The Impact of Supranational Identities on Interests in Jordan's Foreign Policy Making
Introduction
When discussing Jordan’s role in the Middle East, observers and scholars often attribute a disproportionate large role to the kingdom despite its small size, lack of resources, and more powerful neighbors. Unlike neighboring Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Jordan does not suffer from the presence of a variety of ethno-religious identities; instead, a predominantly Sunni nation with about 6% Christian community illustrate homogeneity on the surface. However, looking deeper into the demographic fabric of Jordan, we see a number of sub-state identities that play a large role in influencing foreign policy decision making. More specifically, Jordan is a home to a multigeneration Jordanians of Palestinian origins in addition to Jordanians or “East Bankers” or “Transjordanians”. Such a demographic makeup often transcends a common national Jordanian identity, resulting into major prevalence of supranational identities such as pan-Arab and Pan-Islamist identities. These demographics and identities along with its location and geographic proximity to many protracted conflicts in the region require cautious and very calculated foreign policy making, often taking the shape of omni-balancing.
In this paper, I look at the dynamics between identities and interests in Jordan’s foreign policy making. I examine how Jordan’s supranational identities, namely Pan-Arabist and Pan-Islamist identities, shape and influence its interests. I argue that these identities intertwine and overlap, further complicating foreign policy decision making in a sense that such identities take precedence on the expense of state national interests and ultimately result in shaping these interests to align with these supranational identities. In furthering this argument, I explore Jordan’s role in the ongoing Arab-Israeli. More specifically, I analyze how the precedence of identities over interests impacts domestic dynamics, foreign policy orientation, and foreign policy outcomes.
Theoretical Approach
In this case, supranational identities are those that transcend national identities. They are cross-border identities that often supersede nation states and their associated identities. Literature shows that this concept is vastly understudied, especially in the Middle East despite the fact that supranational identities are somewhat inescapable in the region given the underdevelopment of individual national identities. Instead, most literature studies this concept within the context of Europe. For instance, Zimmerbauer indicates that supranational identities contribute to the idea of bounded regions and regional identities, with Medrano, Ciornei, and Apaydin asserting that it implies solidarity, and Kennedy adding that supranational identities can be a stepping stone for democratization. Richard Lyons refers to supranational identities as an alternative form of identity, conversed with regional identities, national identities, place identities, historical and cultural identities, geographic identities, and socioeconomic and political identities, and together, they make “self-identity”. He asserts that a high degree of identification with a supranational identity may lead to a perceived conflict at the intra-national level.
Of the prevalent supranational identities in the Middle East and in Jordan, Pan-Arabist and Pan-Islamist identities are at the forefront. James Mellon indicates that these two identities provide a “supranational ideal transcending individual states as a focus of identity capable of shaping ends and means of foreign policy.” Adeed Dawisha in Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair looks at the foundation of Pan-Arab identity or Pan-Arab Nationalism as shaped by the rhetoric that Arab states can be stronger through economic, political, military, and cultural solidarity and cooperation. Arab Nationalists such as Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Baathists such as Hafez Al-Assad viewed Arab states as artificial entities, created by the West, to keep Arabs politically, economically, and militarily ineffective. This anti-imperialist narrative gave much attraction to this notion, propelling many Arabs to cling to this identity, as it remains a major draw until this very day. Ali Muhsen Hamed adds that much of this overarching consensus lies within the shared language and history that binds Arabs together, making the idea of transforming these bonds into political bonds appealing. Faheem Sheikh illustrates that while it has not been successful in achieving its goals (which have been contested in themselves), Pan-Arabism will remain prevalent as long as Israel remains in the region.
The second form of supranational identity is Pan-Islamic identity; that is the identification with the wider group of the Ummah. Cemil Ayden asserts that Pan-Islamist identity came into being as a response to the lack of leadership for the imagined Muslim World, which refers to narratives of geopolitics, civilization, and religious tradition. Ayden indicates that it is when Islam is under scrutiny or attack that Pan-Islamist identity is heightened. Moreover, Raymond Hinnerbusch reasons that historically, Arabs have identified with such groups far more intensely than they have with their territorial states. As such, many states and nonstate actors have worked towards utilizing this form of identity to rally support.
Supranational Identities in the Jordanian Context
How does Jordan view itself vis-à-vis these identities? Looking at the Jordanian constitution, Article 1 asserts that Jordan is a Hashemite Kingdom, it is an Arab state, and the Jordanian people is a part of the Arab Nation. Article 2 adds that Islam is the religion of the state. These two articles show identification and association with the overall Arab and Islamic identities. As for how Jordanians view themselves. The World Values Survey data shows that religion is very important for Jordanians, as stated by 95.4% of the general public, with 77.2% said unprompted that religious faith should be taught to children at home, 93.1% feel close to the Arab World, and 95.6% feel close to the Islamic World.
As such, it is evident that Jordan and Jordanians place great value and identify largely with Arabs and Muslims, but how does this affect foreign policy decision making? Mitzen asserts that states need to experience one-self as a whole to ensure their ontological security, Darwich adds that security is ensured vis-à-vis a stable conception of self-identity. Further unwrapping this conception, if a state has many competing identities, how does it maintain its security, let alone its interests. Acknowledging this challenge, Jordan prioritized people’s contestations of its identity and worked on shaping its interests as byproduct, as Lynch asserts “Jordan’s foreign policy can be best explained by incorporating public contestation of identity in which the interests of the state came to be defined rather than simply pursued.” Such a Constructivist method utilizes what is known as Steven David’s omni-balancing or Hinnerbusch’s domestic security dilemma. In essence, Jordan’s preferences are constructed through the intertwining and overlapping dynamics of these supranational identities, propelling Jordan to give its national interest in foreign policy making a passenger seat to the supranational identities, which in turn shape its foreign policy orientation to align more clearly with these identities, as they become the prime foreign policy determinants.The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is Jordan’s most important foreign policy issue. Its importance stems from geographic proximity posing a security threat. It also stems from Jordan’s Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic identities, along with the presence of a sizeable Palestinian community in the kingdom. Within this conflict, Jordan exhibits a major struggle between identities and interests, particularly through its dealings with Israel. Marc Lynch indicates that there are “sharp contradictions between demands of identity and of interests,” whereby Jordan’s identities would place Israel as its eternal enemy while its interests would view Israel as a necessary strategic partner. Jordan has carried out its dealings with Israel privately, “cautious of open collaboration that would place Jordan outside the Arab consensus and in violation of its own identity.
With the two options in mind (enemy or partner), Jordan approached the conflict cautiously. For many years, Jordan has been a strong advocate for the Two State Solution, particularly since its first official participation in direct Palestinian-Israeli peace talks that resulted in The Wye River Memorandum in 1998. King Abdullah, since ascending to the throne in 1999, placed major priority over the Two State Solution, often asserting that it is the only option and the only solution to the conflict and to peace in the region. He indicated numerous times that Jordan’s stance will not change. This is attributed to many reasons, as indicated earlier, but another reason is the Hashemite custodianship over Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, a near century long responsibility of the Jordan monarch, a source of legitimacy domestically, and a bargaining piece within the conflict. This custodianship has been contested; in fact, in 2017, the Saudi monarchy made public assertions that they look to challenge it. This can be explained through Darwich’s ontological insecurity of similarity argument, that Saudi’s leadership of the Islamic world is hindered in the presence of the Hashemites’ custodianship over Jerusalem’s religious sites.
Saudi’s remarks followed the United States’ decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, a move that preceded its declared “Deal of the Century”. Trump’s election into presidency saw a disruption to the peace process and associated resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as he essentially argued that a Two State Solution should not be the only option on the table. The Deal of the Century is proclaimed as the ultimate solution to the conflict, but it essentially ends the Palestinian quest and their right to return, with more Palestinians will be expelled from their homes into Jordan as their “substitute home.” One can argue that King Abdullah retrospectively warned of such an alteration. In fact, in his book Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril, he argues that “if we do not seize the opportunity presented by the now almost unanimous international consensus on the solution, I am certain we will see another war in our region-most likely worse than those that have gone before and with more disastrous consequences.”
The departure from the previously quasi-unanimous Two State Solution poses major complications for Jordan’s foreign policy making, particularly with the aforementioned supranational identities intact. Essentially, following the reveal of the proposed deal, Jordan has been pressurized by various world and regional leaders to alter its position on the deal, with various accounts conforming attempts to penetrate Jordan’s political and security institutions to weaken its position on the Palestinian cause. King Abdullah’s response to the Deal of the Century has been manifested through three No’s: “no to giving in on Jerusalem”; “no to alternative homeland for the Palestinians in Jordan”; and “no to settling the Palestinians in Jordan” which received an average of 94% strong support among Jordanians, as shown by a national poll conducted in August 2019.
Jordan’s seemingly unshaken position is driven by the fact that Jordan holds a vast majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origins and Palestinian refugees. As such it is imperative for Jordan to advocate for their rights. The alternative homeland rhetoric also poses a threat to Jordan’s own sovereignty as well as to the Palestinians’ right of return. In exchange for this firm stance, Jordan has been under massive pressure; for example, the Saudi-owned Ritz Carlton luxury hotel project in Amman has been halted and listed for sale for “government stubbornness”. There have also been many reports of an attempted coup or infiltrations into the Jordanian system. Many international nongovernment organizations have reduced their work in Jordan, particularly in the humanitarian sector. Additionally, with the rising unemployment rates in Jordan and the stagnant economic situation, it has been reported that Jordan would be financially pressured into agreement, as the United States can stop its annual $1.275b financial aid package to Amman while the Gulf States have been pumping endowments into the Central Bank of Jordan to further lure in the kingdom. Moreover, Jordan has been promised a share of the Saudi pledged $50b mega projects in Jordan, Egypt, Gaza, the West Bank, and Egypt.
Domestically, countless demonstrations have further solidified Jordan’s stance on the matter. However, one additional matter was conflated with the Deal of the Century: a natural gas deal between Jordan’s NEPCO (National Electric Power Company) and the US-based Noble Energy to supply Jordan with natural gas, albeit imported from Israel. This deal, while would provide Jordan with favorable prices, it would both position Israel as a mega provider of natural gas in the region and place Jordan under further pressure domestically. In fact, following the unveiling of the Deal of Century, Jordanians took to the streets to protest the gas deal as well, under the slogan “enemy gas is an occupation”.
As such, Jordan’s foreign policy making in the midst of all of this is as complicated as ever. On the one hand, political and economic pressures mount with rising unemployment and deteriorating economic situation. The kingdom is risking not only its biggest financial provider in the United States, but also its most important political ally. It would also risk the $1.5b penalty clause for the gas deal along with the risk of going back to the international market, a move that saw tremendous daily losses, particularly following a series of bombings of the Egyptian gas pipelines during the Egyptian revolution. And most importantly, Jordan is risking its political role on the peace process map, as its political and military power relative to the rest of the actors entail that it cannot sustain the pressures for long. On the other hand, Jordan would gain tremendous financial and economic benefits from the United States and especially the Gulf States, but it would be risking domestic support, from both Jordanians and those of Palestinian origins. As such, the situation can be best described as a process of clipping Jordan’s wings.
With that, if we were to look at the situation from the Realist point of view, it is mostly in Jordan’s best interest to agree to the deal to sustain its national, economic, and political securities. However, Jordan’s supranational identities are likely to trump such interests, with Jordanians’ closeness and identification and affiliation with the Arab and Islamic worlds add a serious dimension to be addressed. As a result, Jordan is left with the imperative to omni-balance the situation, with the spectrum leaning more towards the domestic security dilemma which is shaped by supranational identities.
As such, it is more realistic to illustrate the situation through a Constructivist point of view. As indicated earlier, a Realist point of view would propel Jordan to sign off on the deal; however, with increasingly vocal demonstrators, Jordan had to proceed with caution. In essence, a strictly economic deal (i.e. NEPCO’s deal with Noble Energy) was faced with major public discontent, meaning the kingdom cannot even justify its signing on the Deal of the Century, regardless of how unlikely that is. In other words, Jordan’s deal with Noble gave a realistic indicator to further shape its foreign policy orientation in the conflict, in a learning process that further shapes its interests. This means that Jordan’s interests came to be rather defined through this conflict, and they are likely to sustain themselves, particularly that any change in Jordanians’ identities is unlikely. Ultimately, the king’s “Three No’s” represent Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic identities and even interests, a process that shows an adoption and application of the public’s supranational identities onto its own national interests.
Conclusion
Understanding that it cannot possibly emerge out of this crisis without losses, Jordan looks to balance its national security with its domestic security dilemmas while looking to ensure the most favorable outcome out of this unfavorable identity-interest dichotomy. Jordan’s foreign policy making toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict especially amid the Deal of the Century has been more shaped by its identities rather than interests. It prioritizes its supranational identities over its national interests, elevating the importance of domestic security dilemma higher than the traditional security dilemma, and further leaning the spectrum of omnibalancing domestically. As such, Jordan has and will likely continue to place greater priority on its supranational identities over its interests. Finally, given Jordan’s decision making resilience and history of forging middle paths, it has shifted its interests to align more clearly with its supranational identities, following a constructivist learning process of its own identities.
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At MENAACTION, we do not only highlight the challenges our young peers face in the Middle East and North Africa region, but we also believe that the region is a home to thousands of successful young people who have accomplished a great deal. With that, this is a space designated to highlight success stories of MENA youth.
Iran's Dustbowl Migration
The once vibrant wetland culture of Hamun has now become a relic with scenes of abandoned boats and dried up lake beds
It seems only a few decades ago, when Iran was home to some of the Earth’s most fertile and agricultural land. Large permanent rivers flowed through and contributed sediment-rich soil to the abundant oasis that previously characterized Khuzestan, a southwestern province of Iran. Similarly, Iran’s historical southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan Province, housed a once-vibrant agricultural community and vast wetlands known as the Hamun Wetlands, an oasis in an otherwise Mars-like landscape.
Khuzestan Province neighbor Iraq’s southern marshlands is an area historically known as the Mesopotamian Marshes. The region is often referred to as the ‘Cradle of Civilization’ for being home to ancient civilizations, such as Sumer and Babylon who made sophisticated use of the dense marshland. Surrounded by a vast arid landscape, has made it a unique yet abundant biome filled with fish, migratory birds, and even big cats such as lions, tigers, leopards, and cheetahs that once heavily prowled but have had their ranges significantly reduced due to human activity.
Prior to the onset of desertification and 20-year drought that began after the 1950s due to Afghanistan building a dam on the Helmand River, these once thriving cradles of civilizations have become desolate wastelands resulting in the exposure of both lakebeds and the consequences of human negligence on the environment. The once vibrant wetland culture of Hamun has now become a relic with scenes of abandoned boats in dried up lake beds and skeletal remains of fish baking in the scorching sun being common sightings.
When we think about climate change, our minds often evoke replayed images that you see on commercials for climate change advocacy such as melting ice caps, rising sea levels, and island nations being swallowed up which does not cover the whole story of our changing planet.
“Desertification is a slow-moving disaster,” says Dr. Kristina Shull, a current post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University. Shull specializes in the intersections of history, migration and policy and noted this process is in part a result of water mismanagement, such as the over-use of dams, as well as government corruption. “Local and regional politics are also shaped by global inequalities exacerbated by US sanctions and histories of colonialism,” she says.
