudi Iran’s threat was about the power of the ideals portrayed by its leaders who sought to expand revolutionary Islam, as a foil to Saudi’s failed policies. As such, Iran’s model proclaimed the spread of true Islam, and that as its rightful leaders, they would speak as its imaginative universal authority. They saw Saudi’s approach as passive, unlike Iran’s which supported Muslim rights, albeit through militant means.   

Khomeini saw his divine right to rule and urged the Shiite community in Saudi to fulfill their roles and follow the example of Iran, whereas King Fahd of Saudi countered with asserting that Iran’s actions were “against the interests of Islam, the Muslim World, and the stability of the Middle East.”

Saudi Arabia was facing its own internal issues, including the ramifications of the 1979 Islamic Revolutions on the social dynamics, the rise of oppositions, Islamism, succession struggles, demonstrations, the effects of the Gulf War, and socioeconomic issues. With struggle comes opportunity, and for Saudi’s leadership, it was time to embrace an outside enemy to suppress the internal issues. Gwen Okruhlik argues that regimes facing issues at home create enemies abroad for the idea that external conflict results in internal cohesion, manifested in rallying around the flag. As such, Saudi Arabia began to move away from the possibility of reconciliation with Iran and more towards embracing it as its inherent ideological enemy, to face domestic issues. 

In a region of majority Arab Sunni states, Iran’s worldview of the Middle East has been one of insecurity, particularly following the 1979 Revolution, the subsequent war with Iraq, and the Gulf War. Kayhan Barzegar illustrates that while Iran’s posture in the Middle East is inherently one of insecurity, the solution does not lie within policies of containment, isolation, or destabilization. An International Crisis Group report titled “Iran’s Priorities in a Turbulent Middle East,” further highlights the roots of Iran’s sense of insecurity in the region, asserting that Iran was at the wrong end of a tremendous sense of strategic solitude throughout the war with Iraq. It was the fact that Arab states stood behind Saddam’s government in hopes of containing Iran’s revolutionary ideals from spreading into the region, thus pushing Iran towards forging relations with Hafez Al-Assad in Syria and establishing Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Consequently, with the fall of Saddam and the Baathists in Iraq, Iran’s arguably biggest rival was gone, resulting in further concerns in Saudi Arabia over Iran’s regional ambitions manifested in expanding its sphere of influence by not only physically surrounding the Kingdom with allies but also by outshining its leadership in major Pan-Arab issues including Palestine. Moreover, from 2003 up until the end of the first wave of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, all of a sudden, found itself surrounded by Iran’s allies and proxies. Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Qatar, and Yemen are now within Iran’s sphere of influence, gaining the Islamic Republic a geographic advantage over the Kingdom, thus, perhaps leveling the military superiority which has kept Saudi feeling safe.

Saudi Arabian-Jordanian Relations

Saudi-Jordanian relations are now among the most important and strategic in the region. Multiple data sources show that Jordanians have a high favorable views toward Saudi, with 83% of Jordanians describing their views as very favorable in 2017. Arab Barometer Data highlight the economic relations between the two states, as 78% of Jordanians indicated their hopes for the economic relations with Saudi to became stronger in 2017 than it was in the year before. Data from Konrad Adenauer Stiftung illustrate that 22.4% of Jordanians view Saudi as Jordan’s strongest ally, second to the United States, while 58% perceived Saudi to have an influence on Jordan. Moreover, current relations between the two countries are highly positive. One can argue that the relations are good because of economic reasons and because of geopolitical reasons. 

Jordan’s economic stagnation has caused tremendous tension internally. Saudi Arabia, concerned for the impact an unstable Jordan could have on an already gruesome situation in the region, ran to Jordan’s aid. In 2011 Jordan received $1.7 billion, in aid from the GCC, mainly Saudi, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar, as part of a $5 billion in financial aid for development in Jordan. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia is a home to a sizeable number of Jordanian workers. Of the 750,000 Jordanians working abroad, it is estimated that 400,000 work in Saudi Arabia, who actively send remittances home. These remittances sent by Jordanian workers in Saudi comprise for 10% of Jordan’s GDP ($3.8 billion) annually. These economic factors, in the form of foreign aid and remittances, are not the only factors shaping relations between the two countries, as geopolitical factors play an integral role. 

In fact, one can argue that Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Jordan serves towards its own sphere of influence to counter Iran’s. The rise of Iran as a geopolitical force along with its perceived threat on the region’s Sunni monarchies led both Jordan and Saudi to each other. At a first glance, the alliance is imbalanced with Saudi’s wealth far surpasses Jordan’s, who remains reliant on the financial support of its allies, including Saudi Arabia. However, Jordan is just as important for Saudi Arabia. Jordan’s location is strategic for Saudi in its quest for containing Iran’s expanding bloc. The two countries have implemented numerous military strategies together. On the ideological level, Jordan being a Sunni Arab monarchy is just like Saudi and a direct foil to Iran.

The current relations between the two kingdoms tend to turn a blind eye on their darker past. The two kingdoms did not always see eye to eye. King Hussein of Jordan over the span of 4 decades kept Saudi on their toes. He consistently highlighted his direct descent from prophet Muhammad and that he was the grandson of Sherif Hussein bin Ali, the leader of the Great Arab Revolt, thus giving him a legitimate claim over Arab leadership. King Hussein sent hints and messages at Saudi indicating that his ancestors came from Saudi and one day he could regain that. Given the nature of the rise of the Al-Sauds, such claims had to be taken seriously.

Putting these differences aside, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sought to lure in Jordan with financial aid. In the 1970s, over 40% of all budgetary aid of the two Gulf countries was provided to Jordan in the form of grants, subsidized oil, or low-interest loans. Jordanian workers were sending remittances back to Jordan. Thus, both factors were enhancing Jordan’s economic stability. For Saudi Arabia, a stable Jordan was essential for its own security, as Jordan was a buffer from the Arab-Israeli conflict and radical ideologies. By the mid 1980s, Saudi and Kuwait began decreasing their foreign aid to Jordan, due to the ramifications of the Iran-Iraq war in which the two countries were spending big, as oil prices decreased. As such, Jordan turned to form alliances with two of its most immediate neighbors: Syria and Iraq. With Syria, Jordan had hoped to increase bilateral trade and form a united front in seeking funds from the GCC. Jordan’s alliance with Iraq was problematic for Syria and for Saudi Arabia later on. When Jordan needed to make a decision between Iraq and Syria, Iraq’s financial prospects to Jordan made the difference. 

Jordan’s relations with Iraq solidified, and in 1990, Jordan was one of the very few countries who stood with Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait. This has led to tensions between Amman and Ryadh. For King Hussein of Jordan, Baghdad was essential, and his alliance with Saddam Hussein was financially rewarding in aid and oil support. With the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Jordan remained a channel for Iraqi funds, businessmen, and even trade exchanges to circumvent the blockade. Later on, it dawned on Jordan that it had just lost one of its most important economic and political, let alone wealthy allies, sending Jordan back towards restoring and strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia. The situation this time was less problematic for Saudi, as King Abdullah II of Jordan was unlike his father. King Abdullah acknowledged his Jordanian identity and worked towards building a solidified Jordanian identity on the basis of pride in country and flag. The byproduct of such actions was that Saudi no longer feared a Jordanian imaginative divine return to Saudi lands as its rightful leaders. 

While current relations are positive, they are not at the peak they reached in 2011 – 2016 anymore, for two important reasons. Jordanian public opinion has been growing more critical of Saudi Arabia, particularly in regards to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The brutality of the action and the media attention it gained affected Jordanians’ views toward Saudi. The second important matter is the issue in Jerusalem, in what has become to be known as the “Deal of the Century.” Deal of the Century is portrayed as the ultimate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it entails the end of the Palestinian quest and their right to return. Instead, more Palestinians will be expelled from their homes into Jordan as their “substitute home.” 