Desertification, drought, dust storms, and rising temperatures in the Middle East are largely an overlooked topic, mainly due to its numerous conflicts, sectarian schisms, and ongoing proxies that achieve mainstream media attention.
Neighboring the harsh mountainous desert terrain of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran’s southeast-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan Province is one of the least developed regions of Iran taking shape in a lack of infrastructure and economic development resulting in the region having the lowest per capita income in Iran. This purposeful neglect has resulted in over 70 percent of the Baloch living below the poverty line by State Department estimates due to state-sponsored marginalization-resulting from the Baloch being a Sunni minority in a Shiite theocracy. This, coupled with having to face extreme drought has prompted resistance and anger towards the Iranian government among the local majority ethnic population — its Baloch-Sunni residents. Dry winds, similar to the wildfire igniting Santa Ana winds of California, dominate the region and are known as the “Wind of 120 Days”, and have a fearsome reputation among U.S. service members in Afghanistan who faced these winds first-hand with numerous injuries being attributed to being physically lifted up and being pegged by loose objects. However, the number of days in this storybook title is increasing as the lack of moisture fuels the intensity and recurrence of these harsh desert winds.
A prime example of this crisis can be seen in southern Iran where thermometers consistently hit a scorching 110F (43.3C), and maximum temperatures of 131F (55C) being recorded at an alarmingly increased rate. For U.S. readers to relate, Iran is undergoing a modern-day Dust Bowl.
Notably, climate migration within the Middle East is a growing contributor to internal displacement and deserves more attention from the mainstream media and multilateral action. Minority-inhabited territories such as Khuzestan and Balochistan, with already marginalized local tribes, are generally rich in resources and agricultural potential. Yet exploitative policies coupled with water mismanagement due to corruption are severely affecting traditional livelihoods. This mismanagement and political negligence have exacerbated the environmental crisis in addition to humanitarian impacts encompassing food insecurity, mass migration, health hazards, soil deterioration and desertification. “Those on the front lines and who are most directly affected are often of indigenous or minority communities who have been historically and economically marginalized and experiencing environmental racism as a result,” states Dr. Shull.
The Baloch tribes, local to Balochistan, depended on managing fisheries along the Hamun river for survival – an oasis in a barren landscape. Following drastic and swift change of the landscape due to drought, the local Baloch have had to pack up their former livelihoods and migrate elsewhere where they will likely face discrimination. Nearly one-fifth of the Sistan-Baluchistan province’s inhabitants have either had to move to neighboring provinces inland or are at-risk of being displaced immediately due to deteriorating conditions. Likewise in Khuzestan Province to the west of Sistan-Baluchistan, many agricultural livelihoods depended on producing and exporting lucrative crops such as dates, wheat, barley, and sugar cane. Today, these livelihoods are at stake with the lack of moisture in drying plains allowing dust to rise before winds carry it away creating unstable and weakened soil, which is not ideal for agriculture. The weakened soil has made it susceptible to being blown away forming into massive dust storms which encapsulates major cities such as Abadan and Ahvaz.
The environmental impact from desertification has become detrimental both to the health and livelihoods of the local populace resulting in residents emigrating en-masse to northern Iranian cities in order to escape desertification.
The wetlands of Hamun suffered major dry spells by the start of 1950s but the conditions worsened significantly in the late 1990s where Southern Iran suffered a water crisis. By 2011, Khuzestan had the third largest level of emigration — behind Tehran and East Azerbaijan Provinces. The negative environmental impact in Khuzestan is so bad that it has caused many government employees, enjoying the most stable jobs in Iran through its current economic crisis, to even submit requests to move to other cities due to the mismanagement of water and the accompanying drought making conditions unbearable. By 2018, drinkable water had become so scarce, it had to be rationed among individual Abadan residents.
In both regions of Iran, development projects in the form of dams take some of the blame in these drastic environmental changes. Dam projects resulting in environmental catastrophe seem to be the norm in recent years, as evidenced by tragedies such as the Brumadinho dam disaster in Brazil earlier this year. Per the norm, against the advice of environmental experts and cautionary preliminary studies, the Gotvand Dam was built upon the Karun River near the Gachsaran Salt Mine in Khuzestan Province in 2012, to supply sugar cane plants with hydro-electric energy and since then has increased water salinity to levels that inhibit its use in agriculture and even drinking. This has had a primarily negative impact on the marginalized Ahwazi Arabs of Iran who’s farming livelihoods have been hampered by increased salinity levels from the Gotvand Dam.
Development projects and political corruption go hand-in-hand in producing disastrous results for the environment. The local populaces contend that the detrimental decision-making is because none of the cabinet members of Presidential administrations came from either of these regions, despite their economic and political importance due to water, farming and oil resources as well as a sizeable heavy industry base and electricity generation. Instead, ministries are dominated by relatively powerful local figures made up of both politicians and clerics, from Isfahan, Kerman, and Yazd, provinces who profit from the exploitation of these regions by operating in a mafia-like manner rife with embezzlement of state-funds and payoffs, similar to that of the political machines of the late-19th century in the United States who effectively ruled cities such as Chicago – a common theme now in authoritarian countries marked by a lack of effective internal oversight. Disenfranchised farmers stripped of their livelihoods have even disrupted official prayer ceremonies that are essentially religious distractions to showcase false piety and turn attention away from the real issues, such as the case in Isfahan in 2018 where farmers from rural areas banded together and turned their backs towards the aforementioned corrupt clerics while chanting anti-state slogans in a show of solidarity.
“Climate change contributes to social conflict and unrest we are seeing world-wide. However, governmental responses that are repressive create a feedback loop that in turn exacerbates the disparate impacts of climate change, social inequities, and so on,” states Dr. Shull
The lack of inclusivity in the policy-making process increases the marginalization of ethnic minorities such as the Ahwazi Arabs and Balochis in terms of policy impacts. While both ethnic groups have been represented by organized armed resistance from their fringes towards the Iranian government in response to state marginalization, both the Ahwazi Arab and Baloch people face a changing environment and climate as the ultimate obstacle in achieving stable livelihoods while voicing their frustrations with the state. While individuals attempt to stay in their ancestral homelands of Khuzestan and Balochistan, others feel the strain of staying in an unstable environment and migrate towards more developed urban centers in the north of Iran to achieve new livelihoods.
First Published on Eon Magazine
https://www.eonmag.org/irans-dustbowl-migration/?fbclid=IwAR2AS5UiBAP8QE9RuRzQif4_UTV0lY42wmVedACkOEVVQMgC1tKMG8va774
An Analysis of the Triadic Relationship of Saudi, Iran, and Jordan and The Impact on Pan-Islamism in the Post-Cold War Era
Introduction
The Cold War era in the Middle East saw the emergence of various colliding ideologies, with kingdoms ideologically deterring Nasser’s Pan-Arabism quest at the core of the mid-twentieth century. The post-Cold War era was just as scrambled in the Middle East as it was throughout the world. With global powers marking the end of their mega financial and security support to their-once-proxies, the Middle East was set for the emerging Sunni-Shia rhetoric to be heightened at its central stage. As such, Saudi Arabia and Iran began to exert their spheres of influence in the region, and by the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, one can argue that Muslim states in the region are aligned with one sphere or the other.
Despite different social and political ideologies penetrating Middle Eastern states at the national and local levels, Islamic ideologies retained their importance not only in shaping state dynamics, but also in shaping Pan-Islamism, as states pushed their own versions of the Muslim World. Since the decline of the Ottoman Empire and ultimately its fall, Muslim states sought to revitalize the role of the leader of the Muslim World. Three states have been at the forefront of this quest in the Post-Cold War era: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran see themselves as the rightful and legitimate leader of the Muslim World, while Jordan’s Hashemite leadership has advanced its own imaginative Muslim World through the lenses of Hashemite legitimacy. On the local level, the Arab Barometer Wave II illustrates that 54% of Saudi Arabian respondents and 44% of Jordanian respondents disagree that religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life. Similarly, according to the World Values Survey, 94.3% of Iranian respondents and a staggering 99.5% of Jordanian respondents characterize religion as either “rather important” or “very important,” ultimately showcasing the role played by religion in state-state relations, state-society dynamics, and societal relations.
While the conventional discussion of the Muslim World in the modern era automatically is inherently narrow, placing Saudi Arabia as the global leader of Sunnis and Iran as the global leader of Shiites, the role played by the Hashemites in Jordan is ought to be incorporated in the discussion of Pan-Islamism. As such, this paper explores the impact of the triad of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan on Pan-Islamism. It addresses the roles played and the avenues utilized by these states in filling the vacuum of Pan-Islamism and advancing their geopolitical interests. As such, this triad’s attempt to exert religious legitimacy and exercise the lead role in the Muslim World has changed in the past 28 years, and it has resulted in enabling non-state actors to pursue their own versions of Pan-Islamic thought, albeit through violent extremist means.Analytical Framework
In order to explore the impact of this triad on Pan-Islamism, it is important to define what a triad and Pan-Islamism are. Alex Mintz defines triads in his article “Triads in International Relations: The Effect of Superpower Aid, Trade, and Arms Transfers on Conflict in the Middle East.” He indicates that triads consist of three members of the international community, such as countries A, B, and C. He adds that any two countries of a triad “may be linked through formal or informal alliance structures, while two may have a hostile relationship or one nation has influence on the other two nations.” Furthermore, Lee, Muncaster, and Zinnes explore triadic interactions through their module of: “the friend of my friend is my friend, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and the enemy of my friend is my enemy.” The authors add that this rule manifests itself in the creation and preservation of the polarity of regions, as the nature of relations whether amiable or hostile intensify with time. These dynamics can be seen, at face value, in the triad of Saudi, Iran, and Jordan. With the first two in a clear intensifying hostility, Jordan’s position had to be determined with this increasing conflictual relationship.
As for the Muslim World and Pan-Islamism, Cemile Aydin, in his book “The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History,” explores these notions throughout the late 18th century until the end of the Cold War. The idea of the Muslim world and Pan-Islamism embrace and incorporate the notion of Muslim unity. In fact, Cemile Aydin illustrates that the idea of the Muslim World refers to narratives of geopolitics, civilization, and religious tradition. He adds that it does not mean Ummah, which refers to the Muslim community, expressing unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings. Both Cemile Aydin and Dwight Lee attribute the emergence of the idea of the Muslim World as well as Pan-Islamism to Europeans’ categorization of race. Aydin indicates that Pan-Islamists and Islamophobes utilized the imaginative idea of Muslim unity in ways to advance their own agenda, as they argued for and responded to racialization. Lee adds that Pan-movements emerged as a trend, responding to Europeans’ racialization of groups. He argues that Pan-Islamism “was probably adopted as an imitation of Pan-Slavism.”
Many of the themes and parameters he utilized in his analysis are still prevalent today, including Muslim unity and solidarity, narratives of Islamophobia, Pan-Islamic discourse, public opinion, and state and non-state actors attempting to fill the vacuum left by the caliphate. As such and given the rise of ferocious extremist organizations, it is important to analyze the extent to which the contemporary shape of the Muslim World, particularly the aforementioned triangle, contributed to allowing the motives and space for such organizations to advance their own agenda. The prevalent geopolitical rivalry of Sunna-Shia and its inability to produce appropriate responses to islamophobic narrative have fragmented the Muslim World and hindered Pan-Islamic thought and ultimately allowed for terrorist organizations to gain a voice in the discourse despite Jordan’s efforts.
Relations Among the Three States
Before discussing the roles played by the triad, it is important to provide a background about the relations between the three countries. The following section offers an overview of the relations of Saudi Arabia with Iran, Saudi Arabia with Jordan, and Iran with Jordan.
Saudi Arabian-Iran Relations
The dynamics and relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be viewed through the lenses of the Realist international affairs theory, with emphasis on rivalry, distrust, and embracing conflictual relations to gain internal support. Scholars including Cemile Aydin in The Idea of the Muslim World, Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp in Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, Gwenn Okruhlik in “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and Internal Consolidation,” and Frederic Wehrey et. al in Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for US Policy, all provided analyses of Saudi-Iran relations through realism.
Saudi-Iranian relations cannot be addressed without understanding the impact of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the dynamics it posed on the region in general and in Saudi Arabia in specific. In fact, the aforementioned scholars marked the revolution as the start of their rivalry, and this rivalry has been manifested in religious legitimacy and regional security and hegemony. Aydin asserts that Saudi Arabia feared the impact of the revolution on its internal societal fabrics, given the sizeable Shiite community. Iran’s leadership began voicing an anti-West and anti-allies-of-the-West narrative, with Saudi Arabia at the core, as they saw the Kingdom as America’s eyes, ears, and hands in the region. As such, ties with the United States has been an integral part of Iran’s narrative in the region. More specifically, Iran sees Saudi as a “client of the US” who implements the orders provided from Washington, an outside force to which it denounces a “demonic role”. These orders include economic issues such as oil prices and political matters with Palestine at the core.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked the beginning of the religious primacy rivalry. Aydin reports Ayatollah Khomeini’s narrative towards Saudi Arabia, arguing that the leaders of the Kingdom has failed to be a leader of the Muslim World, and it was time for Iran to demonstrate its religious legitimacy, as they questioned the compatibility of monarchy with true Islam. With time, the relationship between the two states became centered around competition for legitimacy as leaders of Islam. For Saudi Iran’s threat was about the power of the ideals portrayed by its leaders who sought to expand revolutionary Islam, as a foil to Saudi’s failed policies. As such, Iran’s model proclaimed the spread of true Islam, and that as its rightful leaders, they would speak as its imaginative universal authority. They saw Saudi’s approach as passive, unlike Iran’s which supported Muslim rights, albeit through militant means.
Khomeini saw his divine right to rule and urged the Shiite community in Saudi to fulfill their roles and follow the example of Iran, whereas King Fahd of Saudi countered with asserting that Iran’s actions were “against the interests of Islam, the Muslim World, and the stability of the Middle East.”
Saudi Arabia was facing its own internal issues, including the ramifications of the 1979 Islamic Revolutions on the social dynamics, the rise of oppositions, Islamism, succession struggles, demonstrations, the effects of the Gulf War, and socioeconomic issues. With struggle comes opportunity, and for Saudi’s leadership, it was time to embrace an outside enemy to suppress the internal issues. Gwen Okruhlik argues that regimes facing issues at home create enemies abroad for the idea that external conflict results in internal cohesion, manifested in rallying around the flag. As such, Saudi Arabia began to move away from the possibility of reconciliation with Iran and more towards embracing it as its inherent ideological enemy, to face domestic issues.
In a region of majority Arab Sunni states, Iran’s worldview of the Middle East has been one of insecurity, particularly following the 1979 Revolution, the subsequent war with Iraq, and the Gulf War. Kayhan Barzegar illustrates that while Iran’s posture in the Middle East is inherently one of insecurity, the solution does not lie within policies of containment, isolation, or destabilization. An International Crisis Group report titled “Iran’s Priorities in a Turbulent Middle East,” further highlights the roots of Iran’s sense of insecurity in the region, asserting that Iran was at the wrong end of a tremendous sense of strategic solitude throughout the war with Iraq. It was the fact that Arab states stood behind Saddam’s government in hopes of containing Iran’s revolutionary ideals from spreading into the region, thus pushing Iran towards forging relations with Hafez Al-Assad in Syria and establishing Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Consequently, with the fall of Saddam and the Baathists in Iraq, Iran’s arguably biggest rival was gone, resulting in further concerns in Saudi Arabia over Iran’s regional ambitions manifested in expanding its sphere of influence by not only physically surrounding the Kingdom with allies but also by outshining its leadership in major Pan-Arab issues including Palestine. Moreover, from 2003 up until the end of the first wave of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, all of a sudden, found itself surrounded by Iran’s allies and proxies. Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Qatar, and Yemen are now within Iran’s sphere of influence, gaining the Islamic Republic a geographic advantage over the Kingdom, thus, perhaps leveling the military superiority which has kept Saudi feeling safe.