A brief analysis of the region shows that major GCC countries including Saudi Arabia have signed off on the deal, leaving Jordan behind as a strong antagonist to the deal. King Abdullah II of Jordan spoke consistently and repeatedly that Jordan is a red line and will never succumb to any pressures, and that he will continue to advocate for the Two State Solution. The Gulf countries led by Saudi seem to be persistent on realizing the deal. June of 2018 saw a major wave of demonstrations in Jordan against structural adjustments and taxation laws. Saudi Arabia and UAE pledged $2.5 billion in aid to Jordan, presumably to support the kingdom out of its economic struggles, though many sources suggest that the underlying message was to pressure Jordan towards accepting the deal.

Iranian-Jordanian Relations

Jordan’s relations with Iran are much more complicated to unfold. While 83% of Jordanians indicated high favorable views of Saudis in 2017, only 4% of Jordanians indicated high favorability towards Iran. Jordanian-Iranian relations have resembled a roller-coaster, with times the two states enjoyed great relations, with other times they would appear as bitter rivals. Interestingly, and despite Saudi Arabia’s influence on Jordan’s stance towards Iran, it was not until recent years that Jordan began dealing with Iran as Saudi’s rival. 

Dr. Mohannad Mobidien argues that Jordan-Iran’s relations were characterized by cooperation and understanding during Iran’s monarchy era between 1949 – 1979. King Hussein of Jordan and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran inaugurated Jordan’s embassy in Tehran in 1959. Jordan and Iraq had agreed to counter the United Arab Republic by creating the Arab United Kingdom in 1965, however, the revolution in Iraq ended the prospect for that, thus pushing Jordan towards bolstering its relations with Iran to ensure sovereignty, independence, and security. In 1960, however, relations between the two countries began to worsen when Iran recognized Israel. While the Shah of Iran reiterated that it was not a new stance for Iran, King Hussein of Jordan urged him to change his position. Later on, while Jordan recognized the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representatives of Palestinians, Iran acknowledged Hamas as the legal representatives of Palestinians. 

Jordan’s leadership welcomed the new “Islamic Republic” following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran with open arms. Will Fulton, however, indicates that relations between the two countries were immediately strained with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. It was all due to the fact that King Hussein held close ties with the Pahlavi monarchy of Iran. Nevertheless, the war with Iraq meant that Jordan had to take a position. As such, King Hussein backed Iraq in all conferences, meetings, summits, and visits around the world. Jordan provided volunteer fighters to Iraq and established fifteen centers in Amman which recruited 2,500 volunteers to fight for Iraq. As King Hussein continued to support Iraq in all means possible, including granting access to port of Aqaba for transporting military supplies, Syria mirrored Jordan’s actions with Iran and provided it with ground and airspace, transporting 1,500 Iranian soldiers to South Lebanon.

After the Gulf war, Jordan’s alliance with Iraq against Iran hindered ties between the two countries, especially that many reports suggested direct Jordanian involvement with Iraq against Iran, an action that is harder to reconcile from. With the passing of Khomeini in 1989, Iran’s foreign policy in the region turned towards normalization relations with Arab neighbors, which meant that they had to ensure that their policies do not involve “exporting the revolution.” During the second Gulf War in 1990, Jordan’s position at the United Nations kept relations positive with Iran, as Jordan’s representative to Iran and later the Foreign Minister visited Iran. Such actions steered diplomatic relations back on track. The situation did not last long, as Jordan discovered a violent extremist organization under the name “Jadish Mohammad” who admitted receiving support from Iran. A few months later, Jordan discovered armories which it perceived as a direct threat to the regime. Hamas admitted that the source was Iran, but the aim was to supply the West Bank.

In 1994, Jordan signed the Wadi Araba Peace Treaty with Israel, which sparked massive criticisms from Iran. Jordan expelled Iran’s ambassador in Jordan along with 21 diplomats under the charges of establishing terrorist cells in Jordan for both Hamas and Hezbollah, and following the killing of a Jordanian diplomat in West Beirut. Three years later, the election of Mohammed Khatami as Iran’s new president saw the resumption of diplomatic relations. Once again, however, tensions flared quickly, as Jordan arrested four Palestinians coming from Iran carrying huge amount of money, believed to be for plotting operations against Israel. Then, Jordan discovered a 16-member cell and arrested 83 others who received training in Iran. King Abdullah II of Jordan raised the issue with George W. Bush, a move that was not received too softly in Iran and accused King Abdullah of inciting the US against Iran. 

In 2010, King Abdullah urged president Obama to refrain from military force against Iran, referring to it as “Pandora’s Box.” King Abdullah asserted that Iran’s strength lies in rhetoric of injustice against Palestinians and Jerusalem, and that once those cards are off the table, Iran’s influence through Hezbollah and Hamas decreases substantially. He added that Iran has positioned itself as an advocate of Palestinian affairs, and as long as Israel commits human rights violations against Palestinians, Iran will keep revamping its military and causing tension in the region.

Despite all of these tensions, the situation never escalated further than that. The influx of Iraqi refugees into Jordan, however, brought a sizeable portion of Shiites. They slowly organized themselves and managed to convert tens of Jordanian Sunni families. In 2015, Jordan and Saudi affirmed their rejection of Iran’s approach in the region, and in 2016, Jordan rejected Iran’s request for half a million visas to visit Shiite holy sites in Jordan. Jordan’s situation was clearer, and it backed Saudi in its rivalry with Iran, especially that in 2018, Jordan’s Minister of Industry ruled out any economic or commercial rapprochement with Iran because of “the political divergence between the two countries.” Instead, Jordan reestablished its close economic ties with war-torn Iraq, a step Iran fears due to the historic ties of Jordan and Iraq, and the ability for economic prosperity to change Iraq’s stance in the region. Then, Iran’s “Shia crescent in the Eastern Mediterranean” could lose a major ally to one of the “wild cards.”  

Ultimately, Saudi and Iran are bitter rivals and are at a quasi-cold war through proxies; Saudi and Jordan are close allies with shared interests in the region, except for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; and Jordan and Iran experienced rivalry and allegiance, as the current situation can be explained through Lee, Muncaster, and Zinnes’ module of “the enemy of my friend is my enemy” or the “friend of my enemy is my enemy.”

Individual Strive for Pan-Islamic Leadership

This brief overview of the direct relations between the triad sets the stage to analyze the roles they have played in filling the vacuum of Pan-Islamist leadership. Cemile Aydin described that feelings of Muslim solidarity would be heightened when religious freedom is oppressed and threatened. The Ottoman Empire long served as the leader of the Muslim World, but its collapse left an ideological power vacuum. Saudi Arabia and Iran attempted filling the role. With Abdel Nasser’s policies of Pan-Arabism, Muslim solidarity was becoming more unattainable. Leaders of Saudi and Iran saw a united Muslim World as a solution to global and domestic issues.

Saudi Arabia

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia worked to rebuild the Muslim World in an age of nation states Saudi, who was worried about internal strife, feared Iran, and developed its internationalism narrative focused on Sunni message. Iran saw itself capable of leading Pan-Islamism, as it signaled out the Gulf monarchies and secular states for allying with USA. While Suliman’s Rushdie’s “The Satanic Verses” was under massive scrutiny, Khomeini capitalized and emerged as a spokesman of an imagined Muslim World and revealed that Muslims in the west were an extension into the heart of western civilization. Khomeini attempted to reform the Muslim World along the lines of postcolonial region still humiliated by the USA, Europe, Britain, and post-colonial Muslim elites and secular states allied with the West, mainly Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The following section explores the means through which the triad sought to demonstrate leadership of the Muslim World in the Cold War era. It also analyzes the impact of their actions on Pan-Islamist thought. 

Saudi Arabia’s quest for Islamic leadership has taken multiple shapes in the past. Aydin illustrates that King Faisal sought to modernize the country by utilizing oil. He was cited to have used narratives of Pan-Islamism to rally Muslim-majority states behind Saudi’s approach so that Saudi can emerge as the true leader of the Muslim World. The idea was that in a world of nation states interacting in a world economy, economically advanced countries have more agency in the world. 