Saudi Arabian-Jordanian Relations
Saudi-Jordanian relations are now among the most important and strategic in the region. Multiple data sources show that Jordanians have a high favorable views toward Saudi, with 83% of Jordanians describing their views as very favorable in 2017. Arab Barometer Data highlight the economic relations between the two states, as 78% of Jordanians indicated their hopes for the economic relations with Saudi to became stronger in 2017 than it was in the year before. Data from Konrad Adenauer Stiftung illustrate that 22.4% of Jordanians view Saudi as Jordan’s strongest ally, second to the United States, while 58% perceived Saudi to have an influence on Jordan. Moreover, current relations between the two countries are highly positive. One can argue that the relations are good because of economic reasons and because of geopolitical reasons.
Jordan’s economic stagnation has caused tremendous tension internally. Saudi Arabia, concerned for the impact an unstable Jordan could have on an already gruesome situation in the region, ran to Jordan’s aid. In 2011 Jordan received $1.7 billion, in aid from the GCC, mainly Saudi, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar, as part of a $5 billion in financial aid for development in Jordan. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia is a home to a sizeable number of Jordanian workers. Of the 750,000 Jordanians working abroad, it is estimated that 400,000 work in Saudi Arabia, who actively send remittances home. These remittances sent by Jordanian workers in Saudi comprise for 10% of Jordan’s GDP ($3.8 billion) annually. These economic factors, in the form of foreign aid and remittances, are not the only factors shaping relations between the two countries, as geopolitical factors play an integral role.
In fact, one can argue that Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Jordan serves towards its own sphere of influence to counter Iran’s. The rise of Iran as a geopolitical force along with its perceived threat on the region’s Sunni monarchies led both Jordan and Saudi to each other. At a first glance, the alliance is imbalanced with Saudi’s wealth far surpasses Jordan’s, who remains reliant on the financial support of its allies, including Saudi Arabia. However, Jordan is just as important for Saudi Arabia. Jordan’s location is strategic for Saudi in its quest for containing Iran’s expanding bloc. The two countries have implemented numerous military strategies together. On the ideological level, Jordan being a Sunni Arab monarchy is just like Saudi and a direct foil to Iran.
The current relations between the two kingdoms tend to turn a blind eye on their darker past. The two kingdoms did not always see eye to eye. King Hussein of Jordan over the span of 4 decades kept Saudi on their toes. He consistently highlighted his direct descent from prophet Muhammad and that he was the grandson of Sherif Hussein bin Ali, the leader of the Great Arab Revolt, thus giving him a legitimate claim over Arab leadership. King Hussein sent hints and messages at Saudi indicating that his ancestors came from Saudi and one day he could regain that. Given the nature of the rise of the Al-Sauds, such claims had to be taken seriously.
Putting these differences aside, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sought to lure in Jordan with financial aid. In the 1970s, over 40% of all budgetary aid of the two Gulf countries was provided to Jordan in the form of grants, subsidized oil, or low-interest loans. Jordanian workers were sending remittances back to Jordan. Thus, both factors were enhancing Jordan’s economic stability. For Saudi Arabia, a stable Jordan was essential for its own security, as Jordan was a buffer from the Arab-Israeli conflict and radical ideologies. By the mid 1980s, Saudi and Kuwait began decreasing their foreign aid to Jordan, due to the ramifications of the Iran-Iraq war in which the two countries were spending big, as oil prices decreased. As such, Jordan turned to form alliances with two of its most immediate neighbors: Syria and Iraq. With Syria, Jordan had hoped to increase bilateral trade and form a united front in seeking funds from the GCC. Jordan’s alliance with Iraq was problematic for Syria and for Saudi Arabia later on. When Jordan needed to make a decision between Iraq and Syria, Iraq’s financial prospects to Jordan made the difference.
Jordan’s relations with Iraq solidified, and in 1990, Jordan was one of the very few countries who stood with Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait. This has led to tensions between Amman and Ryadh. For King Hussein of Jordan, Baghdad was essential, and his alliance with Saddam Hussein was financially rewarding in aid and oil support. With the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Jordan remained a channel for Iraqi funds, businessmen, and even trade exchanges to circumvent the blockade. Later on, it dawned on Jordan that it had just lost one of its most important economic and political, let alone wealthy allies, sending Jordan back towards restoring and strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia. The situation this time was less problematic for Saudi, as King Abdullah II of Jordan was unlike his father. King Abdullah acknowledged his Jordanian identity and worked towards building a solidified Jordanian identity on the basis of pride in country and flag. The byproduct of such actions was that Saudi no longer feared a Jordanian imaginative divine return to Saudi lands as its rightful leaders.
While current relations are positive, they are not at the peak they reached in 2011 – 2016 anymore, for two important reasons. Jordanian public opinion has been growing more critical of Saudi Arabia, particularly in regards to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The brutality of the action and the media attention it gained affected Jordanians’ views toward Saudi. The second important matter is the issue in Jerusalem, in what has become to be known as the “Deal of the Century.” Deal of the Century is portrayed as the ultimate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it entails the end of the Palestinian quest and their right to return. Instead, more Palestinians will be expelled from their homes into Jordan as their “substitute home.”
A brief analysis of the region shows that major GCC countries including Saudi Arabia have signed off on the deal, leaving Jordan behind as a strong antagonist to the deal. King Abdullah II of Jordan spoke consistently and repeatedly that Jordan is a red line and will never succumb to any pressures, and that he will continue to advocate for the Two State Solution. The Gulf countries led by Saudi seem to be persistent on realizing the deal. June of 2018 saw a major wave of demonstrations in Jordan against structural adjustments and taxation laws. Saudi Arabia and UAE pledged $2.5 billion in aid to Jordan, presumably to support the kingdom out of its economic struggles, though many sources suggest that the underlying message was to pressure Jordan towards accepting the deal.
Iranian-Jordanian Relations
Jordan’s relations with Iran are much more complicated to unfold. While 83% of Jordanians indicated high favorable views of Saudis in 2017, only 4% of Jordanians indicated high favorability towards Iran. Jordanian-Iranian relations have resembled a roller-coaster, with times the two states enjoyed great relations, with other times they would appear as bitter rivals. Interestingly, and despite Saudi Arabia’s influence on Jordan’s stance towards Iran, it was not until recent years that Jordan began dealing with Iran as Saudi’s rival.
Dr. Mohannad Mobidien argues that Jordan-Iran’s relations were characterized by cooperation and understanding during Iran’s monarchy era between 1949 – 1979. King Hussein of Jordan and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran inaugurated Jordan’s embassy in Tehran in 1959. Jordan and Iraq had agreed to counter the United Arab Republic by creating the Arab United Kingdom in 1965, however, the revolution in Iraq ended the prospect for that, thus pushing Jordan towards bolstering its relations with Iran to ensure sovereignty, independence, and security. In 1960, however, relations between the two countries began to worsen when Iran recognized Israel. While the Shah of Iran reiterated that it was not a new stance for Iran, King Hussein of Jordan urged him to change his position. Later on, while Jordan recognized the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representatives of Palestinians, Iran acknowledged Hamas as the legal representatives of Palestinians.
Jordan’s leadership welcomed the new “Islamic Republic” following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran with open arms. Will Fulton, however, indicates that relations between the two countries were immediately strained with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. It was all due to the fact that King Hussein held close ties with the Pahlavi monarchy of Iran. Nevertheless, the war with Iraq meant that Jordan had to take a position. As such, King Hussein backed Iraq in all conferences, meetings, summits, and visits around the world. Jordan provided volunteer fighters to Iraq and established fifteen centers in Amman which recruited 2,500 volunteers to fight for Iraq. As King Hussein continued to support Iraq in all means possible, including granting access to port of Aqaba for transporting military supplies, Syria mirrored Jordan’s actions with Iran and provided it with ground and airspace, transporting 1,500 Iranian soldiers to South Lebanon.
After the Gulf war, Jordan’s alliance with Iraq against Iran hindered ties between the two countries, especially that many reports suggested direct Jordanian involvement with Iraq against Iran, an action that is harder to reconcile from. With the passing of Khomeini in 1989, Iran’s foreign policy in the region turned towards normalization relations with Arab neighbors, which meant that they had to ensure that their policies do not involve “exporting the revolution.” During the second Gulf War in 1990, Jordan’s position at the United Nations kept relations positive with Iran, as Jordan’s representative to Iran and later the Foreign Minister visited Iran. Such actions steered diplomatic relations back on track. The situation did not last long, as Jordan discovered a violent extremist organization under the name “Jadish Mohammad” who admitted receiving support from Iran. A few months later, Jordan discovered armories which it perceived as a direct threat to the regime. Hamas admitted that the source was Iran, but the aim was to supply the West Bank.
In 1994, Jordan signed the Wadi Araba Peace Treaty with Israel, which sparked massive criticisms from Iran. Jordan expelled Iran’s ambassador in Jordan along with 21 diplomats under the charges of establishing terrorist cells in Jordan for both Hamas and Hezbollah, and following the killing of a Jordanian diplomat in West Beirut. Three years later, the election of Mohammed Khatami as Iran’s new president saw the resumption of diplomatic relations. Once again, however, tensions flared quickly, as Jordan arrested four Palestinians coming from Iran carrying huge amount of money, believed to be for plotting operations against Israel. Then, Jordan discovered a 16-member cell and arrested 83 others who received training in Iran. King Abdullah II of Jordan raised the issue with George W. Bush, a move that was not received too softly in Iran and accused King Abdullah of inciting the US against Iran.
In 2010, King Abdullah urged president Obama to refrain from military force against Iran, referring to it as “Pandora’s Box.” King Abdullah asserted that Iran’s strength lies in rhetoric of injustice against Palestinians and Jerusalem, and that once those cards are off the table, Iran’s influence through Hezbollah and Hamas decreases substantially. He added that Iran has positioned itself as an advocate of Palestinian affairs, and as long as Israel commits human rights violations against Palestinians, Iran will keep revamping its military and causing tension in the region.
Despite all of these tensions, the situation never escalated further than that. The influx of Iraqi refugees into Jordan, however, brought a sizeable portion of Shiites. They slowly organized themselves and managed to convert tens of Jordanian Sunni families. In 2015, Jordan and Saudi affirmed their rejection of Iran’s approach in the region, and in 2016, Jordan rejected Iran’s request for half a million visas to visit Shiite holy sites in Jordan. Jordan’s situation was clearer, and it backed Saudi in its rivalry with Iran, especially that in 2018, Jordan’s Minister of Industry ruled out any economic or commercial rapprochement with Iran because of “the political divergence between the two countries.” Instead, Jordan reestablished its close economic ties with war-torn Iraq, a step Iran fears due to the historic ties of Jordan and Iraq, and the ability for economic prosperity to change Iraq’s stance in the region. Then, Iran’s “Shia crescent in the Eastern Mediterranean” could lose a major ally to one of the “wild cards.”
Ultimately, Saudi and Iran are bitter rivals and are at a quasi-cold war through proxies; Saudi and Jordan are close allies with shared interests in the region, except for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; and Jordan and Iran experienced rivalry and allegiance, as the current situation can be explained through Lee, Muncaster, and Zinnes’ module of “the enemy of my friend is my enemy” or the “friend of my enemy is my enemy.”
Individual Strive for Pan-Islamic Leadership
This brief overview of the direct relations between the triad sets the stage to analyze the roles they have played in filling the vacuum of Pan-Islamist leadership. Cemile Aydin described that feelings of Muslim solidarity would be heightened when religious freedom is oppressed and threatened. The Ottoman Empire long served as the leader of the Muslim World, but its collapse left an ideological power vacuum. Saudi Arabia and Iran attempted filling the role. With Abdel Nasser’s policies of Pan-Arabism, Muslim solidarity was becoming more unattainable. Leaders of Saudi and Iran saw a united Muslim World as a solution to global and domestic issues.
Saudi Arabia
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia worked to rebuild the Muslim World in an age of nation states Saudi, who was worried about internal strife, feared Iran, and developed its internationalism narrative focused on Sunni message. Iran saw itself capable of leading Pan-Islamism, as it signaled out the Gulf monarchies and secular states for allying with USA. While Suliman’s Rushdie’s “The Satanic Verses” was under massive scrutiny, Khomeini capitalized and emerged as a spokesman of an imagined Muslim World and revealed that Muslims in the west were an extension into the heart of western civilization. Khomeini attempted to reform the Muslim World along the lines of postcolonial region still humiliated by the USA, Europe, Britain, and post-colonial Muslim elites and secular states allied with the West, mainly Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
The following section explores the means through which the triad sought to demonstrate leadership of the Muslim World in the Cold War era. It also analyzes the impact of their actions on Pan-Islamist thought.
Saudi Arabia’s quest for Islamic leadership has taken multiple shapes in the past. Aydin illustrates that King Faisal sought to modernize the country by utilizing oil. He was cited to have used narratives of Pan-Islamism to rally Muslim-majority states behind Saudi’s approach so that Saudi can emerge as the true leader of the Muslim World. The idea was that in a world of nation states interacting in a world economy, economically advanced countries have more agency in the world.
Nawaf Obeid explores the dynamics of religion in Saudi’s governance. He indicates that the rules of Saudi have long shared power with the religious “Ulema”, a powerful group of spiritual leaders. Al Saud controlled the state and the Al Ash-Sheikh who are descendent of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab controlled religious institutions, albeit with the king holding the position of the country’s supreme religious leadership, mainly as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest two shrines. The Ulema hold many important positions in public institutions, such as judges, lawyers, and imams.
As such, Saudis consider themselves as the custodians of true Islam, Islam’s holiest two sites, and they consider themselves to preach the right form of Islam. Saudi’s leadership believe that the fall of the Ottoman Empire placed the banner of Islam in their hands, yet they believe it is their divine right to spread Wahhabi Islam, as Wahhabis managed to exert influence since 1979. Such an approach has led to the spread of violent forms of political Islam in many areas. Saudi’s view of their divine right to lead is manifested in their belief that they were chosen by God through the Prophet and the Arabic language, the language in which Islam was brought. This belief is contradictory to the essence of Islam which places morality over ethnicity. Ultimately, they managed to combine religious and nationalistic factors well to convince the world of their legitimacy as the supreme dynasty to carry the banner of Islam through their ethnicity and Arab origins. This approach, which Heghammer assigns the terms of “socio-revolutionary Islamism”, “classical jihadism”, and “global jihadism” to it, entails that Saudi’s Pan-Islamism is centered on macro-nationalism of an imagined Muslim community.
The Arab Spring posed a tremendous threat to Saudis quest for Pan-Islamist leadership. In essence, the empowerment of Islamists in many neighboring countries such as in Egypt and Tunisia, amongst others, entailed that Saudi Arabia was losing its “unique Islamic credentials.” While the Saudi regime was eager to contain these movements to maintain its regime and stance as the sole Islamic model in the region, the military coup in Egypt, which ousted Morsi breathed a sigh of relief for Saudi.