Nawaf Obeid explores the dynamics of religion in Saudi’s governance. He indicates that the rules of Saudi have long shared power with the religious “Ulema”, a powerful group of spiritual leaders. Al Saud controlled the state and the Al Ash-Sheikh who are descendent of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab controlled religious institutions, albeit with the king holding the position of the country’s supreme religious leadership, mainly as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest two shrines. The Ulema hold many important positions in public institutions, such as judges, lawyers, and imams.

As such, Saudis consider themselves as the custodians of true Islam, Islam’s holiest two sites, and they consider themselves to preach the right form of Islam. Saudi’s leadership believe that the fall of the Ottoman Empire placed the banner of Islam in their hands, yet they believe it is their divine right to spread Wahhabi Islam, as Wahhabis managed to exert influence since 1979. Such an approach has led to the spread of violent forms of political Islam in many areas. Saudi’s view of their divine right to lead is manifested in their belief that they were chosen by God through the Prophet and the Arabic language, the language in which Islam was brought. This belief is contradictory to the essence of Islam which places morality over ethnicity. Ultimately, they managed to combine religious and nationalistic factors well to convince the world of their legitimacy as the supreme dynasty to carry the banner of Islam through their ethnicity and Arab origins. This approach, which Heghammer assigns the terms of “socio-revolutionary Islamism”, “classical jihadism”, and “global jihadism” to it, entails that Saudi’s Pan-Islamism is centered on macro-nationalism of an imagined Muslim community.

The Arab Spring posed a tremendous threat to Saudis quest for Pan-Islamist leadership. In essence, the empowerment of Islamists in many neighboring countries such as in Egypt and Tunisia, amongst others, entailed that Saudi Arabia was losing its “unique Islamic credentials.” While the Saudi regime was eager to contain these movements to maintain its regime and stance as the sole Islamic model in the region, the military coup in Egypt, which ousted Morsi breathed a sigh of relief for Saudi.

However, the rise of Prince Mohammed bin Salman into power saw a substantial change in Saudi’s Pan-Islamist aspirations. Bin Salman is changing the Kingdom into a secular state more than a theocratic one. His approach reasoned that Saudi’s sole role in the region in the past has been centered around its religious status, and to place that status at risk can result in a greater role in the region. Moreover, as Faisal Devji argues, Saudi’s project to turn into a politically-defined state rather than a religious-defined one can demolish the vision of an Islamic geography. Devji adds that this may also result in Islam finally becoming a truly global religion while the Middle East may still enjoy the pride of the place of its origin despite the fact that the vast majority of its believers reside elsewhere in the East. Devji concludes that Islam would inevitably find its home in Asia, as most of its followers live there in addition to the fact that wealth and development is achieving substantial results there. Saudi Arabia, with Mohammed Bin Salman’s vision, is on the verge of abandoning its quest for Pan-Islamic leadership, and with time, its only importance in Islam will remain merely in Mecca and Medina as the destination of pilgrimage.

This transformation in Saudi’s regional foreign policy has been manifested in the narrative. While Saudi’s allies in the region tend to be Sunni-majority states and its rivals tend to be Shiite-majority or Shiite-backed states, Saudi now reasons its approach through geopolitical narrative rather than religious. Part of this changing narrative has been Iran’s transformation in its regional foreign policy from exporting the revolution to advancing the interests of its leadership in gaining geopolitical importance. 

Iran

Iran’s Pan-Islamist leadership aspirations has long used Saudi Arabia as its foil. Iran claims that Saudi’s alliances with neo-imperialist global powers, mainly the United States, has weakened Saudi’s legitimacy as well as its Islamic identity. Instead, Iran views its resistance narrative as a more legitimate representation of Islamic geopolitics. As such, Iran’s worldview of the Muslim World and its Pan-Islamist narrative places United States as the enemy of Islam. For instance, Iran’s current president Hassan Rouhani urged Muslims of the world to unite against the United States. He added that if Muslims were to submit to the West and the United States, they would be betraying Islam and the future generations of the Middle East.

Unifying against a common enemy has long been a module utilized by nationalist movements, but in this context, Iran uses such narratives for Pan-Islamist and geopolitical purposes. Ayatollah Khamenei reduced the solution to the contemporary Muslim World to merely “unity amongst Muslim states” and “the weakening of America.” He added that only by following this module, Muslims of the world would be able to enjoy a bright future and Ummah would prosper. As such, Iran’s narrative of “unification of the ranks of Muslims against the enemies of Islam” was highlighted in 2008, which was referred to as “the year of Islamic unity,” and this is a shift from its previous efforts to spread the revolution. Moreover, Iran, after 40 years of its Islamic Revolution, has not exported its revolution, but it has, in fact, expanded its influence in the region. Iran’s leadership now utilize their 1979 movement to help Iran secure its interests and enhance its role in the region.

Iran now holds an annual Islamic Unity conference and its charter illustrates its guiding principles, manifested in Iran’s aspiration for Islamic cooperation. This document urges Muslims of various sects to refrain from “name-calling” or takfir (denouncing one’s faith or belief). This is the embodiment of Iran’s vahdat of Pan-Islamic unity. Despite the promise of this charter, much of Iran’s Pan-Islamist aspirations is geopolitical, to enhance its position as a leader of the Muslim World. These aspirations remain somewhat unattainable or hard to achieve given Iran’s characteristics as a Shiite Persian state, unlike Saudi Arabia who has used its Sunni Arab traits to advance its geopolitical interests in the past.

Iran’s Shiite traits placed limits on its aspirations, but recently, Iran’s leadership has turned towards embracing its Shiism and assume its role as the protector of Shiites within the Muslim World. Iran now embraces the Shiite communities around the Middle East to spread its sphere of influence to advance what King Abdullah II of Jordan referred to as “the Shia Crescent.” The pressing question is: has Iran been advancing a Pan-Islamist narrative or a Pan-Shia narrative. The short answer is both. Research shows that Iran aspires to utilize a Pan-Sha approach in order to advance its Pan-Islamist aspirations. In essence, Iran acknowledges the shortcomings of Pan-Shiism experiences in Central Asia and the Caucasus. They also know that to establish the Shia Crescent will not achieve any results beyond being denounced by Western powers, antagonizing Sunni Powers, and block Iran’s influence. As such, Iran seeks to refrain from any intra-Islamic confrontations in order to expand its sphere of influence beyond Shiite-majority areas. This explains Khamenei and Rouhani’s narrative in Muslim unity, refraining from takfir practices, and rallying under the banner of Islam against their imagined enemies in the West. 

Despite King Abdullah’s warning of the Shia Crescent in 2004 when he wanted to bring the attention to Iran’s regional behavior, Iran has been able to expand its influence in the Middle East. Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are now all under Iran’s direct sphere of influence. King Abdullah’s theory did not account for Saudi Arabia’s influence, using very similar approach. Yet, Iran seems to attempt to upstage Saudi in matters pertaining for Pan-Arabism. Muhammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, asserted that Iran will continue to support oppressed peopled globally, mainly Muslims. Nevertheless, analyses show that Iran only interferes when it concerns its own national interests, and while it mainly supports Shiites, it does support Sunnis if it is within its best interest to do so.

Iran’s policies in the region has served to develop loyalty to the region, and it has been successful with developing Shiite militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen who are trained by Iran and serve to preserve Iran’s influence. For instance, its support for the Houthis, a Yazidi Shiite sect, is explained through the lenses of protecting Shiites around the region. Iran has also been utilizing education, culture, and media to advance its geopolitical interests, by investing in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, supporting the Islamic Azad University networks in Syria and Iraq, and producing Arabic-speaking radio and television programs to affect public opinion, with Hezbollah in Lebanon being the embodiment of Iran’s approach in the Middle East, as it blends soft and strong power. 