However, the rise of Prince Mohammed bin Salman into power saw a substantial change in Saudi’s Pan-Islamist aspirations. Bin Salman is changing the Kingdom into a secular state more than a theocratic one. His approach reasoned that Saudi’s sole role in the region in the past has been centered around its religious status, and to place that status at risk can result in a greater role in the region. Moreover, as Faisal Devji argues, Saudi’s project to turn into a politically-defined state rather than a religious-defined one can demolish the vision of an Islamic geography. Devji adds that this may also result in Islam finally becoming a truly global religion while the Middle East may still enjoy the pride of the place of its origin despite the fact that the vast majority of its believers reside elsewhere in the East. Devji concludes that Islam would inevitably find its home in Asia, as most of its followers live there in addition to the fact that wealth and development is achieving substantial results there. Saudi Arabia, with Mohammed Bin Salman’s vision, is on the verge of abandoning its quest for Pan-Islamic leadership, and with time, its only importance in Islam will remain merely in Mecca and Medina as the destination of pilgrimage.
This transformation in Saudi’s regional foreign policy has been manifested in the narrative. While Saudi’s allies in the region tend to be Sunni-majority states and its rivals tend to be Shiite-majority or Shiite-backed states, Saudi now reasons its approach through geopolitical narrative rather than religious. Part of this changing narrative has been Iran’s transformation in its regional foreign policy from exporting the revolution to advancing the interests of its leadership in gaining geopolitical importance.
Iran
Iran’s Pan-Islamist leadership aspirations has long used Saudi Arabia as its foil. Iran claims that Saudi’s alliances with neo-imperialist global powers, mainly the United States, has weakened Saudi’s legitimacy as well as its Islamic identity. Instead, Iran views its resistance narrative as a more legitimate representation of Islamic geopolitics. As such, Iran’s worldview of the Muslim World and its Pan-Islamist narrative places United States as the enemy of Islam. For instance, Iran’s current president Hassan Rouhani urged Muslims of the world to unite against the United States. He added that if Muslims were to submit to the West and the United States, they would be betraying Islam and the future generations of the Middle East.
Unifying against a common enemy has long been a module utilized by nationalist movements, but in this context, Iran uses such narratives for Pan-Islamist and geopolitical purposes. Ayatollah Khamenei reduced the solution to the contemporary Muslim World to merely “unity amongst Muslim states” and “the weakening of America.” He added that only by following this module, Muslims of the world would be able to enjoy a bright future and Ummah would prosper. As such, Iran’s narrative of “unification of the ranks of Muslims against the enemies of Islam” was highlighted in 2008, which was referred to as “the year of Islamic unity,” and this is a shift from its previous efforts to spread the revolution. Moreover, Iran, after 40 years of its Islamic Revolution, has not exported its revolution, but it has, in fact, expanded its influence in the region. Iran’s leadership now utilize their 1979 movement to help Iran secure its interests and enhance its role in the region.
Iran now holds an annual Islamic Unity conference and its charter illustrates its guiding principles, manifested in Iran’s aspiration for Islamic cooperation. This document urges Muslims of various sects to refrain from “name-calling” or takfir (denouncing one’s faith or belief). This is the embodiment of Iran’s vahdat of Pan-Islamic unity. Despite the promise of this charter, much of Iran’s Pan-Islamist aspirations is geopolitical, to enhance its position as a leader of the Muslim World. These aspirations remain somewhat unattainable or hard to achieve given Iran’s characteristics as a Shiite Persian state, unlike Saudi Arabia who has used its Sunni Arab traits to advance its geopolitical interests in the past.
Iran’s Shiite traits placed limits on its aspirations, but recently, Iran’s leadership has turned towards embracing its Shiism and assume its role as the protector of Shiites within the Muslim World. Iran now embraces the Shiite communities around the Middle East to spread its sphere of influence to advance what King Abdullah II of Jordan referred to as “the Shia Crescent.” The pressing question is: has Iran been advancing a Pan-Islamist narrative or a Pan-Shia narrative. The short answer is both. Research shows that Iran aspires to utilize a Pan-Sha approach in order to advance its Pan-Islamist aspirations. In essence, Iran acknowledges the shortcomings of Pan-Shiism experiences in Central Asia and the Caucasus. They also know that to establish the Shia Crescent will not achieve any results beyond being denounced by Western powers, antagonizing Sunni Powers, and block Iran’s influence. As such, Iran seeks to refrain from any intra-Islamic confrontations in order to expand its sphere of influence beyond Shiite-majority areas. This explains Khamenei and Rouhani’s narrative in Muslim unity, refraining from takfir practices, and rallying under the banner of Islam against their imagined enemies in the West.
Despite King Abdullah’s warning of the Shia Crescent in 2004 when he wanted to bring the attention to Iran’s regional behavior, Iran has been able to expand its influence in the Middle East. Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are now all under Iran’s direct sphere of influence. King Abdullah’s theory did not account for Saudi Arabia’s influence, using very similar approach. Yet, Iran seems to attempt to upstage Saudi in matters pertaining for Pan-Arabism. Muhammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, asserted that Iran will continue to support oppressed peopled globally, mainly Muslims. Nevertheless, analyses show that Iran only interferes when it concerns its own national interests, and while it mainly supports Shiites, it does support Sunnis if it is within its best interest to do so.
Iran’s policies in the region has served to develop loyalty to the region, and it has been successful with developing Shiite militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen who are trained by Iran and serve to preserve Iran’s influence. For instance, its support for the Houthis, a Yazidi Shiite sect, is explained through the lenses of protecting Shiites around the region. Iran has also been utilizing education, culture, and media to advance its geopolitical interests, by investing in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, supporting the Islamic Azad University networks in Syria and Iraq, and producing Arabic-speaking radio and television programs to affect public opinion, with Hezbollah in Lebanon being the embodiment of Iran’s approach in the Middle East, as it blends soft and strong power.
Many of the scholars reviewed earlier asserted that Saudi Arabia transformed itself from preaching Pan-Islamism to advance its economic development, to highlighting its ethnic-religious superiority as the divine chosen leaders of the Muslim World, and eventually to stepping back from this role, as the new leadership seeks to enhance its geopolitical role, through social and secular reforms. Iran has also undergone certain changes in its Pan-Islamist narrative. Whereas Khomeini sought to expand the revolution, more recent approaches saw Iran preaching Islamic unity. Nowadays, Iran adopts a mixed method of Pan-Shiite and Pan-Islamist narrative, albeit for geopolitical purposes.
Jordan
Jordan’s Pan-Islamism narrative is different from the duo. Jordan’s Pan-Islamic leadership aspirations can be seen as both reactionary and proactive. Both King Hussein who served as King of Jordan between 1952 – 1999 and King Abdullah II (1999-) highlighted their Hashemite heritage and direct lineage of Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II has been far more active in pursuing a Pan-Islamist leadership than his father, who was more concerned with Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, among other geopolitical challenges. King Hussein lived in a fragmented era, given the 1967 war, the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Iraq-Iran War, and the Gulf Wars. As such, he was more concerned with politics than religion, and he was content with Saudi Arabia assuming the role of leaders of the Muslim World, as he did not want to antagonize the Saudis.
On the night of November 9th, 2005 Amman witnessed a major terrorist attack, as 3 hotels in the capital were bombed, leaving over 60 people dead and hundreds wounded. This gruesome event propelled Jordan to react. In a region of colliding Saudi Sunni messages, Wahhabism, Iran’s Pan-Shiite rhetoric, and terrorist organizations, Jordan’s leadership sought to assume a role of an advocate for moderate Islam.
King Abdullah II denounced radicalization and violent extremism as Islam’s biggest and most threatening enemy. He drafted the Amman Message, which was a document that sought to reiterate Islam’s true message. A year later, he enacted the “Kalema Sawaa’” and established the Inter-Faith Forum in efforts to establish effective dialogue amongst different world religions, highlight their similarities, and stress on the fact that violent extremism is the enemy of all religions. The inter-faith forum is a continuation of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Study established in 1994 by Prince Hassan bin Talal. He spoke at multiple international conferences with moderation, placing himself as a leader of moderate Islam, as he denounced the extremists as “Khawarej (the outlaws) of Islam.” His efforts received global recognition, as he received the Templeton Prize in 2018 due to his efforts in seeking “religious harmony within Islam and between Islam and other religions.”
More recently, Jordan has been under scrutiny in the region amidst efforts by regional leaders to shake Jordan’s position on the “Deal of the Century.” King Abdullah affirmed conspiracies penetrating into Jordan’s political and security apparatus to cause tension in the country and weaken its position on Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause as a whole. As such, he reiterated multiple times that his position is final and that “Jerusalem is a red line to him and all of his people” and that “his position on Jerusalem is unwavering.” In a transcript published by the Hashemite Royal Court, King Abdullah II was quoted affirming that Jordan’s position on the matter cannot be pressured and the answer will remain negative. He added that “Arabs and Muslims will stand with us.”
Jordan’s position on the matter is threefold: first, Jordan holds a vast majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origins as well as Palestinian refugees and it is in Jordan’s best interest to advocate for their right of return. Secondly, Jordan sees the “alternative homeland” strategy within the “Deal of the Century” as undermining its own sovereignty and Palestinians’ right of return. Thirdly, Jordan’s Hashemite leadership is the legitimate custodian of the Al Aqsa mosque and other Islamic and Christian holy sites in East Jerusalem. This custodianship dates back to Sherif Hussein bin Ali, the leader of the Great Arab Revolt. The Hashemite’s custodianship is also recognized by the Palestinian Authority and is documented in the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty with Israel.
Further Discussion
Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East and the failure of regional powers to produce concrete solutions to the issues, radical alternatives became more attractive, particularly for young, disenchanted people. Saudi’s fixation on Iran and Iran’s disturbing behavior in the region left a void in the leadership of the Muslim World, as Jordan’s role was reactionary at heart. With that, violent extremist groups gained support to advance their own versions of Pan-Islamic worldview. In fact, the failures of regional powers contributed to the deepening of what is known as “the Fall from Grace.”
Fuller asserts that Islamist groups carry the banner of Islam in their rhetoric because it makes their quest for gaining legitimacy easier. The Fall from Grace is a romanticized notion and refers to an era in which Islamic civilization produced literary and technological innovations. Such groups, consequently, attribute the decline of the Muslim World to the transformation towards modern nation states and to the deviation from religion. With that, multiple violent extremist groups utilized this narrative in their quest for reestablishing the Caliphate, the most recent of which was Daesh, who denounced the vast majority of Middle Eastern countries as the enemy due to their failure in upholding religious law and resolve the region’s most pressing issues.
The rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia was to contain and counter Shia revival in Iran. Since then, Saudi Arabia emphasized its divine role as the rightful leader of the Muslim World. However, now that the state has developed its economy, the new leadership looks to give up its historic role in the region to move beyond a mere religious leader towards a geopolitical leader. On the other hand, Iran had initially sought to spread its revolution in the region, but slowly moved towards establishing a concrete geopolitical stance, through establishing and strengthening its sphere of influence. Now that Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen have all, in varying degrees, fell within Iran’s influence, the Islamic Republic continues its “Shiization” policies, as it recruits people from East and Central Asia and sends them back with a new ideology.
Iran’s leadership argues that their approach to assuming leadership of the Muslim World is through Pan-Islamist mechanism, however, their actions portray a Pan-Shiite end goal. This can be described a “cognitive dissonance”, a term borrowed from the field of psychology. In essence, Iran’s discourse is different than the policies and actions implemented. Iran’s interference in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain fall within its Pan-Shiite strategy to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region. It is not to protect Muslims despite their sects.
The geopolitical relations amongst the triad of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan has done more harm to the Muslim World and Pan-Islamism than good in the Post-Cold War era. Saudi-Iran relations have been fragmented, and the two states are practically at a cold war. Jordan-Saudi relations have moved past the Hashemite-Saud rivalry over religious legitimacy and have moved on to develop close geopolitical strategic ties, to counter Iran. Jordan-Iran relations have gone through ups and downs, until Jordan chose to side with Saudi Arabia to stop the spread of the “Shia Crescent.” With the exception of a few initiatives led by Jordan such as the Amman Message, Kalema Sawaa’, Inter-Faith Forum, and its position on Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause, which have all been reactionary in nature, the three states, particularly Saudi and Iran have failed to demonstrate true leadership of the Muslim World. Instead, they remain wary of one another and craft their regional foreign policy in that regard. While Saudi is moving past its historic role as the leader of the Muslim World, Iran’s Shiite trait limits its quest and its aspirations remain cognitively dissonant, as Jordan’s prospects are contained by regional pressures. These geopolitical dynamics have enabled non-state actors to gain agency and pursue their own versions of the Muslim World and Pan-Islamism.
In the midst of uncertainty over leadership of the Muslim World, Turkey is in fact slowly positioning itself a popular alternative to replace Saudi Arabia. In a study conducted by PEW Research Center in 2017, about 79% of respondents from the MENA region see Turkey as gaining a prominent actor in the region, tied with the Russia with 3% behind the United States and ahead of Iran, despite is regional behavior. Furthermore, 66% of Jordanians surveyed indicated favorable views towards Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, second to King Salman of Saudi Arabia with 86% favorability. These percentages may be closer nowadays following recent events in the region. Nevertheless, Turkey is slowly positioning itself to gain the role of the leader of the Muslim World, as the true successor of the Ottoman Empire.
The complexity of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey nowadays pose challenges in the region but also creates opportunities, politically and religiously. To capitalize on these challenges and opportunities, a potential Pan-Islamist leader would need proper resources. Jordan cannot afford the resources, especially nowadays with the pressure posed by regional and global powers, but Jordan’s prospects has and will remain the consensus that a stable Jordan is in the best interest of all actors involved. Should religion remain highly important in the region, and World Values Survey data illustrates that it is, then Jordan could become the next leader of the Muslim World. The Hashemite leadership provide the legitimacy, and the actions taken by Jordan in this context have been moderate and portrayed leadership.
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The Saudi Arabian-Iran Proxy War in Yemen
Introduction
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s interests are at two opposite sides in the region. Peter Salisbury concludes that the two states are in a scramble for regional influence, impacting many existing conflicts. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen are examples of the two states attempting to advance their interests, with the last being the latest and most complex. When applying the Realist theory of International Relations, one can argue that Saudi Arabia and Iran are at a regional Cold War.
Rasmussen illustrates that a conflict is “an escalated competition at any system level between groups whose aim is to gain advantage in the area of power, resources, interests, and needs.” He adds that such groups have to perceive that the dimension of their relations is “mutually incompatible.” This discerption is agreed on by Holder and Henry, who added that two parties are at conflict when their actions in pursuit of their interests are to damage the other party. Katz and Lawyer assert, consequently, that the actions of one party have to impact their rival; otherwise, it is a difference, not a conflict. Saudi Arabia and Iran are at a competition to gain an advantage in the region, their interests are incompatible, and the actions of one directly affect the other. The question is what type of conflict?