Many of the scholars reviewed earlier asserted that Saudi Arabia transformed itself from preaching Pan-Islamism to advance its economic development, to highlighting its ethnic-religious superiority as the divine chosen leaders of the Muslim World, and eventually to stepping back from this role, as the new leadership seeks to enhance its geopolitical role, through social and secular reforms. Iran has also undergone certain changes in its Pan-Islamist narrative. Whereas Khomeini sought to expand the revolution, more recent approaches saw Iran preaching Islamic unity. Nowadays, Iran adopts a mixed method of Pan-Shiite and Pan-Islamist narrative, albeit for geopolitical purposes. 

Jordan

Jordan’s Pan-Islamism narrative is different from the duo. Jordan’s Pan-Islamic leadership aspirations can be seen as both reactionary and proactive. Both King Hussein who served as King of Jordan between 1952 – 1999 and King Abdullah II (1999-) highlighted their Hashemite heritage and direct lineage of Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II has been far more active in pursuing a Pan-Islamist leadership than his father, who was more concerned with Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, among other geopolitical challenges. King Hussein lived in a fragmented era, given the 1967 war, the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Iraq-Iran War, and the Gulf Wars. As such, he was more concerned with politics than religion, and he was content with Saudi Arabia assuming the role of leaders of the Muslim World, as he did not want to antagonize the Saudis. 

On the night of November 9th, 2005 Amman witnessed a major terrorist attack, as 3 hotels in the capital were bombed, leaving over 60 people dead and hundreds wounded. This gruesome event propelled Jordan to react. In a region of colliding Saudi Sunni messages, Wahhabism, Iran’s Pan-Shiite rhetoric, and terrorist organizations, Jordan’s leadership sought to assume a role of an advocate for moderate Islam.

King Abdullah II denounced radicalization and violent extremism as Islam’s biggest and most threatening enemy. He drafted the Amman Message, which was a document that sought to reiterate Islam’s true message. A year later, he enacted the “Kalema Sawaa’” and established the Inter-Faith Forum in efforts to establish effective dialogue amongst different world religions, highlight their similarities, and stress on the fact that violent extremism is the enemy of all religions. The inter-faith forum is a continuation of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Study established in 1994 by Prince Hassan bin Talal. He spoke at multiple international conferences with moderation, placing himself as a leader of moderate Islam, as he denounced the extremists as “Khawarej (the outlaws) of Islam.” His efforts received global recognition, as he received the Templeton Prize in 2018 due to his efforts in seeking “religious harmony within Islam and between Islam and other religions.”

More recently, Jordan has been under scrutiny in the region amidst efforts by regional leaders to shake Jordan’s position on the “Deal of the Century.” King Abdullah affirmed conspiracies penetrating into Jordan’s political and security apparatus to cause tension in the country and weaken its position on Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause as a whole. As such, he reiterated multiple times that his position is final and that “Jerusalem is a red line to him and all of his people” and that “his position on Jerusalem is unwavering.” In a transcript published by the Hashemite Royal Court, King Abdullah II was quoted affirming that Jordan’s position on the matter cannot be pressured and the answer will remain negative. He added that “Arabs and Muslims will stand with us.” 

Jordan’s position on the matter is threefold: first, Jordan holds a vast majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origins as well as Palestinian refugees and it is in Jordan’s best interest to advocate for their right of return. Secondly, Jordan sees the “alternative homeland” strategy within the “Deal of the Century” as undermining its own sovereignty and Palestinians’ right of return. Thirdly, Jordan’s Hashemite leadership is the legitimate custodian of the Al Aqsa mosque and other Islamic and Christian holy sites in East Jerusalem. This custodianship dates back to Sherif Hussein bin Ali, the leader of the Great Arab Revolt. The Hashemite’s custodianship is also recognized by the Palestinian Authority and is documented in the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty with Israel.

Further Discussion

Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East and the failure of regional powers to produce concrete solutions to the issues, radical alternatives became more attractive, particularly for young, disenchanted people. Saudi’s fixation on Iran and Iran’s disturbing behavior in the region left a void in the leadership of the Muslim World, as Jordan’s role was reactionary at heart. With that, violent extremist groups gained support to advance their own versions of Pan-Islamic worldview. In fact, the failures of regional powers contributed to the deepening of what is known as “the Fall from Grace.”