Zbigniew Brzezinski defines cold war as “warfare by other (non-lethal) means.” Medhurst, Ivie, Wander, and Scott associate “rhetoric” with the idea of cold war, asserting that the means used are aimed at ensuring a full-scale war between the two competing, confronting, and rival parties does not erupt. Andrew Mumford adds that when two parties seek to advance their interests and strategic goals but avoiding a direct warfare, they engage in proxy wars, defined as “the product of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the conduit for the benefactor's weapons, training and funding.” He illustrates that proxy wars are the “logical replacement for direct warfare.”
As such, Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaging in indirect war through proxies in Syria and Yemen, among others, in pursuit of advancing their own interests and strategic goals through a Middle Eastern Cold War. Of the many places where the two states engage in some level of rivalry, Yemen stands out as the most confrontational and brutal conflict, with Saudi Arabia deterring the Iran-backed faction: the Houthis. The conflict in Yemen is generally analyzed through one of three narratives: the Saudi-Iranian proxy war narrative, the sectarian narrative, and the AQAP/failed state narrative. This protracted conflict has seen numerous failed conflict management attempts, along with many intervening institutions. This paper analyzes the conflict, examines past and current conflict management strategies, assesses the various intervening institutions, and recommends the most relevant strategy that can best address the conflict.
Conflict Analysis
Cemile Aydin, Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Gwenn Okruhlik, and Frederic Wehrey explored Saudi-Iranian relations with emphasis on rivalry and use of conflictual relations to gain internal support, especially amid the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which many scholars define as the start of this rivalry towards religious legitimacy, regional security, and regional hegemony. Iran’s leaders in late 1970s and early 1980s declared its anti-West narrative, placing Saudi Arabia at the center of such rhetoric. Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that Saudi’s leadership failed to lead the Muslim World in the face of western control, and that, Iran had to exert its role as the rightful leader of the Ummah. Saudi, fearing the effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, decided to embrace Iran as an enemy to suppress internal issues and to create cohesion.
Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran began expanding its sphere of influence. This sphere of influence was manifested in Iran geographically surrounding Saudi, through alliances with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, and Yemen. Simon Mabon writes in Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East that the US-led invasion of Iraq marked an integral era in the Saudi-Iran conflict, as they were allowed time and space to engage in proxy antagonism to advance their strategic goals. The Arab Spring provided an opportunity for the two states to extend their influence through a proxy war in Yemen. With Ali Abdallah Saleh’s regime collapsing, insurgency in Yemen expanded, with AQAP, Al Hirak Al Janoubi, Daesh, and the Houthis, among others found time and space for their movements. The involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran through proxies further complicated the course of the conflict in Yemen.
Saleh’s deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi was unable to deal with Jihadists’ movements, separatists’ activities, and the Houthis and security forces, who are loyal to former president Saleh, forced Hadi to flee Yemen and advanced from the south to the north, reaching Saudi’s southern border. Saudi Arabia led a coalition with 8 other mostly Sunni states, receiving logistical and intelligence support from the US, UK, and France, to restore Hadi’s government. They began launching air strikes against the Houthis, and supported the legitimate government’s forces. Meanwhile, Al Hirak Al Janoubi, a separatists’ movement are seeking independence for the south, to partition Yemen into its pre-unification days: East and West.
This multidimensional conflict also includes support from Iran to the Houthis, a revivalist movement representing Zaydi Shiites. Salibury’s research finds that the Houthis’ leadership are committed to the principles of Hussein Badr Al-Deen Al-Houthi, largely influenced by the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The group does in fact receive support from Iran, but the extent to which it takes orders is yet to be confirmed. Their prime objective is to deter any foreign intervention in Yemen, perceived to be Saudi’s “Yemeni government puppets.” In January 2015, they seized Hadi’s presidential palace, private residence, and the two headquarters of Yemen’s intelligence organization. They called for more political power, as the sanctions imposed by the international community remain ineffective in deterring them.
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Figure 1: Source: Aljazeera, Reuters, World Energy Atlas, Critical Threats, March 2019
In recent months, the UAE, Saudi’s biggest ally in this conflict, left the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen due to financial constraints. Since Saudi cannot support any group besides the government of Hadi, its involvement remains mostly in the form of airstrikes and deterring attacks from the Houthis who continue to fire missiles from Saudi’s southern border. Saudi continues to do what is necessary to ensure the retention of Hadi’s government while defending attacks from the Houthis, backed by Iran.
Saudi Arabia wants to ensure the protection of its boarder by deterring Houthi attacks and ensuring the presence of an internationally recognized, legitimate government in Yemen under the leadership of president Hadi. The Houthis, who are supported by Iran, Hezbollah, and Al Quds Force, continue to target Saudi with drone and missiles strikes, the latest of which targeted ARAMCO, Saudi’s most important oil production site. Ultimately, the Yemen conflict’s complexity reached another level with the involvement of Saudi and Iran. Saudi Arabia’s proxy in Yemen is somewhat nonexistent after UAE’s retreat, diminishing the relevance of the coalition, and solidifying Saudi’s direct involvement under the umbrella of national security. On the other hand, Iran’s involvement is manifested in the Houthis as its proxy. The Houthis also seek to ensure that Yemen is alleviated from outside intervention by Hadi’s government allies; mainly Saudi. Riedel argues that the Houthis “embody what Iran seeks to achieve across the Arab world: the cultivation of an armed non-state, non-Sunni actor who can pressure Iran’s adversaries both politically and militarily.” The below table illustrates the main actors and their motivations:
Actor | Motivation | Alliances |
Saudi Arabia | Protection of its boarder and national security, and reinstate president Hadi | Yemeni president Hadi, Yemeni tribal leaders and religious leaders |
The Houthis | Deterrence of any outside intervention in Yemen, mainly from Saudi | Iran, Hezbollah, Al Quds Force, and security forces |
Iran | Advance its own geopolitical interests, enhance its sphere of influence, and weaken Saudi | The Houthis |
An Analysis of Previous Conflict Management Attempts
Previous conflict management efforts in Yemen have been centered around peace-talks, ceasefire, political transition/ power sharing, and mediation. The plethora of techniques utilized is not a surprise given the complexity and multidimensionality of the conflict, with the Saudi-led coalition and later Saudi alone engaging in direct cross-border armed conflict with the Houthis, sectarian separatist groups fighting, and an international effort against AQAP and other terrorist organizations.
First UN Special Envoy on Yemen
Similar to its efforts in Syria, the United Nations Security Council established the Office of the Special Envoy to the Secretary-General on Yemen in 2015. This office has aimed to provide necessary support to the Yemeni-led political transition through an inclusive engagement and participation of all demographic groups involved, including women, youth, the Houthis, and the Southern Hirak Movement. The UN also facilitated a National Dialogue Conference in January 2014, featuring delegates from all Yemeni regions and political affiliations. The delegates drafted the blueprints for a federal and democratic Yemen, based on the principles of good governance, rule of law, and human rights, which were to become the foundation for a new constitution to be drafted by a Constitutional Drafting Commission. While these efforts established an all-inclusive local vision for a better future for Yemen, it disregarded outside interventions and allegiances as well as their impact on intergroup dynamics. It also disregarded a far more important point, which was the ongoing armed conflict between various local groups and between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis. All of which culminated in its failure to bring about proper transition in Yemen.
Former UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed attempted repeatedly to establish a peace agreement amongst the disputing parties, but the Houthis and their allies the Saleh forces along with the Saudi-led coalition continued to disagree over the main points and objectives. In October 2016, Ould Cheikh Ahmed presented a peace plan which relied on a gradual transfer of presidential power to a new prime minister or a vice president, as the president position would become a limited, ceremonial position. The plan also featured a formation of a national unity government, a gradual removal of the Houthi-Saleh forces from the cities they had seized between 2014 and 2015, the formation of an international observation mission to verify this proposed withdrawal, and finally a gradual transition towards presidential and parliamentary elections.
This plan faced a number of issues which either exposes Ould Cheikh Ahmed’s weakness on standing firm or the lack of political or even military support of the international community to back this plan. Nonetheless, president Hadi rejected the plan, arguing that it would legitimize the Houthi-Saleh forces’ control over the capital. He also required that the forces disarm, which Saudi insisted that they are relinquished to a third-party while the new unity government proposed by Ould Cheikh Ahmed prohibits any deployment of weapons that can threaten Saudi in any shape or form. The Houthis countered by demanding Hadi’s resignation and the formation of a new unity government in which they can have a meaningful seat on the table and addend their forces to the national armed forces. These various demands propelled Ould Cheikh Ahmed to withdraw the plan and altered it to enable Hadi’s stay in office until elections, which the Houthis rejected immediately and demanded a new special envoy.The Second UN Special Envoy on Yemen
Following the 2018 coalition airstrikes on Hodeida, a coastal region, the United Nations represented by its newly appointed Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, attempted to negotiate a cease-fire. This cease-fire in Hodeida came after the Houthis seized the port that is essential for humanitarian aid along with Saudi carrying airstrikes on the port, albeit claiming them to be against the Houthis, according to Neil Patrick. Patrick adds that Saudi sought to halt the Houthi’s control over the port and their assaults on shipping in the Red Sea.
The cease-fire, also known as the Stockholm agreement, was limited to the Hodeida port on the Red Sea. The Stockholm agreement stipulated a cease-fire around Hodeida, a prisoner swap in Taiz, and a statement of understanding among all sides to form a committee to discuss the future of Taiz, which later came to be known as the Regional Deployment Committee (RDC). While direct fighting in the Hodeida port did stop, the confrontation increased in other areas.
Peter Salisbury, a renowned analyst on this particular conflict, characterizes the Stockholm Agreement as hard-won despite its shortcomings. He emphasized the importance of its success for future similar efforts. He argued that this agreement did not include any technical details on its scope, duration, or nature of the ceasefire to hostilities; specifications in relation to breaches; or any mechanisms for quick action points in the event any fighting restarts. Such points are integral in any ceasefire agreements, and their absence from the Stockholm Agreement left adequate space for the warring parties to reengage. In fact, the Houthis were not prevented from handing over the port to themselves, as they rendered Patrick Cammaert, the UN chair of the RDC, was overstepping his mandate, particularly that the meetings were held in areas controlled by the Yemeni government. Alistair Burt, the United Kingdom’s Middle East Minister, voiced his doubts over the resolution, arguing that it merely was enacted to build confidence between the disputing parties and to keep the RDC negotiations going. As such, one can argue that the UN Special Envoy, Griffiths, in this ceasefire agreement, had a long-term vision of the parties returning to the negotiation table that his plan was not solid to maintain and enforce the ceasefire that would enable such negotiations to happen. In fact, Griffiths himself spoke about his optimism and his confidence in his ability to bring the parties to the negotiation table. By that time, it had been almost two years following the failure of the last direct negotiation round. Griffiths’ plan had the support of the coalition partners.
It was rather clear that the international community, eager to resolve the conflict, was also thinking ahead with Griffiths beyond and disregarded whether the Stockholm Agreement stands still or fails. Foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates met to discuss the practical steps following the ceasefire in Hodeida. Gerald Feierstein analyzed that it was important to provide the necessary political and diplomatic support for Griffith to pursue his plan. But Feierstein’s analysis presumed, much like the international community, a larger level of political will among the major players in this conflict, namely Saudi, Iran, UAE, and the Houthis. Instead, he argued that the Yemeni population, feeling the effects of the conflict, would be very much be open to and support the plan. Though this assumption is valid, the general Yemeni population have lost their agency in this conflict shortly after the Arab Spring. Furthermore, the “quad meeting” and Feierstein’s article anticipated Saudi and UAE’s goodwill in both reconstruction and economic revival through a reintegration into the GCC, a proposal that appears unlikely, as the two states would be reluctant to re-engage Yemen into the GCC, particularly with Iran’s direct ties to the Houthis, who in Griffiths’ plan, would have a seat on the decision-making table, and with the poorly enforced ceasefire, would still have direct control over the Hodeida port, an important commercial port in Red Sea trading routes.
The United States' Role in Yemen
Looking at the role played by the United States in Yemen, a Congressional Research Service Report illustrates the US approached Yemen through the following action points:
1. Support for U.N. efforts to advance a political process;
2. Condemnation of Iran’s destabilizing role in Yemen;
3. Assistance for the coalition;
4. Sales of armaments and munitions to Gulf partners;
5. Counter-terrorism cooperation with the ROYG and Gulf partners;
6. Humanitarian Aid for Yemen
Former President Obama signed off on the “provision of logistical and intelligence support” to the Saudi-led coalition in their military operations in Yemen, and he announced the “Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate US military and intelligence support.” Perhaps the largest driver behind the US engagement was the operations against AQAP and Daesh in Yemen, as they worked closely with the Republic of Yemen Government and allies in the region in conducting airstrikes on AQAP and Daesh. As such, the United States’ management of the Yemeni conflict prioritized the fight against terrorist organizations, and one can argue that in this regard, they have been relatively effective.
The European Union's Role - Mediation
The role played by the European Union in Yemen has been through the realms of mediation. Mediation is defined as a “form of negotiation in which a third party helps the disputants to find a solution that cannot otherwise find by themselves. It is a three-sided (or more) political process in which the mediator builds and then uses relations with the other parties to help them reach a settlement” Mediation seeks to highlight a set of mutually beneficial settlements, but a major prerequisite is forming formidable diplomatic relations prior to initiating these efforts, something that arguably Ould Cheikh Ahmed and Griffiths failed to do. In fact, Griffiths has accused the Saudis and the Houthis of war crimes in Yemen. Though the accusations are valid, they hinder his efforts to broker a peace agreement through direct face-to-face negotiations.
Natalie Girke writes that the European Union started its mediation efforts through its Delegated Mediation Support Team (MST) following the 2011 uprising and concluded with the failure of the 2014 National Dialogue Conference. Girke outlines that the MST managed to establish mediation awareness in Yemen, but it was short-lived and did not manage to realize its full potential. She reasons that the UN Special Envoy sidelined the EU out of the process.
An Analysis of Current Conflict Management Efforts in Yemen
Though Saudi was seemingly left alone when the UAE left the coalition for financial concerns, recent developments show a different reality. Current conflict management efforts taken in Yemen are now leaning more towards power sharing and political restructuring. The past few months have seen some positive efforts to bring a settlement to the conflict. The Yemen’s internationally recognized government agreed with the Houthi rebels to set up observations posts to observe the ceasefire in Hodeida and de-escalate the areas prone to conflict, an effort that was supported by the UN Hodeida mission.
Two weeks following this agreement, the Yemeni government with its President Hadi who supported by the broader international community and Saudi signed a power-sharing agreement with the southern separatists the Southern Transitional Council (STC) headed by Al Zubaidi, who is backed by the UAE. The agreement, known as the Riyadh Agreement, seeks to stop the fighting and to bring stability to Yemen. In this agreement, the Yemeni government will enable the separatists to assume equal representation while their security forces will join in with the government forces under the defense and the interior ministries.
The third major development in recent months came in one week following the power-sharing agreement when the Saudis and the Houthis are believed to have held an indirect, secret peace talks on November 13th, 2019 to end the war in Yemen. These negotiations have taken place in Oman who served as the mediator. Reports indicate that the talks followed on to a video conference two months ago.
When we cross-examine UAE’s withdrawal from the Saudi-led coalition and their reentry into the scene through backing the southern separatists and co-brokering the Riyadh Agreement with Saudi, we find a positive and a negative side to this turn of events. Salisbury asserted that if the Riyadh Agreement is adopted well, it would prevent a “war-within-a-war” between Hadi’s government and the STC, and it would also provide credibility to future government negotiations with the Houthi rebels, which followed a week later. On the other hand, Salisbury highlighted that the deal is much open to interpretation, loosely worded, and has an ambitious timeline.
On the other hand, Gamal Gasim, a Yemeni-American political science professor, downplayed the agreement, reiterating the fact that the disputants are merely extensions of one or other countries in the region. He added that the Southern Separatists, though backed by the UAE, are still likely to pursue their long-term goal of succeeding and establishing their own state. Gasim sees the strategic objectives of the Riyadh Agreement through two scenarios: first, it may strengthen the coalition in facing the Houthis who are backed by Iran, particularly that they have achieved some gains against Saudi recently. Alternatively, it may help maintain the alliance and utilize it to enhance the Saudi-UAE geopolitical positions in plausible negotiations with Iran and the Houthis. Said Thabet sees another scenario in which Yemen is partitioned into a northern state under Saudi influence and a southern state for the STC to be directly overseen by the UAE. Thabet does not anticipate any STC rejection to this proposal since they long sought to achieve this. This proposal, however, presents complications for the situation involving the Saudi-Houthis stalemate.
Assessing the Intervening Institutions
There have been a number of intervening institutions in the Yemeni conflict since its inception. The list of intervening institutions or actors include Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, the United States, the United Nation through Office of the Special Envoy to the Secretary-General on Yemen, the European Union, and the GCC and coalition member including Oman, excluding local actors such as the Houthis, Hadi’s government, security forces, and the STC. A Human Rights Watch report indicates that the coalition members, involved in unlawful attacks, have avoided international legal liability by refusing to provide any information related to the role played by their forces in these attacks.
The previous sections illustrated the roles played by these intervening actors. This section assesses their strengths and weaknesses according to what literature outlines as effective conflict management actor. Robert Zikmann indicates that an effective institution in conflict management understands the conflict and adopts an active response such as domination, distributive bargaining, compromise, and integrative bargaining, as opposed to a passive response such as denial, avoidance, or capitulation.
Klein, Reiners, Zhimin, Junbo, and Šlosarčík illustrate that major powers adopt one of three diplomatic strategies: unilateralist, bilateral, and multilateral. Applying that onto conflict management, we can argue that an effective intervening actor has the ability to leverage relations, whether bilateral relations or more effectively, multilateral relations. Hampson and Zartman focus on the actors’ ability to adopt the appropriate narrative and shift between them when needed. One of these narratives, straight talk, is helpful in producing alternatives to a negotiated settlement. BATNA or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement are security points[5], which aims at illustrating the, usually undesired, alternative.
Olson and Pearson argue that a successful intervening actor are separate, neutral, an outsider-impartial, and sovereign/independent. They have the ability to bring parties to an agreement through repeated attempts and in the presence of an external military intervention[6]. This last point can be extended to encompass the actors’ ability to maintain the agreement and peace. Other aspects for the strength of an intervening actor include political will and playing a stabilizing role. The following table illustrates the extent to which the intervening actors have fulfilled effective roles in each of these factors. They are assessed on a scale of 1 to 5, whereby 1 means lowest performance/ ability and 5 means highest performance/ ability, for each category to calculate a score out of a total of 65.
Category and commentary | Saudi Arabia | Iran | UAE | US | Special Envoy Ahmed | Special Envoy Griffiths | EU | GCC and coalition |
Understands the Conflict: Complete understanding of the conflict and its consequences | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 |
Adopts an active response: Proactively seeking to manage the conflict | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
Build relations with stakeholders: Meaningful bilateral and multilateral relations with all parties involved | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
Has the ability to leverage relations: Using them to broker a settlement | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
Adopted an appropriate narrative: Approaching the conflict through relevant narratives to its nature and the parties involved | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
Has the ability to shift between narratives: Can switch the tone when needed to arrive at the best outcome | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
Separate, neutral, and impartial: Not a perpetrator in the conflict; can sideline their gains for a productive management | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 |
Sovereign/independent: The actor is the sole decision-maker of their own actions | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
Persistence: Attempting repeatedly until the sought objective is met | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
Ability to maintain the agreement and use military intervention if needed: Can ensure the sustainability of the agreement and use force when needed | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
Ability to maintain peace: Can uphold ceasefire and ensure infighting does not rebreak | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
Political will: Fully determined to bring a settlement | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
Plays a stabilizing role: The actor is stabilizing the conflict and is not inflecting any counterproductive or destabilizing actions | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
Total/65 | 38 | 29 | 35 | 45 | 59 | 63 | 41 | 39 |
Looking at the table above, we find that there are areas of strength and areas of weaknesses, individually and collectively. Overall, Special Envoy Griffiths with his office top the list as the most effective intervening actor, with Ould Cheikh Ahmed slight behind. This is because the former envoy did not manage to uphold his relations with all parties involved, and he was not as persistent as Griffiths. In fact, the Houthis demanded his replacement, as he failed to deal with them properly and failed to keep Saudi, Iran, and others accountable, unlike Griffiths who was vocal in his condemnation.
Other major actors, namely the US and the EU have limited their involvement to rather underwhelming roles. The United States focused on the fight against terrorism, which is the basis for their relatively high score. On the other hand, they contributed largely to the coalition, which played a counterproductive and destabilizing role. The EU were fulfilled after their incomplete mediation efforts. Both actors have not adopted an active response, did not invest much time or effort in building relations, were not persistent, did not invest in maintaining any agreements or maintaining peace, and they lacked the political will.
Saudi, Iran, the UAE, and the coalition countries have shown a number of weaknesses in their interventions. They did not separate their interests from the conflict; they were sporadically inactive, but when they were active, they played a rather destabilizing role. They also did not build meaningful and useful relations, they were inflexible, they were not persistent in the positive sense, and they were not able to uphold any agreement or ceasefire, let alone, peace. The only exception is recent efforts that brought Hadi’s government with the STC and then the Saudis with the Houthis, but even that can inflect further instability to the conflict going forward. </
Is Stabalization the Answer
In the midst of geopolitical talk and conflict management efforts, the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen often gets sidelined. HRW estimates 7,000 civilian deaths, 11,000 in casualties, and 3 million women and girls at the risk of violence, and 14 million face the risk of starvation and death. These numbers are for 2018 alone, as the actual total numbers are much higher in terms of deaths and casualties. These numbers, coupled with the ongoing insurgency, intergroup fighting, and cross-border war, necessitate efforts to stabilization as a step for further conflict management efforts. The US government, through the Stabilization Assistance Framework, defines stabilization as a “political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems and peaceably manage conflict.
Stabilization is a prerequisite to restructuring/ rebuilding and state building efforts. It can be effective in stopping the infighting, and it can maintain peace. It celebrates inclusion for all stakeholders, and it is less financially consuming and far better viewed internationally, unlike its counterpart, full military intervention. Stabilization also serves as a bridge for a longer-term reconstruction and reconciliation. The success for stabilization is contingent on local and international partnerships, to essentially approach the conflict and its burden on the local people cooperatively[4]. It would not be fully successful without some military presence on the grounds, which would seek to ensure fighting does not break again.
Stabilization would be effective in Yemen for a number of reasons. First, stabilization has seen relative success in Iraq and in Syria, two nearby states going through similar issues. In both states, the United States spearheaded stabilization efforts and forged effective, and necessary, partnerships with local actors, mainly to deter terrorist organizations, such as in Syria and in Iraq, two of the most recent US engagements in the Middle East region. In Syria particularly the US’ alliance with the Syrian Kurds proved effective in territorially defeating Daesh, albeit served as a building block for a Turkish offensive on the-now-enhanced Syrian Kurds. In Iraq, the anti-ISIS coalition was supported directly by the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), proving for relative success too. As such, the US appears more in favor for such an engagement as opposed to its alternative, military intervention, which not only has been too costly on the US budget, but it has also harmed the US’ image in the region.
Another reason why stabilization would be effective in Yemen is that stabilization tends to be inclusive in nature. In this context, recent talks between the Hadi Government and the STC, between the government and the Houthis, and between the Saudis and the Houthis pave the way for further collaborative effort for stabilization, especially following the agreement between the first two groups to joining their arms together under the Ministries of Defense and the Interior. With that, the political will, internally, is welcoming for such a plan.
For this plan, the United Nations may also see necessary that it deploys a peacekeeping mission. Its special envoy on Yemen also has to maintain its role as the integrated and impartial broker. Griffiths ought to keep the parties talking, periodically, to facilitate the next steps for Yemen. These two subfactors are necessary to counter the possibility of spoilers. Spoilers are defined as “groups and tactics that actively seek to obstruct or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means, including terrorism and violence.”
Possible spoilers for stabilization in Yemen are Saudi, UAE, Iran, the Houthis and resurgent terrorist organizations such as the AQAP and Daesh. The Hadi government and the STC are not included in this list due to their allegiances to bigger actors in the region, namely Saudi and UAE. The Houthis are included, however, as they may still act independently of Iran. The complexity and multidimensionality of the Yemeni conflict makes predictive analysis difficult. Nonetheless, peacekeeping missions along with the joint forces of STC and Yemeni government, and perhaps with US support, can act swiftly to any terrorist spoilers.
Griffiths, on the other hand, has a large role to play, to keep Saudi, Iran, and the UAE accountable and monitor their actions. For that, he would require the support of the international community to back his vocal statements against any potential spoilers on their part. Saudi and UAE established quasi-mandates over the north and south parts of Yemen, respectively, and if they anticipate that this proposal may hinder their geopolitical stance, they may inflect destabilizing actions. Griffiths would have to mediate between the Houthis and the Saudis to establish important guarantees. If Saudi had claimed its motivation in engaging in Yemen was driven by national security and if the Houthis claimed their motivation was the rejection of any Saudi involvement, then a prolonged ceasefire and an agreement to guarantee neither of that happens would propel the two parties to disengage.
Ultimately, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia and its coalition have been losing much support inside of Yemen as well as internationally, following the murder case of journalist Jamal Khashogji and careless airstrikes on civilian targets. On the other hand, Iran as destabilizing as it is, has utilized the media better. The more civilian casualties, the more Yemeni people seem to stand behind the Houthis. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, are appearing in the media somewhat arrogantly and their killing of children, women, civilians, and the destruction of many schools and hospitals have been a card used effectively by the Iranian-backed propaganda.
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Theological Pathway Out of Islamic Extremism: Using Islamic Study and Qur’anic Reading in De-Radicalization Programs
Introduction
The spread of the Internet and the advent of social media have played a key role in the recent rise of violent Islamist extremism globally. Platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter have exacerbated the problem of Islamist radicalization and incited terrorism, as algorithms that underpin these networks promote engaging content, in a feedback loop that, link by link, guides new audiences to toxic ideas. The internet has also offered terrorists and extremists the capability to communicate, collaborate with and convince other individuals towards their ideology, creating more opportunities to radicalize and accelerating the process of radicalization. Today, radicalization primarily occurs on the Internet. Individuals radicalize “remotely” by consuming jihadist propaganda online, and become self-directed, internet-inflamed Islamist extremists who self-recruit in extremist groups. Unfortunately, this increase in online Islamist radicalization and jihadism has been tied back to Islam, in turn provoking a rise in Islamophobia and Muslim hate crimes. Yet, most Muslim majority countries have centered their deradicalization programs around theological dialogue in an effort to contest interpretations and messages received from violent extremists and jihadist propaganda. These “soft” counter-terrorism programs seek to undo the radicalization process, divorcing Islamist militants from their extreme beliefs by providing spiritual guidance and encouraging personal reflection on Islamic theological principles. This essay seeks to examine the importance and the process of deradicalization programs that rely on theological dialogue and Islamic religious re-education. Why does this ideological component of deradicalization programs matter to counter extremist narratives? How is this type of deradicalization carried out and what are the theological underpinnings in the Qur’an that allows for deradicalization? In addition to answering those questions, this essay will also assess the degree of success these programs have.
Why It Matters: Deradicalization and Ideology, Reversing Islamist Extremist Indoctrination
Many people who radicalize online actually have poor knowledge of Islamic theology and religious texts, and many have not even read the Qur’an. This is problematic because extremist narratives manipulate specific verses to fit their political purposes and jihadist ideology. Theological dialogue and Islamic re-education help challenge extremist interpretations of Islam, disseminating ideas of peace to correct radical ideas and to prevent jihadist recidivism. This theological deradicalization process is based on the assumption that militant Islamists do not have the proper understanding of Islam and that their religious interpretation is wrong, therefore implying they can and must be reeducated or reformed. Moreover, since Islamist militants tend to be ideologically motivated and committed to jihadism, it is difficult for them to renounce their ideology, which is rooted in a major world religion. Deradicalization focusing on ideological moderation hence provides an opportunity to leverage mainstream Islam to challenge extremist interpretations of the religion and their radical Islamist ideology. It also facilitates the deradicalization of radical Muslims by making it possible for them to renounce their extremism without also renouncing their faith. Furthermore, this type of deradicalization program offers a compelling approach to counter-terrorism because it allows Islamist militants to engage with the most authentic and legitimate source of Islam—the Qur’an, which they cannot question. This will likely effect a more permanent change in the militant’s worldview, but will also help weaken the radical Islamist movement altogether by discrediting its ideology, especially considering most radicals had little to no formal religious training.
Another important element in theological-based ideological deradicalization is that it can redirect jihadis quest for significance sought in extremist groups towards new, more positive and fruitful goals. Indeed, Islamist militants tend to join extremist groups because they wish to be relevant, to have meaning in their lives—a desire that is fulfilled through extremist narratives that present violence as a spiritual duty or even necessity and a politically acceptable method. Former extremists tend to have a dramatic impact when countering these motivations because they personally denounce radical Islamism and encourage Islamic moderation, which will push Islamist militants to question and eventually renounce extremism, in addition to fatally discrediting jihadist groups. By engaging these militants with theological dialogue, these programs can redirect militants’ quest for significance towards more positive goals, like piety, moral uprightness, or da’wa. Essentially, this type of deradicalization program aims to reverse Islamist extremism by challenging ex-combatants’ Islamic beliefs system and using credible religious sources to support their religious re-education and curb their radicalism.
How to Use the Qur’an to Deradicalize Ex-Jihadis?
Religious scholars and Islamic clerics are recruited in those theological deradicalization programs to discuss and educate Islamic extremists on Islamic theology, relying on the Qur’an, to emphasize religious tolerance and provide gentler interpretations of passages that could be taken to promote violence. Participants are listened to and share their ideological motivations with these religious experts, who then guide them through a religious academic course of study. The main objective of the course aims to persuade the participants that their jihadist interpretation of the Qur’an is incorrect. In particular, these religious leaders strive to dislodge certain concepts like ‘takfir’ (apostasy) or ‘al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal’), which nurture and sustain hatred, repudiation, and enmity towards non-Muslims and Muslims who do not abide to the same religious interpretation. Based on this creed, intolerance and radicalism are justified and allows for the killing and brutal murder of any non-Muslim or whoever that does not belong to the group, even though the Qur’an strictly orders that anyone offering peace should never be described as “unbeliever” (4: 94). A main issue that leads to misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Qur’an is that often these contentious verses are taken out from their general context to fit a specific political and ideological agenda. Nonetheless, a more accurate understanding of specific verses should be bounded within its overall context and place in the Surah. For example, if the general context talks about an ancient history, one should not apply the specific verses absolutely on the present. Moreover, if the general context of the Surah talks about war, then the specific verses should not be applied in times of peace at all. In order to combat these distorted understandings, religious and community figures use Qur’anic study to promote and restore the true spirit of Islam, which revolves around peace, tolerance, and pluralism. In addition to intensive spiritual guidance, states have supplemented this effort by reforming mosques, training imams, and implementing Islamic religious seminars or workshops to promote a more moderate message of Islam within its society that counters extremist narratives.