Fuller asserts that Islamist groups carry the banner of Islam in their rhetoric because it makes their quest for gaining legitimacy easier. The Fall from Grace is a romanticized notion and refers to an era in which Islamic civilization produced literary and technological innovations. Such groups, consequently, attribute the decline of the Muslim World to the transformation towards modern nation states and to the deviation from religion. With that, multiple violent extremist groups utilized this narrative in their quest for reestablishing the Caliphate, the most recent of which was Daesh, who denounced the vast majority of Middle Eastern countries as the enemy due to their failure in upholding religious law and resolve the region’s most pressing issues.

The rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia was to contain and counter Shia revival in Iran. Since then, Saudi Arabia emphasized its divine role as the rightful leader of the Muslim World. However, now that the state has developed its economy, the new leadership looks to give up its historic role in the region to move beyond a mere religious leader towards a geopolitical leader. On the other hand, Iran had initially sought to spread its revolution in the region, but slowly moved towards establishing a concrete geopolitical stance, through establishing and strengthening its sphere of influence. Now that Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen have all, in varying degrees, fell within Iran’s influence, the Islamic Republic continues its “Shiization” policies, as it recruits people from East and Central Asia and sends them back with a new ideology.

Iran’s leadership argues that their approach to assuming leadership of the Muslim World is through Pan-Islamist mechanism, however, their actions portray a Pan-Shiite end goal. This can be described a “cognitive dissonance”, a term borrowed from the field of psychology. In essence, Iran’s discourse is different than the policies and actions implemented. Iran’s interference in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain fall within its Pan-Shiite strategy to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region. It is not to protect Muslims despite their sects. 

The geopolitical relations amongst the triad of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan has done more harm to the Muslim World and Pan-Islamism than good in the Post-Cold War era. Saudi-Iran relations have been fragmented, and the two states are practically at a cold war. Jordan-Saudi relations have moved past the Hashemite-Saud rivalry over religious legitimacy and have moved on to develop close geopolitical strategic ties, to counter Iran. Jordan-Iran relations have gone through ups and downs, until Jordan chose to side with Saudi Arabia to stop the spread of the “Shia Crescent.” With the exception of a few initiatives led by Jordan such as the Amman Message, Kalema Sawaa’, Inter-Faith Forum, and its position on Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause, which have all been reactionary in nature, the three states, particularly Saudi and Iran have failed to demonstrate true leadership of the Muslim World. Instead, they remain wary of one another and craft their regional foreign policy in that regard. While Saudi is moving past its historic role as the leader of the Muslim World, Iran’s Shiite trait limits its quest and its aspirations remain cognitively dissonant, as Jordan’s prospects are contained by regional pressures. These geopolitical dynamics have enabled non-state actors to gain agency and pursue their own versions of the Muslim World and Pan-Islamism. 

In the midst of uncertainty over leadership of the Muslim World, Turkey is in fact slowly positioning itself a popular alternative to replace Saudi Arabia. In a study conducted by PEW Research Center in 2017, about 79% of respondents from the MENA region see Turkey as gaining a prominent actor in the region, tied with the Russia with 3% behind the United States and ahead of Iran, despite is regional behavior. Furthermore, 66% of Jordanians surveyed indicated favorable views towards Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, second to King Salman of Saudi Arabia with 86% favorability. These percentages may be closer nowadays following recent events in the region. Nevertheless, Turkey is slowly positioning itself to gain the role of the leader of the Muslim World, as the true successor of the Ottoman Empire. 

The complexity of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey nowadays pose challenges in the region but also creates opportunities, politically and religiously. To capitalize on these challenges and opportunities, a potential Pan-Islamist leader would need proper resources. Jordan cannot afford the resources, especially nowadays with the pressure posed by regional and global powers, but Jordan’s prospects has and will remain the consensus that a stable Jordan is in the best interest of all actors involved. Should religion remain highly important in the region, and World Values Survey data illustrates that it is, then Jordan could become the next leader of the Muslim World. The Hashemite leadership provide the legitimacy, and the actions taken by Jordan in this context have been moderate and portrayed leadership. 

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