Islamic religious re-education focuses on reconciling Islam with peace and tolerance by contextualizing verses that could be seen as promoting violence and analyzing verses that teach love, compassion, and promote religious freedom. Indeed, the Qur’an presents a peaceful life where the infinite compassion and mercy of God manifests itself on earth, and offers love and compassion for every human being, no matter their religion. In 2: 208, the Qur’an says: “O You who believe! Enter absolutely into peace (Islam). Do not follow in the footsteps of Satan. He is an outright enemy to you,” which is a call for peace and the importance of fostering a life in absolute sincerity and honesty before God. The concept of religious tolerance in Islam is most explicit in 2:256, “There is no compulsion in acceptance of the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong” and 28:56, “You cannot guide those you would like to but God guides those He wills. He has best knowledge of the guided.” Here, the Qur’an highlights that no one should be forced to believe in Islam or practice Islamic principles, and that whoever disbelieves will eventually be guided towards Islam and will be dealt with only by God. Another clear elicitation of tolerance is expressed in 109: 6“For you is your religion, and for me is my religion.” God also insists that only He will be the judge for matters in which humankind differs (22: 69-76). In 2:62, God says: “Those who believe and those who are Jews and Christians, and Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and do righteous good deeds shall have their reward with their Lord, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.” This verse illustrates that regardless of individuals’ beliefs, God has an extraordinary tolerance for Jews and Christians, indicating they will be admitted to heaven if they do good, and thus should not be discriminated against by Muslims on earth.
Furthermore, the Qur’an provides an environment where people can fully enjoy freedom of thought and religion, allowing people to live by the faith and values they believe in. According to the Qur’an, everyone has a right to live freely, by his beliefs, whatever they may be. Even in regard to Christians and Jews, the Qur’an describes them as “the people of the Book,” and says “God does not forbid you from being good to those who have not fought you in the religion or driven from your homes, or from being just towards them. God loves those who are just.” (60: 8) This quotes showcase the potential for interfaith dialogue; Muslims who share basic values and ethics of goodness as Christians and Jews should strive together to spread moral virtues across the world. God explicitly states in the Qur’an that the existence of people from different faiths and opinions is something that we have to acknowledge and welcome heartily, for this is how He created and predestined humankind in this world: “We have appointed a law and a practice for every one of you. Had God willed, He would have made you a single community, but He wanted to test you regarding what has come to you. So compete with each other in doing good. Every one of you will return to God and He will inform you regarding the things about which you differed.” (5: 48) In acknowledgement of these quotes, we can say the Qur’an displays the importance of accepting human beings as they are, regardless of their differences in values, and that Islam is a religion of mercy, kindness, tolerance and ease. By emphasizing on Qur’anic values of non-violence, religious tolerance and pluralism, religious experts can and have reverse(d) and rectify(ied) jihadis radical ideological indoctrination and brainwashing.Conclusion
To conclude, deradicalization programs that rely on theological dialogue and religious re-education are essential because they have more potential in bringing permanent change in the militant’s worldview, avoiding jihadist recidivism, and in facilitating deradicalization by allowing radical Muslims to renounce their extremism without renouncing their faith. This type of program has been somewhat successful although most experts agree that this success is difficult to quantify because it requires longer time to meaningfully measure the success of such effort, and because this ideological component of deradicalization is usually combined with a social component to rehabilitate extremists and facilitate their reintegration into mainstream society after they have completed the program. This involves not only cutting former ties to extremist groups and their network, but also ensuring ex-militants and their family can find alternative sources of income, housing, healthcare, and education so that they can establish a new life outside of the group.
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Perspectives on Women in Islam: Qur'anic Injunctions, Salafi-Wahhabi Behavior, and Islamic Feminists' Arguments
Abstract
Gender roles in Islam is a contentious topic that has lingered in the Islamic world, especially from the twentieth century. Islam has widely and historically been regarded as inherently misogynist and particularly oppressive towards women. Specific verses in the Qur’an can be seen as controversial in terms of women’s rights and their status in society, and they have frequently been used as grounds to justify restrictions imposed on women, such as on their mobility and economic empowerment. Various scholars and ideologues have nonetheless sought to re-evaluate this claim, advancing the Qur’an’s progressive and egalitarian character. Islamic feminists in particular, such as Leila Ahmed, have argued that Islam is “stubbornly egalitarian” and that the original message has been corrupted by a male-dominant interpretation that has controlled the Islamic narrative over the centuries. This debate surrounding women’s status in Islam has been increasingly salient with the rise of Islamist radicalism and jihadism globally. ISIS has, for example, despite its brutality, attracted many Western Muslim women who have sacrificed their home, family, and Western livelihood to join the Islamic Caliphate in Syria or Iraq. This has been shocking and incomprehensible to many people who do not understand why any female who enjoys democratic rights and equality before the law would want to join a group that actively promotes her own oppression. What are Salafi-Wahhabi groups’ behavior towards women? What role should women occupy according to Salafi-Wahhabi thought? What are the Qur’anic injunctions on gender relations, and how do they differ from the arguments put forward by Islamic feminist scholars and Salafi-Wahhabi groups like ISIS? This paper seeks to analyze and compare these three different perspectives, presenting an overview of what the actual situation is for women in Islam according to these views and how the latter two may contradict or be in harmony with the Qur’an.
Qur'anic Injunctions on Women in Islam
Male-Female Dichotomy
Islam has often been blamed for the prevailing conditions of women in the Muslim world. The Qur’an cites men as the protectors or providers of women, the righteousness of the latter defined in terms of obedience to males: “Men are in charge of (or: are the protectors) of women, because God has given preference to the one over the other, and because (men) provide support for women from their means. Therefore, righteous women are obedient…” (4:34). This verse has repeatedly been used and interpreted by male rulers and jurists to showcase a naturalness of the circumstance in which women, because of their innate qualities and characteristics, have clearly defined roles and cannot appropriate the functions of men, who thus have authority over women. It offers a justification for the role of the male as head of the household and the final decision-maker, but these gender differences do not deny Muslim women equal rights and responsibilities.
The Qur’an explains that men and women were both created from dust, from one soul, and that God “placed between them affection and mercy” (30: 20-21; 4:1). Eve was therefore not created from Adam, as it is portrayed in the Bible, but the two were created independently and emanated from the same source. Indeed, the two genders were created to complement each other and the combination of the two reflects God’s perfection in His feminine and masculine attributes. God’s jamal names (feminine names of beauty) and jalal names (masculine names of majesty) constitute kamal (divine perfection), and both manifest themselves in the human domain, for example through women and men. More importantly, the original sin does not originate from Eve in the Qur’an, unlike in the Bible; the fault is attributed to both Adam and Eve. Both genders are therefore put on an equal stance in the Qur’an. The male/female dichotomy in the Qur’an in regard to gender roles and relations are not indicative of inequality or characterized by hierarchy; on the contrary men and women were created differently to complement one another and are considered equal in the eyes of God. It is often confused, however, with inequality because many argue that males’ innate attributes or characteristics, such as strength and authority, require them to provide for women or take care of them, which must imply that they are superior in some way to women, who are viewed as forgiving, compassionate, and acquiescent. However, as previously explained, both masculine and feminine characteristics are considered important in the Qur’an as they reflect God’s binary attributes and His divine perfection in being both majestic and feared, but also merciful and caring.
Another issue that has led to the common misperception that the Qur’an is discriminative towards women or even misogynistic is the way the Qur’an was interpreted in the decades following the Islamic revelation, which translated into patriarchal norms and bias policy issues. These norms or policies discriminated women for their perceived inferiority relative to men, as it was understood by Muslim male rulers, and because of a male-dominated Qur’anic interpretation that excluded half of the Muslim population.
Although early Islamic societies at the time of the Prophet may seem to subjugate women, especially from a modern perspective, an examination of the Jahiliya lifestyle—prior to the Qur’anic revelation—in terms of polygamy, easy divorce and remarriage, loose family ties, and obsession with sexual pleasure, shows that the Prophet elevated women’s status by banning infanticide, providing women inheritance rights (which they did not possess before the rise of Islam), making marriage a sacred union where men are limited in the number of women they could marry, and secluding women to showcase their privilege, honor, and purity.
Women Inheritance Rights
The Qur’anic revelation provided clear progress for women in the pre-Islamic period. The Qur’an lays out specific legal protections for women in marriage, divorce, and inheritance, more so than in the other Abrahamic religions. With the rise of Islam, women gained inheritance rights, although they are only given one half of what men are offered because men act as the provider for his wife and their family. The Qur’an prescribes clear guidelines in 4:11 regarding inheritance rights and the division of property among your children: “For the male, what is equal to the share of two females. But if there are [only] daughters, two or more, for them is two thirds of one's estate. And if there is only one, for her is half. And for one's parents, to each one of them is a sixth of his estate if he left children… [These shares are] an obligation [imposed] by Allah.” While women are offered relatively less than men in terms of inheritance, they are still incorporated in the share of a family’s heritage, which is more than they received prior to the Islamic revelation.
Women's Marital Rights
As for marriage, there is no references as to the age of marriage in Islam in the Qur’an. Various contradictions exist in regard to this topic, notably discrepancies among different Hadiths and between the Sunnah and the Qur’an. The Qur’an does not state a specific legal age of marriage; however, it does provide guidance and mentions clearly two situations that should be considered before marriage: that one must be physically mature (i.e. sexually) and be of sound judgement (i.e. mentally mature) in order to get married. It is to be noted that these conditions are subjectively defined as they are meant to depend on and evolve with time and space. The Qur’an is indeed atemporal, designed for all of mankind in the past, present and future, so while it might be morally acceptable back then to marry as a child, now it is not, and the Qur’an allows flexibility with the interpretation of the age of marriage so that it supports values of different times. In 4:6, the Qur’an states: “And test the orphans [in their abilities] until they reach marriageable age. Then if you perceive in them sound judgement, release their property to them. And do not consume it excessively and quickly, [anticipating] that they will grow up.” Hence, according to the Qur’an, one can test the mental ability and maturity of a young man or woman—and whether they are of a marriageable age, if he/she is capable of managing her own affairs well. This verse also warns those entrusted with wealth not to consume or waste it before they grow up, and grown up is referred to in Arabic as “shudud,” which means physical maturity, the period from adolescence to adulthood. This means a marriageable age begins at post-puberty, from adolescence onwards. References to post-puberty or the need to be physically matured before marrying is further referred to in 4:6, 24: 31, and 24: 58-59.
There are other guidelines provided in the Qur’an to consider before marriage such as determining mutual attraction and compatibility, (2:221, 30:21, 33:52), ascertaining whether the potential partner is of similar beliefs/faiths (2:221, 60:10), discussion of and agreeing to the level of dower and other terms if any (4:4, 4:24), understanding and mutual acceptance of marriage as a solemn covenant or strong oath (4:21, 2:232, 2:237, 24:33), and if male, capable of providing for the household (2:228, 2:233, 4:34, 65:6). Thus, according to the Qur'an, marriage is a solemn covenant of mutual trust and faithfulness for each other that arises when two individuals are ready to move on to a new phase of adulthood in their life.
Child marriage has been a very contentious issue in the debate surrounding women’s rights in Islam. It has been practiced in the Islamic world, principally justified through different Hadith reports, specifically the one narrating the Prophet’s marriage to Aisha when she was six years old, and the consumption of this marriage when she was nine. This has offered legal justifications for certain states to accept and tolerate this practice. Nonetheless, while providing volumes of historical information about the Prophet, these hadith narrations were written 200-300 years after the Prophet’s death and thus are not free from faulty and self-contradictory materials that were gathered and orally transmitted from flawed human beings going back to the companions of the Prophet himself. In fact, the information about Aisha’s age when she got married to the Prophet is widely quoted and found in many books but only comes from a single person: Hisham bin Urwah. This information was reported through Iraqis, which has been quoted as unreliable by Yaqub ibn Shaibah[1]. Furthermore, the Qur’an clearly stipulates that all marriages of the Prophet were lawful: “O Prophet, indeed We have made lawful to you your wives” (33:50). The Qur’an also declares Muhammad to be a man of highest moral standards (68:4; 33:21) and the best exemplar for humanity, instructing Muslim believers to follow Muhammad’s teachings and accept him as a final authority in all of their affairs. If the Prophet was so righteous and if all his marriages were lawful, and considering Qur’anic guidelines on marriage, this would imply that Aisha could not have been six or nine when she married Muhammad, but could have been at least 16-19 of age at the time of her marriage. The Qur’anic guidelines in regard to physical and sexually maturity (4:6) tell us that Muhammad could not have married a young girl of age six or nine.
As for polygamy, a practice that was fairly common before the Qur’anic revelation, was restricted to two conditions in the Qur’an: “And if you fear that you will not deal justly with the orphan girls, then marry those that please you of [other] women, two or three or four. But if you fear that you will not be just, then [marry only] one or those your right hand possesses. That is more suitable that you may not incline [to injustice]” (4:3). First, this verse states that men can take a second, third or fourth wife if he is afraid that orphan girls will not be provided for, and thus under this condition, can marry them to provide for them. Second, a man can only marry another woman if he treats his wives equally and justly. Only under these conditions is polygamy accepted according to the Qur’an. Marriage is considered a significant sacred alliance and solemn covenant that unites a man and a woman as companions for life. Because of its importance in the eyes of God, divorce is strongly discouraged in the Qur’an. However, when it is necessary, the Qur’an not only guarantees women a right for divorce without requiring the husband’s consent (khul divorce), but also protects women and assures equal rights with men (compensation if husband initiate divorce and right to child custody).Seclusion and Veiling
In terms of seclusion and veiling, the Qur’an promotes modesty for both men and women: “Say to the believing men that they should cast down their glances and guard their private parts. That is purer for them… And tell the believing women to cast down their glances and guard their private parts and not display their adornment except that which [necessarily] appears thereof and to wrap [a portion of] their headcovers over their chests and not expose their adornment except to their husbands, their fathers…” (24:30-31) Seclusion was also adopted as a practice in the Islamic world from the Byzantine and Persian empires, and was perceived as a sign of privilege, reserved to elite women who were not required to work in the fields along their male counterparts. However, what began as an attempt to protect women—as a sign of prestige, respect, and wealth, or as a “partition” from men to make clear that veiled women were not available, actually led to a real lack of freedom for many women who became excluded from the world of males and from life outside their homes. Even the mosque, guaranteed to them by the Prophet as a place of worship, became inaccessible to some.
As such, the Qur’anic revelation provided a clear progress for women in pre-Islamic societies. Historic circumstances have unfortunately worked in the disfavor of Muslim women, particularly due to a male-dominated interpretation of the Qur’an that excluded women from this process. Pre-existing patriarchal norms were also reinforced over the years, coinciding with the rise of Islam, and therefore these norms were mistakenly seen as emanating from the Qur’an. These predominant traditions of male authority made it difficult for women to avail themselves of the rights guaranteed in the Qur’an, and they faced particular hardships in divorce, employment, and political activity. Gender relations and inequality in the Islamic world hence did not originate from the Qur’an but was a product of history, culture, geography, and politics. I will now examine how Islamic feminist scholars and how ISIS have interpreted Qur’anic injunctions on women in Islam, analyzing how different these two perspectives are from each other and how consistent they are with Qur’anic injunctions.Islamic Feminists' Views on Women's Rights in Islam
Scholarly Perspective
Islamic feminists argue that the Qur’an is fundamentally egalitarian and provides agency for women. They believe that the original message was corrupted by male Islamist jurists and Qur’anic scholars who have controlled the Islamic narrative, excluding women from this process. Because of this, Islamic feminists have often held that Islam needs re-interpretation to include women’s interpretation of the Qur’an, which they argue would reduce some of the underlying biases that have resulted from this unfair or unbalanced analysis. Several prominent scholars emerge from this debate, including Asma Barlas, Fatima Mernissi, Leila Ahmed, and Amina Wadud. This paper will look particularly at the arguments of Asma Barlas, Leila Ahmed, and Albert Hourani.
Asma Barlas highlights that the dominant male-voice in the discussion and interpretation of the Qur’an, and subsequent exclusion of women, was a major factor in the patriarchal interpretations of Islamic religious texts and the corruption of the original message. She blames in particular the early companions of the Prophet for excluding women from the interpretation process and for formulating Islamic tradition and society based on patriarchal and misogynistic values. Her critique focuses on Hadith traditions as she perceives the Qur’an to be in line with gender egalitarianism. She specifically denounces male biases and interpretations of the Prophet’s life and actions as restricting women, and views Islam as portraying women equal to men, arguing that the Prophet did not treat women inferiorly. In fact, the Prophet’s wives and many women after the Qur’anic revelation had a prominent role in the transmission of the Prophet’s sayings and the spread of Islam, notably Khadija, Aisha, Fatima, Mariam, among many others.
Leila Ahmed assumes that Islam is stubbornly egalitarian. She states that “Islam’s ethical vision […] is thus in tension with, and might even be said to subvert, the hierarchical structure of marriage pragmatically instituted in the first Islamic society,” suggesting that Islamic scholars and/or ruling men curtailed women pre-Islamic autonomy and participation to serve their own political purposes, establishing institutions of patriarchal marriage as solely legitimate. Primarily, she holds responsible “the political, religious, and legal authorities in the Abbasid period,” for hearing only and instituting the androcentric voice of Islam, which “has defined Islam ever since.” She also accuses negative foreign influences of the Byzantine and Persian Empires, as well as the Prophet Muhammad’s own practices of secluding and veiling his wives for subverting Islam’s egalitarianism. Identifying these different “corrupting” influences of Islam and the Qur’an, Ahmed’s argument is perhaps too thoroughgoing as it confuses different social dynamics that had unintended consequences, notably in relation to veiling and women’s seclusion from the rest of the society. As explained above, veiling and women’s seclusion was a sign of privilege and of belonging to the upper-class in various societies, like in the Persian, Byzantine, and Chinese empires. As the Islamic polity grew in strength during the Islamic conquests, the Prophet and its successive leaders imitated the practices of privileged families to assert Islam’s power. However, veiling was never intended to be a patriarchal custom, it only became one gradually in later decades, as Islamic rulers and scholars installed the veil to control women’s sexuality. Moreover, Ahmed overlooks pre-existing patriarchal institutions of Arab tribal societies during the Jahiliya period and paints a too optimistic reality of Jahiliya societies, which Albert Hourani recovers from in his argument. Ahmed’s argument can also be problematic because the Qur’an declares the Prophet Muhammad to be a man of highest moral standards (68:4; 33:21) and the best exemplar for humanity. In many verses, the Qur’an enjoins Muslim believers to follow Muhammad’s teachings and accept him as a final authority in all their affairs, which is therefore in direct contradiction to her statement about the Prophet’s corruption of the original message of Islam.
Albert Hourani looks at women’s deprivation of inheritance, their tight monitorization through marriage alliances, and limited spatial mobility during the Jahiliya period. He argues that Islamic rules were “incidental to the process of patriarchy,” which he believes has resulted “from the incomplete and degeneration of the tribal society and of the structure of defense it erected to maintain integrity.” He therefore infers that Islamic rulers did not bring up patriarchy, but that patriarchy was already present in Arabian societies before the Qur’anic revelation and it was only reproduced and reinforced throughout the centuries.
Hence these three scholars all perceive the Qur’an and Islam as fundamentally egalitarian and most generally agree that patriarchy in Islamic societies resulted from various political, geographical, and/or cultural factors, which reinforced patriarchal norms and misogynistic values over the centuries.</div
Women's Islamic Movement
Muslim women taking part in the Islamic feminist movement actively sought to rectify the oppression they were facing by resorting to Islamic principles and using Islamic sources to show that gender egalitarianism is a discourse valid within Islam. Women’s oppression was seen as originating from the absence of proper Islamic principles, which pushed Muslim women to call for an Islamicization of their societies and a recommitment to Islam in order to regain their rights guaranteed under Sharia law[1]. This mission was not merely a call for women to stay at home, but a call to enhance and reconceptualize women’s role in the family as mothers and wives that was different but as equally important as men’s duties, as they prepare the next generations for a leading and productive role in society.
These women also argued for a re-interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence and a new form of ijtihad that include women, using Islamic religious texts to justify their arguments and showcase their capability to provide social and political leadership. In order to assert their presence in previously male-defined sphere, they negotiated their entrance into these arenas by relying on specific Qur’anic verses and Hadith reports that historically secured their subordination to male authority. According to them, women’s subordination to feminine virtues such as shyness, modesty, and humility was a necessary condition for their enhanced public role in religious political life. Concretely, these women aimed to revive Islamic values in social life by establishing for example neighbourhood mosques, institutions of Islamic learning or da’wa training centres, and Islamic charities dedicated to social welfare for the poor and religious activities. Essentially, they sought to educate ordinary Muslims in Islamic religious virtues, moral uprightness, and pietistic conduct, as well as in the proper performance of religious duties and acts of worship.
Several prominent Islamist women activists are reputed for their role in leading this women’s liberation movement, notably Zaynab al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali played a leading role in developing and spreading Islamism in Egypt in the 20th century. Her modernist religious activism emphasized on women’s visibility within the boundaries of Islam, calling for women’s active role in public, intellectual, and political life in accordance with Islamic standards of reserve, restraint, and modesty that were required from pious Muslim women. Her speeches and writings often invoked that Muslim men and women were equally called upon to serve God and emphasized equity and compatibility between men and women. She also held weekly religious sermons and organized religious lessons, which she claimed had a following of three million women.
Even today, many Muslim women have used their Islamic expertise to enter politics and negotiate with male leaders in the midst of conflict. Their religious knowledge and piety were key factors for them to gain esteem and respect, and they were able to use their religiosity to effectively settle differences and bring peace. A notable success was the role of Afghan women when they negotiated directly with Taliban leaders, addressing violence and bringing attention to social and humanitarian concerns. For example, at the 2004 constitutional convention, women successfully reached across ethnic lines to push for a written commitment to equal rights for all Afghan citizens. They also worked in schools and community organizations to counter extremist narratives for the peaceful upbringing of their children and life within their community.
Thus, Islam has repeatedly been used as a ground to justify women’s liberation or equality to men. Scholarly but also practically, Islamic feminists have defended women’s rights on the basis of Qur’anic injunctions and Islamic law, which they perceive as granting them specific rights to assert their presence in public, intellectual, and political life. While some scholars may have been too thoroughgoing in their arguments, especially when they criticize the Prophet Muhammad, most arguments put forward by Islamic feminists are in harmony with the Qur’an, particularly in relation to women’s different but equal role to men in society.ISIS' Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam and their Treatment in IS Held Territories
ISIS’ interpretation of women’s rights and their treatment in society according to Islamic principles is in stark opposition to Islamic feminists’ interpretation of the Qur’an. This paper will show that ISIS’ interpretation is less accurate because it is less in harmony with the Qur’an and the group has manipulated certain verses to fit its political purposes.</span
Propaganda Targeting Arab Muslim Women and Portrayal of Women’s Roles
I will closely analyze ISIS’ manifesto published by the all-female police ‘Al Khanssaa Brigade’ to recruit Arab Muslim women to join the Islamic Caliphate. This manifesto is not aimed at a Western audience but is clearly designed to draw women from the region, particularly those in the Gulf. We can also deduce from the numerous references to Saudi Arabia in the manifesto, that the target audience can be narrowed down to women in the Kingdom and that ISIS’ interpretation of Islamic sources is the closest to Saudi Wahhabi Islam and can be associated with the Salafi-Wahhabi trend of Islamic political thought.
I have chosen to focus my analysis on this manifesto to analyze ISIS’ Salafi-Wahhabi ideology towards women because these guidelines present something that is more akin to the realities of living as a female jihadist in IS-held territories, in comparison to ISIS propaganda targeting Western women. From it, we generally learn that while there are indeed women operating to battle, police, and fight under certain circumstances, this is actually very low on the list of responsibilities given to women. The manifesto specifically emphasizes the importance of motherhood and family support, stating the role of women is “divinely” limited, and overall it has a very misogynist interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith.
The manifesto reflects ISIS’s archaic, literalist interpretation of Sunni Islam, imposing a strict attire on all women, which resembles the Saudi niqab (all-black dress covering every inch of their bodies, including gloves to cover their hands and fingers). The manifesto encourages women to remain hidden and veiled, confined within a single space that they cannot leave unless under exceptional circumstances—to wage jihad when there are no men available or to study religion. Women are also allowed to exit their houses if they wish to go to Shariah courts and are legally entitled to openly talk about their issues for consultation on marriage, divorce, and inheritance, without the need for bargaining or bribery.
A sedentary lifestyle is declared to be women’s divinely appointed right, revolving around motherhood and maintenance of the household, while men provide for women and wage jihad to build the Caliphate. The guide also urges Arab Muslim women to emulate the women first called to Islam, like Khadija, Aisha, or Fatima. This is a contradiction to the previous statement about women’s sedentariness because the wives of the Prophet, his daughters, and others had a prominent role in supporting the Prophet to spread the Islamic message and in the transmission of Islamic knowledge after his death. The manifesto completely discounts this key role and even neglects it. Furthermore, as previously discussed, this sedentariness and need to remain hidden or veiled from the rest of society was not initially a restriction imposed on women, but rather established as a sign of privilege, wealth, and power. In 33: 32-33, the Qur’an states: “O wives of the Prophet, you are not like anyone among women. If you fear Allah, then do not be soft in speech to men, … but speak with appropriate speech” and “abide in your houses and do not display yourselves as was the display of former times of ignorance.” This shows that the wives of the Prophet, despite being veiled and hidden, had enormous power and influence both within the household, in supporting the Prophet, and in guiding believers with their speech.
Furthermore, the guide clearly stipulates that men and women are not equal under Islam, saying “upon examination of the state of the human condition, it is clear that God provided for man’s needs.” It further declares that “woman was created to populate the Earth just as man was. But as God wanted it to be, she was made from Adam and for Adam.” We know after discussing Qur’anic injunctions on women in Islam that this statement is false because Adam and Eve were created from the same soul and that God created them as mates, placing between them “affection and mercy” so that they may find tranquillity among each other (30: 21). The manifesto nonetheless uses this same verse to illustrate that there is no greater responsibility for women that to be a wife to her husband, which is an inaccurate interpretation of this verse because the emphasis is on the complementarity of the genders who become soulmates, and not on women’s submissiveness to and housework for men. Furthermore, the manifesto explains that men, notably in Western societies, have felt emasculated due to women supporting or helping to support their husbands and family. In 4:34, the Qur’an says: “men are in charge of women by right of what Allah has given over the other and what they spend for maintenance from their wealth.” This verse has been used to assert that having a job is only a task reserved for men, arguing that men have been “given the body and brain to tend to his wives, daughters, and sisters. ISIS further justifies women’s limited ability to work with “monthly complications”, “pregnancies”, and “nature of her life and responsibilities to her husband, sons, and religion.” However, if she is forced to work outside of the house, ISIS stipulates that women must be rewarded for this service, through assistance with household chores and childrearing as well as limited working hours so that she can tend to her family.
In regard to education, in order for woman to fulfil her role to bring up, educate, protect and care for the next generation to come, ISIS highlights that she cannot be illiterate or ignorant and that Islam does not ordain the forbidding of education or blocking of culture from women. Learning shariah sciences and fiqh is indeed ordained for women in ISIS. Ideally, girls begin studying from 7 and end at 15, sometimes a little earlier. They must be taught mental arithmetic and skills according to their age as well as their mental and physical development. Curricula focus on fiqh and religion, especially related to women and rulings on marriage and divorce, as well as important household skills, such as knitting, cooking, and other manual skills. Schools are naturally gender segregated, and girls are required to stop studying when they marry. Their role as mothers or wives can begin as early as nine years old, but the manifesto states that “most pure girls will be married by 16 or 17, when they are still young and active,” while men will not be more than 20.
ISIS’ manifesto imposes many restrictions on women and clearly portrays women as second-class citizens. Overall, this ultra-conservative religious narrative glorifies women’s roles as mothers and wives, depicted as a religious duty, and denigrates women who seek anything else than to dedicate herself to giving birth and rearing her children, which can happen as early as nine years old.
Conclusion
This paper has allowed us to examine the actual situation of women in Islam and the rights granted to women according to the Qur’an. From the analysis, we can deduce that the Qur’an indeed provides an egalitarian discourse on gender relations and justifies the male/female dichotomy on the basis of the complementarity of the genders, which reflects God’s divine perfection in His binary attributes (feminine and masculine names). Islamic feminists undoubtedly offer the closest interpretation to this religious text, using Qur’anic verses to defend their liberation and rights as Muslim women. On the contrary, ISIS portrays women as second-class citizens, manipulating Qur’anic injunctions to justify women’s subordination to men and their brutal misogynist ideology.
Endnotes
Fauq, Abdul H. “Did Aisha Marry Muhammad, The Prophet of Islam, at the Age of 6” Quranic Teachings, http://web.archive.org/web/20100224061139/http://www.quranicteachings.co.uk/ayeshas-age.htm
Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'an (Univ. of Texas Press, 2002).
Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of Modern Debate, pp. 41-168
Albert Hourani, “A New Power in an Old World,” A History of Arab Peoples, pp. 7-21
Karam, Azza M., Women, Islamists and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt, MacMillian Press LTD, 1998
Mahmood, Saba, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005
Sabaah Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.
Krause, Wanda, Civil Society and Women Actvists in the Middle East: Islamic and Secular Organizations in Egypt. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012
Council on Foreign Relations (2019), “Afghanistan, Women’s role: In Brief,” https://www.cfr.org/interactive/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/afghanistan
Winter, Charlie, “Women of the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade”, Quilliam Foundation, February 2015, https://therinjfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/women-of-the-islamic-state3.pdf
Patel, Sofia. (2017, February). The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetrating and preventing violent extremism,Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved from: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women- exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism
Winter, Charlie, “Women of the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade.”
Academic articles published by young scholars on the Middle East and North Africa Region.
